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The Challenge of Natural Language




Abstract. In this paper, discussing the famous Turing’s test and the
Chinese Room Argument, I delve into the question of what language
understanding means for humans, and what it can mean for a machine.
Using the "solved" problem of Word Sense Disambiguation (WSD) and
IBM Watson as examples, I question the level of actual language under-
standing achieved with the current state-of-the-art approaches. Consid-
ering the principle with which humans successfully deal with ambiguity
and understand each other, I propose a model which learns language
gradually and handles open domain by asking for clarification.
Keywords: Natural Language Understanding · Symbol Manipulation ·
Language Ambiguity Handling
1 Introduction
Language is a complex social institution, with human communication and inter-
action as its primary function [Par91]. Language understanding is an internal,
mental and psychological process where a person attaches a meaning to a word.
It is impossible to define all the aspects this encompasses in the mind of each
individual person. We cannot know how exactly another human being under-
stands or processes something. I use the term processes because I want to point
out that despite the immense diﬀerence in the way humans and machines pro-
cess language, the same term can be used for both concepts. Actually, Natural
Language Understanding is an inherently human thing and as such, quite "un-
natural" to machines.
For people, language understanding requires, among other things: under-
standing sounds of words, talking, reading, writing, remembering, replying, but
also reacting emotionally and having an internal thought process about the con-
tent of language. The memories and feelings that arise in a person from language
understanding are individual and too metaphysical to be discussed in this pa-
per. But it is hard to determine the boundaries or a definition of what is Human
Language Understanding, without the human part.
Some aspects of human language understanding, are rather easily mimed.
Reading and writing are default skills for computer programs, while a human
child needs time and practice. Transferring text to speech and vice versa is done
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with very high accuracy for English language, and soon we can expect the same
for other languages as well. Many algorithms model diﬀerent aspects of language
syntax and semantics. Human memory can be understood as data with which
an algorithm ’knows’ and decides upon, and if an algorithm can logically decide
upon which gaps in its knowledge to fill next, this can be seen as learning.
The question is - can machines overcome the various programming and sen-
sory insuﬃciencies to leap across the diﬀerence between symbol manipulation
and understanding their meaning?
2 How Do We Know Someone Understands?
For other human beings, we assume the ability and capacity to understand.
However, if we say something to a person, let’s say in a foreign country, and
they ignore us, we would just assume they did not understand. Information is
defined as meaningful data. So technically, we present other humans with what
we think is meaningful data, and if they do not react as the meaning requires,
we assume they do not understand.
While we are talking to someone, we do not question whether they understand
or not, as long as they respond to what we say. The communication works because
both sides have a constant awareness that there might be misunderstanding
between them. The ability to distinguish these cases and solve misunderstanding
is what makes people the masters of understanding. So, because people react, in
a human way which we expect from them, we accept they understand language.
This is not quite applicable for machines, because of the essential diﬀerences
among human and computer hardware and software. However, we can expect
a machine to act as close as possible to a human, in the medium which we
share equally with machines - written text. This is exactly what Alan Turing
has proposed.
3 Turing’s Test
"Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of
thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we
agree that machine equals brain - that is, not only write it but know that it had
written it." [Tur50]
For a machine to be considered thinking, many expect that it needs to achieve
a human level of consciousness and emotions. Turing disregarded this question,
even though he had admitted a paradox connected with any attempt of localizing
consciousness. The mystery of consciousness and thought does not necessarily
have to be solved, in order to create a machine which could pass as a human, he
argues.
Because of the "polite convention that everyone thinks" [Tur50] we credit
other humans with understanding capacity from the start. This is why Turing
proposed a scenario, the Imitation Game, where a human interrogator is commu-
nicating with two people via text. One of them is a machine, and the interrogator
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needs to determine which one. A machine which has the capacity to fool a human
that it is a human as well, passes the Turing’s test for consciousness.
The setting of the imitation game makes a diﬀerence between a person’s phys-
ical and intellectual capacities. Making the communication through teleprompter,
Turing made sure the physical aspects of language understanding, such as voice,
mimics, and gestures, would not be taken into account. Accepting the machine’s
physical disadvantage, Turing aimed to design the test so the machine still has
a fair chance. A machine that processes text in a way that humans think it
understands, can be considered intelligent.
This test is still the most popular test for AI sentience, and Turing has
proposed it in 1950. as a replacement for the question: Can machines think? In
essence, Turing turned the problem of thought and intelligence into language
understanding. However, by disregarding the diﬀerences between a human and
a machine he also dodged the question of deeper, inner understanding, in the
sense of attaching meaning. Turing is not concerned with the meaning within,
just the output.
4 Chinese Room Argument
For many, Turing’s test seems insuﬃcient to prove a machine is thinking and
understanding. Inputting text and outputting a response reasonable enough to
convince a person that they are talking to a human does not seem enough to
call the machine intelligent.
Supporting the sceptics, Searle gave a famous proof that Turing’s test is
not enough for us to accredit the program with actual language understanding
[Sea80]. The proof he provided is well known as the Chinese Room Argument.
He compared the program which is taking the Turing’s test to himself taking the
test for Chinese, being in a closed room with Chinese symbols and a rule-book.
He provides the correct output for the input he gets, but he does not know the
meaning of any of those symbols, as he in fact does not know Chinese. Still, he is
passing the Turing’s test for Chinese because the output is fooling the Chinese
interrogator.
This means that Turing’s test is inadequate, or at least insuﬃcient. However,
Searle is forgetting something as well. Imagining himself in this situation, Searle
thinks in English, and this has nothing to do with the fact that he does not speak
Chinese, or that he would pass the Chinese Turing’s test using the rule-book.
The Chinese Turing’s test is not testing his English understanding skills. The
program could, potentially, also have its language which is not Chinese, but its
own. The interrogator cannot know if the person inside is thinking in English,
so disproving the validity of Turing’s test in this case does not mean that the
machine doesn’t think.
It is important to note that, if Searle was in the room, he would have thought
in English because he already knew English, and he would have known it because
he had been taught for several years at least. In the case of an actual program,
we could dismiss the argument about Searle thinking in English in the room.
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Because, simply put, at what point in time could a program have learned a
language - if it was written entirely by the programmers? The fact that a program
can only do what it’s programmers design and implement, made some question
whether Turing’s test is testing the machine at all. Since the person in the
Chinese room depends on the rule-book, the same way that a program depends
on the programmer, a Turing test is actually testing the rule writers and their
understanding of the language [Mot89]. This is true in a way. But the way
that NLU models are being made is changing rapidly. Programs are becoming
a product of bigger and bigger groups of programmers, even companies, using
huge amounts of data. Imagine if, after a year, a new person came to the room
to replace the previous one. The new person would not be as good as the one
experienced with passing Chinese symbols. In the beginning, the symbols were
just "squiggles" but in time patterns emerged. With experience, the person is
starting to reason over the symbols, in their own way, maybe in English. But
maybe they have developed some internal system for recognizing the symbols.
This is exactly what is happening with Machine Learning approaches. Thanks
to Moore’s law and abundance of data, we can present the person in the room
with so many Chinese characters, they start to learn things. They don’t learn
Chinese, in the general sense, but they learn in their own way how to reply
to the symbols they are given. For some tasks, like playing Go, a group of
people who do not know how to play Go can make a model which plays better
than any human, and learns this in 3 days starting from zero [Sil17]. Searle’s
argument and Motzkin’s reply were written before machine learning approaches
showed us the possibilities of huge data and statistics. These allow a model
to go far beyond the capabilities of one person. So far, these solutions showed
a lot of potential in many NLP tasks, but general language understanding is
still unfeasible. Nevertheless, programs and models are now equipped with some
reasoning within them not entirely made by their programmers, which can be
understood as thinking "on their own".
Searle claims that the way that human brains actually produce mental phe-
nomena cannot be reproduced solely by virtue of running a computer program
[Sea80]. For me, this seems pretty clear. A machine is not a human, and a com-
puter cannot work like a human brain. This does not mean that a computer pro-
gram cannot have its own way of thinking and learning. If a program processes
new information, decides upon it and learns, is it not thinking, in a computer
way? It is unnecessarily anthropomorphic to expect a program to behave as a
human all the time. Especially when we don’t completely understand humans
either. I think it is important to distinguish thinking from understanding a lan-
guage. Understanding a language requires a program to use human language,





For humans, a quiz can be considered the perfect scenario to test language
understanding. Answering complicated questions, solving riddles, puzzles, and
associations are all good ways to test someone’s knowledge and intelligence. As
such, the open domain Question Answering (QA) presents a great challenge for
programmers as well.
This is why a team of IBM programmers decided to test their skills and
build Watson, a machine competitor for the American TV Quiz Jeopardy. This
quiz is particularly demanding because of high precision, accurate confidence
determination, complex language, breadth of domain, and speed [FECC+10]. Of
course, this was no easy task. It took approximately 3 years for a team com-
posed of 20 researchers and software engineers with a range of backgrounds in
natural language processing, information retrieval, machine learning, computa-
tional linguistics, and knowledge representation and reasoning, to bring Watson’s
performance near human level [FECC+10].
The system they have built is called DeepQA, and is described as a mas-
sively parallel probabilistic evidence-based architecture. It employs more than
100 diﬀerent techniques for analyzing natural language, identifying sources, find-
ing and generating hypotheses, finding and scoring evidence, and merging and
ranking hypotheses. More important than any particular technique is the way
that DeepQA combines these overlapping approaches so all contribute to im-
provements in accuracy, confidence, or speed [FECC+10].
In order to compete against a human champion, the system needed to pro-
duce exact answers to complex natural language questions with high precision
and speed and have a reliable confidence in its answers, in 3 seconds or less.
The requirements which this implied presented a tremendous challenge for Wat-
son’s developers. Ultimately, they have succeeded, managing to tackle both the
breadth of open domain and unusual word phrasing, not uncommon in Jeopardy.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that, even though Watson works on a
wide range of topics, the questions are still rather constrained. No matter how
quickly and accurately the program answers questions, it still cannot handle any
unexpected input. Be that as it may, Watson is truly an amazing example of how
far models can go with NLU and question answering. And also, a great example
of how hard it is to grasp the notion of understanding language. Because even
if a system processes questions accurately, and extracts the relevant data based
on the question, and does this better than a human - we still do not attribute
it the power of understanding. At a lecture at Stanford University in 2012, one
of the leaders of the Watson team made the following remark as he ended his
talk: “The only advantage the human contestant had over Watson was that he
understood the questions” [Val07].
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5.2 SenseEval
A word or a sentence is defined as ambiguous if multiple alternative linguistic
interpretations can be built for it [AE07], and word sense disambiguation is the
task of determining which is the correct meaning. For the task of Word Sense
Disambiguation, humans need to annotate texts to represent their semantics by
labeling each content word (noun, verb, adjective, and adverb) with its Word-
Net sense. This eﬀort is time-consuming and energy intensive, but it seems too
complicated for automation.
However, in 2004. the Senseval-3 task was to perform this tagging automat-
ically, with the hand-tagging being used as the gold standard for evaluation. In
the task, no context was provided, but it was expected that participants will
make use of additional WordNet information (synset, the WordNet hierarchy,
and other WordNet relations) in their disambiguation.
Anyone who has annotated at least one text, knows that this is an undeni-
ably complicated task. And yet, all top 10 systems beat the score of the inter-
annotator agreement by more than 5 points [AE07]. The human inter-annotator
agreement score was in fact quite low, only 67%, probably because the annota-
tors were not experts in the field. This shows how far these kind of tests and
expectations are from the actual concept of understanding language. With tests
like this, we make the humans solve computer tasks and then teach the computer
how to copy as well as it can, while even humans agree on the correct output
for only two-thirds of the task.
For some tasks, this approach can be good enough, because it is possible that
this is just what we need - a numerical value with some percentage of certainty.
This calculated value, however, has one big drawback. It is an outcome of long
and complex computations we know very little about and, in case of neural
networks, usually do not truly understand.
A model built like this would fail the Turing test, no matter how high the
accuracy. Systems for word disambiguation based on supervised machine learning
algorithms and hand-annotated data are reaching human performance, but they
have still not shown a decisive diﬀerence in any application, and just as often
they can hurt the performance [AE07].
The fact that stat-of-the-art models are doing better than humans in partic-
ular tasks, and we are yet miles away from general NLU, shows we have a lot to
learn. Like Turing, I think that the best way to teach a machine human language,
is to try to mimic the way humans understand each other. Most importantly, we
should find a way to replicate the way humans deal with misunderstanding.
6 How Do Humans Deal with Ambiguity?
Human language can be characterized as a systematic relationship between form
and meaning [Val07]. This relationship is rarely straightforward, because word
meaning is infinitely variable and context sensitive. The fact that 121 most
frequent words occupy 7.8 meanings on average shows that a lot of the time
we are guessing what the other person is saying [AE07].
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Unlike machines, accepting the ambiguity of language comes naturally to
humans. This is because the human brain is a very powerful machine to instantly
process language, and it makes sense because the human brain invented language
in the first place. On the other hand, the brain invented programming languages
as well, but they depend on the premise of a finite and discrete world with a
limited set of rules. While solving a problem such as Word Sense Disambiguation,
we assume a finite and discrete set of senses [AE07], in order to present the
problem in a solvable manner. However, it is very diﬃcult to enforce this kind
of premise onto human language because of its intricate complexity. The key
diﬀerence between natural and artificial languages is the fact that an artificial
language can be fully circumscribed and studied in its entirety, and a natural
language cannot [Gun92]. However, we can try to copy the way humans handle
this complexity.
Word sense ambiguity is a trace of the fundamental process underlying lan-
guage understanding. Domain constraints sense [AE07] and in an open domain
we have an unlimited set of fuzzy meanings. When communicating, humans han-
dle the open domain with ease. This is because, when processing what they have
heard or read, people assume the most likely interpretation, given the choice of
expression and a-priori likelihood of message [Par91]. This is known as the Prin-
ciple of strategic communication, and it allows us avoid painstaking accuracy
and precision in everyday communication.
In a way, the Principle of strategic communication is similar to lazy acqui-
sition and just-in-time compiling. Lazy acquisition defers resource acquisition
to the latest possible point in time during system execution, in order to opti-
mize resource image [Kir01]. We say that a compiler works just-in-time, when it
doesn’t load libraries until they are actually used, to not overflow the working
memory with unnecessary knowledge.
The are many benefits of lazy acquisition and just-in-time compilation: eﬃ-
cient resource usage with no redundancies makes the system scalable and more
robust to resource exhaustion [Kir01]. Of course, these approaches have down
sides too. Avoiding steps to save on time, can also lead to losing time due to bad
planning and unexpected issues that can arise from omitting some knowledge we
thought was not needed. Relying on handling input on the go means we need a
complex system which handles unpredictability.
Why do people talk approximately? Approximate language use allows a sim-
plified cognitive representation and a simplified inference process. For these rea-
sons, humans accept the ambiguousness that comes along with using imprecise
language. In Figure 1, we can see the reflection of this preference of imprecise-
ness. Looking at the frequency of word usage for number words ten to twenty,
we can recognize that round numbers are preferred to odd. The most commonly
used are ten, twenty, twelve and fifteen. This is because people select a scale
of coarseness strategically for communication. If a person does not need precise
measurements, insisting on accuracy becomes counter-productive for communi-
cation. Explanations are used only when misunderstanding already exists, not
before. This ability to set the coarseness appropriately to the context, but also
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Fig. 1. Frequency of word use for number words ten to twenty, Google N-gram
to the level of understanding of others who are supposed to understand is the
key to successful communication.
If the goal is to make a system which converses in a human-like way, I think it
is important to remember that when it comes to knowledge, there are cases when
less is more. Humans always balance between precision required to understand
each other on the one hand, and generalization needed for eﬃcient communi-
cation on the other. Trying to fill the gaps of our models with more and more
data, is not beneficial for creating a human-like model.
7 A Diﬀerent Approach
Machine learning, both supervised and unsupervised, shows promising success
in solving many NLU tasks such as SensEval [AE07]. The scores are boosted by
more data, more features tagged, and tuning hyper-parameters. However, the
focus is on the evaluation part of the task and how the solution will perform,
and not actually creating a system which understands language.
Since the goal of NLU is understanding, correctly determining the meanings
of the words is fundamental. In his paper controversially titled I don’t believe in
word senses Kilgarriﬀ focuses on WSD, saying that lexical ambiguity is perhaps
the most important problem an NLU system is facing [Kil02]. If we choose to
create a system which can understand semantic content, we need to solve the
problem of misunderstanding arising from language ambiguity. In order to do so,
we need to re-think the way we approach WSD and implement a more human-
inspired algorithm.
If we look at the way humans understand each other, we see that humans
are not “above” ambiguity, but they have eﬃcient methods of resolving it. When
somebody says something that we are unsure of, we check by comparing our
understanding to the “truth”. This is why it seems to me that creating a dialog
system for handling ambiguity by asking for confirmation would be a good way
for solving this issue, better than trying to find the best statistical estimate.
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In this case, we need to focus on the uncertainty which triggers the question
asking mechanism. This mechanism depends on the person who is talking to the
machine to clarify any existing misunderstandings. This way, the machine learns
language in a more organic way, solidifying previous knowledge and making
sure it can still make sense, before it continues learning new things. Graduate
acquisition of knowledge might be crucial to having an inner understanding
of something so complex as natural language. This is similar to what Turing
proposes: "Instead of trying to produce a program to simulate the adult mind,
why not rather try to produce one which simulates the child’s? If this were
then subjected to an appropriate course of education one would obtain the adult
brain." [Tur50]
This idea is almost 70 years old, and yet, it has not been implemented.
Perhaps because, like most concisely phrased ideas, it is in fact extremely com-
plicated. However, it is my opinion that this approach makes the most sense as
a beginning of a true General NLU system. The wonders of technology we have
now, such as Neural Networks, should not be omitted from the model. But they
cannot provide the core decision making, because of their lack of transparency.
A model which is to pass any test for true NLU will have to be able to support
its words with reasoning, which a Neural Network system cannot do.
In order to be able to provide its thought process, the program needs to
know why it understood language the way it did. But, we do not want just a
very comprehensive rule-book for handling Chinese. In order to go above this,
we should allow the program to make its own rule-book, with enough time to
actually learn. Mistakes are a normal part of learning, and we accept them
as a part of our humanness, so in this process the program should be given
time to make mistakes. If we teach a program how to learn and how to correct
its mistakes, we can create an environment for developing thought processes
through language. Allowing a computer to reason, learn, and communicate with
and through natural language is what, I think, Natural Language Understanding
should be.
Concluding this paper, I want to try to answer the question from the Intro-
duction: can machines overcome their programming and sensory insuﬃciencies
and progress from symbol manipulation to true understanding of meaning? The
answer depends on our definition of what is true meaning. If we insist on an
exact replica of a human brain in code, I would have to say no. But, an open-
domain system which understands humans in a way that humans understand
each other seems feasible to me.
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Playing with Information Source
Velislava Todorova
Sofia University
Abstract. In this paper I present a NetLogo simulation program which
models human communication with indication of information source. The
framework used is evolutionary game theory. Under di erent initial set-
tings the individuals in the simulation either learn to systematically in-
dicate their information source or not. The factor of most importance
seems to be the impact of one’s speech behaviour on their reputation.
In a community where this impact is high, the individuals who do not
mark their information source lose reputation quickly and are ultimately
excluded from the community. My hope is that this simulation program
can help understand better the grammatical category evidentiality – the
prototypical way of systematically indicating information source – and
why it developed in some languages and not in others.
Keywords: Information source Simulation Evolutionary game theory
Evidentiality
1 Introduction
Every language has a way of indicating the information source. If this way is
a special grammatical category, it is called evidentiality. If it is a special use
of a category with a di erent primary meaning, it would be rather called an
evidential strategy. And if the marking is done by lexical means, it would be
simply a lexical expression of information source.1 There are even further means
to indicate one’s source: for example, the scientific community has developed
e cient and highly conventionalized, yet not properly linguistic, ways to make
bibliographical references.
I have created a simulation program2 that models human communication
with a focus on information source indication. The simulation is not meant
to represent specifically the linguistic marking of information source, but its
main motivation is to shed light on the possible reasons for the appearence of
evidentiality in some languages and not in others.
The intuition behind the simulation scenario is that the indication of infor-
mation source is connected to the reputation of speakers. In Aikhenvald’s (2004,
p. 359) words:
1 For a clear distinction between the possible ways to indicate information source, see
(Aikhenvald 2004, esp. Section 1.2.2).




2In a small community everyone keeps an eye on everyone else, and the
more precise one is in indicating how information was acquired, the less
the danger of gossip, accusation, and so on. No wonder that most lan-
guages with highly complex evidential systems are spoken by small com-
munities.
This article will show how reputation, and most precisely the impact of one’s
speech on their reputation, does indeed play a role in the development of a
systematic practice of marking information source.
2 Structure of the simulation
Before the start of the simulation, the user specifies the number of individuals in
the population, the number of witnesses, the level of reliability of the information
and the impact of the speaker’s messages on their reputation. When the simula-
tion starts, an event takes place and some individuals witness it. The witnesses
might get a wrong impression of the event,3 but either way they search for hear-
ers to share what they think has happened. If there are uninformed individuals
near the witness and if those individuals find the reputation of the witness high
enough, a conversation begins. In the conversation the speaker utters a message
reporting the belief they have and, optionally, marking the information source.
Hearers either believe what they have heard or not, and decide if the informa-
tion should be spread further. There is again the chance of misunderstanding
the message.
When the whole population has been informed (or misinformed) about the
event, all individuals observe, as by providence, whether their believes and state-
ments are true or false. On the basis of these observations their strategies (to
prefer one message or another, and to rather believe or disbelieve a message)
are adjusted, and their reputation levels are changed. With this a step in the
simulation is completed, and a new one can start, with a new event and new
witnesses.
At the end of each step of the simulation, the individuals with minimal (zero)
reputation are excluded from the community and if the individuals are less than
the number specified by the user, a new member is added to the community.
This new member has exactly the same strategy as one (a random one) of the
individuals with maximal reputation (if there are such).
3 For the sake of simplicity, in this simulation all agents are assumed to be cooperative
and benevolent. This means that there would be no liars in the community. Still, in
order to bring the model closer to reality there will be a chance of misunderstanding,




3.1 Players and Moves
The simulation is a game in the sense of evolutionary game theory and Fig. 1
presents its extensive form. At the beginning Nature (Player 0)4 gives firsthand
evidence to some of the players. Firsthand evidence can be interpreted correctly
or incorrectly. As it is not a conscious decision the player makes, I assume it is
again Nature’s choice. The player cannot be sure if the belief they formed is true
or false.5 They nevertheless have a belief and search for a hearer to share it. If a
hearer is found, they would be Player 2, and Player 1, the speaker, would choose
either the basic message to communicate the information, or a more complicated
message, marked for information source, viz. a firsthand information message.6
I assume that the speaker chooses a message that correctly represents their
belief and the only di erence in the possible messages is that one is marked for
information source and the other is not. Then Player 2 decides whether to believe
the information. In the end both players have some utility from the conversation:
in the leaves of the tree the first number is always the speaker’s utility and the
second one is the hearer’s.
The second branch of the game tree – the hearsay subgame – starts with
Nature giving hearsay evidence to a player.7 The player might be given a true
or false piece of information, but they cannot distinguish between the two cases.
They have decided according to their hearer strategy (when they were Player 2
in the firsthand evidence subgame) if they will believe or doubt the information.8
If they believe it, it can turn out that they have misunderstood.
There are two options for the case in which Player 1 has formed a belief – they
can either use the basic message or a message marked for hearsay information.9
The firsthand information message cannot be used, as its sincerity condition
requires the additional belief that the speaker has witnessed the event. There
4 Nature is a ficticious player in the game, whose actions are those choices that do not
depend on either of the two actual players.
5 The information sets (the sets of states between which a player cannot distinguish)
are represented in the tree by dotted arcs.
6 To give an example, in English the di erence between these two kinds of messages
would be the distinction between “It is raining” and “I see that it is raining.”
7 The hearsay information is given to players by other players in a previous stage
of the same game. However, the structure of the simulation is such that whether
a player will get hearsay information, is decided together with the distribution of
firsthand evidence – all the individuals who didn’t receive firsthand evidence, have
to eventually be informed by others.
8 Technically, the application of the hearer strategy takes place in the previous stage
of the game, when Player 1 in this second branch has been Player 2 in the first
branch. However I repeat this part of the game, as it is important to distinguish
between the states that result from di erent outcomes in the previous stage.
9 An example from English for the di erence between a message of the basic type and
a message of the hearsay type would be the same as between the sentences “It is


























































































Fig. 1. Extensive form of the game. (Outcomes are calculated for reputation cost/gain
values of 20 and 10 for the firsthand and the basic message respectively.)
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5is no possibility for unsincerity in the model (lies are not allowed), so firsthand
information messages are excluded in the hearsay scenario and similarly the
hearsay information messages are excluded in the firsthand evidence scenario.
In the case in which Player 1 has not formed a belief, the options are to
either pass along the information using the hearsay information message, or to
stay silent. The hearsay information message is the only admissible one here,
as all other would not be sincere given that the speaker does not believe the
information is true.10
Here again, just like in the firsthand evidence subgame, Player 2 has to choose
if to believe the message they hear. They cannot tell if a speaker uttering the
basic message was a witness or not, nor if the information this message carries
is true.
There is one move by Nature that is omitted in the tree for some simplicity.
After Player 2 decides to believe Player 1, it could turn out that they had
formed a false belief. In this case neither the speaker nor the hearer gains or
loses anything and their strategies are not updated, since neither the speaker
may draw a conclusion about the persuasive power of their message, nor the
hearer can blame the negative outcome of the communication on their naivity.
3.2 Outcomes, Costs and Gains
After each conversation, both the speaker and the hearer receive some utility.
The precise value of the received utility depends on the perlocutionary goal the
speaker had, the complexity of the message employed, the reaction of the hearer
and, ultimately, on the truth of the information transmitted.
The basic outcome of the communication – the one dependent of the truth of
the information – is positive for both players, if true information has been shared
and believed, and negative if false information has been shared and believed. In
the cases when a piece of information (true or false) is not believed, there is a
neutral outcome. Table 1 presents the basic outcomes.
The basic outcome is the only factor to be considered for the hearer’s utility.
For the speaker there are other relevant factors. One of them is the perlocution-
ary goal.
In line with Martina Faller’s discussion of the purposes of conversations with
di erent evidentials in Quzco Quetchua (Faller 2006, p. 28–29), I assume that
whenever the speaker does have a belief, their goal is to persuade the hearer;
and that whenever the speaker shares information in the truth of which they do
not believe, the goal of the communication is simply to provide the hearer with
options on the basis of which they could decide for themselves what the case
10 It is clear that in English a sentence of the form “They say it is raining” can be
sincere even if the speaker is convinced it is not raining. Languages that do not
use such embedding structures, but grammatical evidentiality also seem to allow for
the sincere utterance of hearsay marked messages even when the speaker knows the
information is false. For an example from Bulgarian, see (Smirnova 2011, p. 27) and
for one from Quechua, see (Faller 2006, p. 4).
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6Table 1. Basic outcomes
Player 1 Player 2
(Speaker) (Hearer)
believed true information 10 10
not believed true information 0 0
believed false information -10 -10
not believed false information 0 0
actually is. The gains related to the perlocutionary goals are given in Table 2.
The persuading goal is only fulfilled when the hearer accepts the believe, but
the alternative goal is fulfilled by the simple act of telling, and the reaction of
the hearer is irrelevant.
Table 2. Perlocutionary gains for the speaker
Perlocutionary goal:
Persuading Presenting options
transferred belief 10 3
not transferred belief 0 3
Each message has an utterance cost and a conditional reputation cost, as
shown in Table 3. The latter is only paid if the information turns out to be false.
In case of sharing true information, there is an additional reputation gain. This
aims at representing how one’s utterances – according to their truth – contribute
positively or negatively to one’s reputation in the community.
Table 3. Costs and additional gains
utterance cost reputation cost reputation gain
basic message (m1) 2 [0, 100] [0, 100]
firsthand message (m2) 3 [0, 100] [0, 100]
hearsay message (m3) 3 [0, 100] [0, 100]
Utterance costs are fixed, while the values of the reputation costs and gains
are specified by the user (in the interval between 0 and 100). The chosen value
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7for the reputation costs and gains is not only used to calculate the utility of the
communication, bus is also added to (or substracted form) the reputation of the
speaker (which also varies between 0 and 100 and is initially 50).
The utility function for the speaker may thus be defined as follows:
Us(mi(ej), ak) =
 
O(mi(ej), ak)  Cu(mi) +Gr(mi), if ej happened
O(mi(ej), ak)  Cu(mi)  Cr(mi), otherwise.
(1)
Where O refers to the basic outcome, Cu and Cr to the utterance and rep-
utation costs, and Gr to the reputation gain. mi(ej) represents the uttering of
a message of type mi about event ej . ak for k   {0, 1} is the action the hearer
undertakes – either to believe (a0) or doubt (a1) the statement.
The utility function for the hearer is considerably simpler, as it equals the
basic outcome:
Uh(mi(ej), ak) = O(mi(ej), ak) . (2)
The ultimate values of the utility functions of both players can be found in
the game tree (Fig. 1), where the first number represents the expected utility
for Player 1 (the speaker) and the second one – for Player 2 (the hearer).
4 Learning mechanism
I have chosen to model players’ strategies and learning mechanisms with Po´lya
urns, much in the spirit of (Mu¨hlenbernd 2011, pp. 6–8) and of the already
existing Signaling Game NetLogo simulation (Wilensky 2016). Each player has
a set of speaker urns for their local speaker strategies and a set of hearer urns
for their local hearer strategies.11
There are three urns for the three speaker information sets:  w for when a
witness,  b for when heard and believed a report and  n for when the report
was not believed. Each urn contains two kinds of balls: for each kind of message
the player may choose to utter. There are other three urns for the three hearer
information sets:  m1 for the basic message,  m2 for the firsthand information
message and  m3 for the hearsay information message. Each hearer strategy urn
contains two kinds of balls: for believing the message or for discarding it. At the
beginning of the game, each player’s urns have the content specified in Tables 4
and 5.
After each iteration of the game, the following strategy update is made for
each speaker of type t, who utters a message m, or in other words – who drew
a ball bm from the urn  t at time   to report the event e:
11 I call local strategy the strategy to act in a particular way if the game has already
evolved to the state in which the player has to move. Simply strategy will refer to
a combination of local strategies and will tell us how the player would move at any
point of the game.
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8Table 4. The initial state of the urns for the speaker strategies
m1( s)0 m2( s)0 m3( s)0 msc( i)0
 s =  w 100 100 0 0
 s =  b 100 0 100 0
 s =  n 0 0 100 100
Table 5. The initial state of the urns for the hearer strategies
ab( h)0 ad( h)0
 h =  m1 100 100
 h =  m2 100 100
 h =  m3 100 100
m( t) +1 = max[m( t)  + Us(m(e), a), 1] . (3)
Analogously, the strategy update for a hearer having drawn a ball ba from
urn  m, i.e. who reacted with a to the utterance m(e), would be:
a( m) +1 = max[a( m)  + Uh(m(e), a), 1] . (4)
The urn cannot contain less than one ball of each type, that has been allowed
in it at the beginning of the game. In this way there is always a chance for the
player to change their strategy.
5 Visualization
The simulation is written in the language NetLogo,12 and the explanation of its
visualization will follow the structure of a typical NetLogo program. The basic
element are the turtles,13 these are the agents I use to represent communicating
individuals. Then there are links between turtles – I represent by them the
messages exchanged between the individuals.
5.1 Turtles
The turtles have shape, size, color and opacity. The shape represents the type of
information source – the witnesses are square-shaped and the rest of the turtles
12 See (Wilensky 1999).
13 The language has been developed for simulating the behaviour of a robotized turtle,
hence the extravagant name of this basic kind of agents.
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9have the shape of a circle. The size of the turtle represents the individual’s
reputation. The bigger the turtle, the greater its reputation.
Speaker local strategies are represented by color. The user can choose if they
want to see the speaker local strategies for firsthand evidence, the one for believed
hearsay evidence or the one for doubted hearsay evidence. In each case the prob-
abilities of the individuals to use the three available messages (basic, firsthand
information and hearsay information message) are mapped to the RGB color
space. Red represents inclination towards the basic message, green – towards
the firsthand information message and blue – towards the hearsay information
message.
Opacity codes hearer local strategies. The user may choose the message for
which to see the hearer local strategies. The turtles get the more opaque the
more the individuals are inclined to believe the message. As simultaneous visu-
alization of speaker and hearer local strategies may produce confusion, each of
these visualizations can be disabled.
5.2 Links
The messages exchanged between individuals are represented with links between
turtles. Color encodes type of message: red for basic message, green for firsthand
information message and blue for hearsay information message. The color coding
of links can be switched o .
The link is represented by a solid line if the transmitted information is true.
Otherwise the line is dotted. If the hearer has believed the message, the line’s
opacity is the maximal possible, otherwise the opacity of the link is reduced.
6 Examples
Figures 2, 3 and 4 present the speaker strategies after 1000 communication ’steps’
in a population of 100 individuals with 1 witness and reliability value of 0.9.
What varies, are the values of the reputation bet for the commitment messages
(the basic and the firsthand message). Each figure consists of three NetLogo
views, representing the strategies for firsthand information, believed hearsay
information and not believed hearsay information (in this order).
Figure 2 presents the case in which the reputation of the agents is not in-
fluenced at all by what they say and the way they say it. This is why all the
dots are the same size – the agents kept their initial reputation. There seems to
be a slight preference for the marked message in the firsthand information sce-
nario and somewhat clearer preference for the unmarked message in the believed
hearsay case.
Figure 3 is an example for the influence of a high reputation bet value (80
for both commitment messages). One can see how the dots are of di erent sizes,
representing agents with di erent reputation levels. Furthermore, there is a clear
tendency for marking hearsay information. The agents seem to have divided in




Fig. 2. Speaker local strategies for firsthand information, believed hearsay information
and not believed hearsay information, with no impact of the messages on the speaker’s
reputation.
the speakers’ preferences are clearer – they are common for the community in the
case of hearsay and more a matter of personal choice in the firsthand scenario.
Fig. 3. Speaker local strategies for firsthand information, believed hearsay information
and not believed hearsay information, with high impact of the messages (reputation
bet = 80) on the speaker’s reputation.
Figure 4 consists of two parts: Case A and Case B. They are two di erent
developments that occurr when the simmulation is run twice with the same
initial parameters, viz. reputaion bet value of 80 for the firsthand message and
60 for the basic.
In Case A the whole population managed to develop a strategy to mark
hearsay information, as well as firsthand information. In Case B the population
again developed a preference (somewhat weaker, though) for marking firsthand
information, but this time they failed to adopt a strategy for marking hearsay. As






Fig. 4. Speaker local strategies for firsthand information, believed hearsay information
and not believed hearsay information, with di erent impacts of the commiting messages
(reputation bet for firsthand message = 80, and for basic message = 60) on the speaker’s




be excluded from the community, which is why there are so few agents remaining
in case B, even though their initial number was 100, like in Case A.
7 Conclusion
I have described here a simulation that presents speaker reputation as one of the
factors relevant for the systematic marking of information source. It was shown
that the impact of one’s speech on their reputation does influence the choice to
indicate the information souce or not. Furthermore, we saw that in a setting with
high impact of speech on reputation not marking hearsay information increases
the risk of exclusion from the community.
The finding that reputation and systematic marking of information source
are related can explain (at least to some extent) the existence of the grammatical
category evidentiality in some linguistic communities. It is in line with the fact
that most languages with large evidential systems are spoken in small, compact
communities, where a person is very dependent on their good name.
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Abstract. We discuss the open problem of parsing the Dyck language
of 3 symbols, D3, using a 2-Multiple Context-Free Grammar. We tackle
this problem by implementing a number of novel meta-grammatical tech-
niques and present the associated software packages we developed.
Keywords: Dyck Language; Multiple context-free grammars (MCFG)
1 Introduction
Multidimensional Dyck languages[6] generalize the well-known pattern of well-
bracketed pairs of parentheses to k-symbol alphabets. Our goal in this paper is
to study the 3-dimensional Dyck language D3, and the question of whether this
is a 2-dimensional multiple context-free language, 2-MCFL.
For brevity’s sake, this section only serves as a brief introductory guide to-
wards relevant papers, where the interested reader will find definitions, properties
and various correspondences of the problem.
1.1 Preliminaries
We use D3 to refer to the Dyck language over the lexicographically ordered
alphabet a < b < c, which generalizes well-bracketed parentheses over three
symbols. Denoting with #x(w) the number of occurrences of symbol x within
word w, any word in D3 satisfies the following conditions:
(D1) #a(w) = #b(w) = #c(w)
(D2) #a(v)   #b(v)   #c(v),  v   PrefixOf(w)
Eliding the second condition (D2), we get the MIX language, which represents
free word order over the same alphabet. MIX has already been proven express-
ible by a 2-MCFG[10]; the class of multiple context-free grammars that operate
on pairs of strings[2].
1.2 Motivation
Static Analysis Interestingly, the 2-symbol Dyck language is used in the static
analysis of programming languages, where a large number of analyses are for-
mulated as language-reachability problems[9].
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For instance, when considering interprocedural calls as part of the source
language, high precision can only be achieved by examining only control-flow
paths that respect the fact that a procedure call always returns to the site of
its current caller[8]. By associating the program point before a procedure call fk
with (k, and the one after the call with )k, the validity problem is reduced to
recognizing D2 words.
Alas, the 2-dimensional case cannot accommodate richer control-flow struc-
tures, such as exception handling via try/catch and Python generators via the
yield keyword. To achieve this, one must lift the Dyck-reachability problem to
a higher dimension which, given the computational cost that context-sensitive
parsing induces, is currently prohibited. If D3 is indeed a 2-MCFL, parsing it
would become computationally attainable for these purposes and eventually al-
low scalable analysis for non-standard control-flow mechanisms by exploiting
the specific structure of analysed programs, as has been recently done in the
2-dimensional case[1].
Last but not least, future research directions will open up in a multitude of
analyses that are currently restrained to two dimensions, such as program slicing,
flow-insensitive points-to analysis and shape approximation[9].
Linguistics For the characterization of natural language grammars, the ex-
treme degree of scrambling permitted by the MIX language may be considered
overly expressive[3].
On the other hand, the prefix condition of D3 is more suggestive of free
word order still respecting certain linear order constraints, as found in natural
languages. Hence, it is reasonable to examine whether D3 can also be modelled
by a 2-MCFG. Such an endeavour proved quite challenging, necessitating careful
study of correspondences with other mathematical constructs.
1.3 Correspondences
Young Tableaux A standard Young Tableau is defined as an assortment of
n boxes into a ragged (or jagged, i.e. non-rectangular) matrix containing the
integers 1 through n and arranged in such a way that the entries are strictly
increasing over the rows (from left to right) and columns (from top to bottom).
Reading o  the entries of the boxes, one may obtain the Yamanouchi word
by placing (in order) each character’s index to the row corresponding to its
lexicographical ordering.
In the case of D3, the Tableau associated with these words is in fact rectan-
gular of size n  3, and the length of the corresponding word (called a balanced
or dominant Yamanouchi word in this context) is 3n, where n is the number of
occurrences of each unique symbol[6]. Practically, the rectangular shape ensures
constraint (D1), while the ascending order of elements over rows and columns
ensures constraint (D2). In that sense, a rectangular standard Young tableau
of size n   3 is, as a construct, an alternative way of uniquely representing the






1 3 4 8 9 10
2 5 7 11 13 15
6 12 14 16 17 18
Fig. 1. Young tableau for ”abaabcbaaabcbcbccc”
Promotions and Orbits There is an interesting transformation on Young
Tableaux, namely the Jeu-de-taquin algorithm. When operating on a rectangular
tableau T (n, 3), Jeu-de-taquin consists of the following steps:
(1) Reduce all elements of T by 1 and replace the first item of the first row with
an empty box  (x, y) := (1, 1).
(2) While the empty box is not at the bottom right corner of T,  (x, y)  = (n, 3),
do:
- Pick the minimum of the elements directly to the right and below the
empty box, and swap the empty box with it. T (x, y) := min(T(x+1,y), T(x,y+1)),
 (x , y ) := (x+1, y) (in the case of a right-swap) or  (x , y ) := (x, y+1)
(in the case of a down-swap).
(3) Replace the empty box with 3n.
The tableau obtained through Jeu-de-taquin on T is called its promotion
p(T ). We denote by pk(T ), k successive applications of Jeu-de-taquin. It has been
proven that p3n(T ) = T [7]. In other words, the promotion defines an equivalence
class, which we name an orbit, which cycles back to itself. Orbits dissect the space
of D3 into disjoint sets, i.e. every word w belongs to a particular orbit, obtained
by promotions of Tw.
A2 Combinatorial Spider Webs The A2 irreducible combinatorial spider web
is a directed planar graph embedded in a disk that satisfies certain conditions[4].
Spider webs can be obtained through the application of a set of rules, known as
the Growth Algorithm[7]. These operate on pairs of neighbouring nodes, collaps-
ing them into a singular intermediate node, transforming them into a new pair or
eliminating them altogether. Growth rules will be examined from a grammatical
perspective in Section 2.2. Upon reaching a fixpoint, the growth process pro-
duces a well-formed Spider Web, which, in the context of D3, can be interpreted
as a visual representation of parsing a word[6,7].
A bijection also links Young Tableaux with Spider Webs. More specifically,
the act of promotion is isomorphic to a combinatorial action on spider webs,
namely web rotation[7].
Constrained Walk A Dyck word can also be visualized as a constrained walk
within the first quadrant of Z2. We can assign each alphabet symbol x a vector
value vx   Z2 such that all pairs of (vx, vy) are linearly independent and:
va + vb + vc = 0 (1)
 va +  vb + µvc   0, (         µ) (2)
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We can then picture Dyck words as routes starting from (0, 0). (1) means
that each route must also end at (0, 0) ( = (D1)), while (2) means that the x and






















Fig. 2. The constrained walk of ”abaabcbaaabcbcbccc” with vector value assignments
va = (1, 0), vb = ( 1, 1), vc = (0, 1)
2 Modeling Techniques
We now present a number of novel techniques that we developed as an attempt
to solve the problem at hand, incrementally moving towards more complex and
abstract grammars. For the purpose of experimentation we have implemented
these techniques, based on a software library for parsing MCFGs[5]. The resulting
Python code is open-source and available online1.
2.1 Triple Insertion
To set things o , we start with the grammar of triple insertion in Fig.3. This
grammar operates on non-terminals W(x, y), producing W(x , y ) with an addi-
tional triplet a, b, c that respects the partial orders x < y and a < b < c. The
end-word is produced through the concatenation of (x, y).
Despite being conceptually simple, this grammar consists of a large number
of rules. Its expressivity is also limited; the prominent weak point is its inability
to manage the e ect of straddling, namely the generation of words whose sub-
stituents display complex interleaving patterns. Refer to Fig.10 for an example.
2.2 Meta-Grammars
To address the issue of rule size, we introduce the notion of meta-grammars,
loosely inspired by Van Wijngaarden’s work[11], which allows a more abstract





W( , xyabc) W(x, y). (2)
...




Fig. 3. Grammar of triple insertions
which, given a rule format, a set of partial orders (over the tuple indices of its
premises and/or newly added terminal symbols), and the MCFG dimensionality,
automatically generates all the order-respecting permutations. An example of
how we can abstract away from explicitly enumerating the entirety of our initial
rules is showcased in Fig.4.
S(xy) W(x, y).
O2 W    | {a < b < c} .
O2 W W | {x < y, a < b < c} .
Fig. 4. G0: Meta-grammar of triple insertions
This approach enhances the potential expressivity of our grammars as well.
For instance, we can now extend the previous grammar with a single meta-rule
that allows two non-terminals W(x, y), W(z, w) to interleave with one another,
producing rearranged tuple concatenations and allowing some degree of strad-
dling to be generated:
G1 : G0 +O2 W W,W | {x < y, z < w} .
The addition of this rule gets us closer to completeness, but we are still not
quite there. We have thus far only used a single non-terminal, not utilizing the
expressivity that an MCFG allows. To that end, we propose non-terminals to
represent incomplete word states; that is, words that either have an extra symbol
or miss one. The former are positive states, whereas the latter are negative. The
inclusion of these extra states would allow for more intricate interactions.
Interestingly, there is a direct correspondence between these non-terminals
and the nodes of Petersen’s growth algorithm[7]. Fig.5 depicts the growth rules
in the exact same web form as proposed by Petersen, modulo node branding. A
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subset of these web-reduction rules are, in fact, precisely modelled by the meta-
grammar G2 presented in Fig.6. In section 4, we briefly explain our inability




























Fig. 5. Growth rules
G2 consists of base cases for positive states, possible state interactions, clo-
sures of pairs of inverse polarity and a universally quantified meta-rule that
allows the combination of any incomplete state with a well-formed one (i.e. non-
terminal W).
A further extension can be achieved through universally quantifying the no-
tion of triple insertion, which is unique in the sense that it can insert three
di erent terminals, each at a di erent position:
G3 : G2 +   K   {A+/ , B+/ , C+/ } : O2 K  K | {x < y, a < b < c} .
2.3 Rule Inference
The improved performance of the above approaches again proved insu cient to
completely parse D3. Our meta-rules are over-constrained by imposing a total
order on the tuple elements, due to their inability to keep track of where the
extra character(s) is. To overcome this, we split each state into multiple position-




O2 W    | {a < b < c} .
O2 A+     | {a} .
O2 B+     | {b} .
O2 C+     | {c} .
O2 C    A+, B+ | {x < y < z < w} .
O2 B    A+, C+ | {x < y < z < w} .
O2 A    B+, C+ | {x < y < z < w} .
O2 A+   C , B  | {x < y < z < w} .
O2 B+   C , A  | {x < y < z < w} .
O2 C+   B , A  | {x < y < z < w} .
O2 W   A+, A  | {x < y < z < w} .
O2 W   C , C+ | {x < y < z < w} .
  K   {A+/ , B+/ , C+/ } :
O2 K  K,W | {x < y, z < w} .
Fig. 6. G2: Meta-grammar of incomplete states
evidenced by the below alteration to the original A+, B+ interaction (where y
can now occur after z or w):
O2 C    A+left, B+ | {x < y, x < z < w} .
In order to accommodate the interactions between this increased number of
states, we need to keep track of both internal and external order constraints.
At this point, the abstraction o ered by our meta-grammar approach does not
cover our needs any more. The same di culty that we had encountered before
is prominent once more, except now at an even higher level.
As a solution to the aforementioned limitation, we propose a system that can
automatically create a full-blown m-MCFG given only the states it consists of.
To accomplish this, we assign each state a unique descriptor that specifies the
content of its tuple’s elements. Aligning these descriptors with the tuple, we can
then infer the descriptor of the resulting tuple of every possible state interaction.
For the subset of those interactions whose resulting descriptor is matched with
a state, we can now automatically infer the rule.
Formally, the system is initialized with a map D, such as the one illustrated
in Fig.7. Its domain, dom(D), is a set of state identifiers and its codomain,
codom(D), is the set of their corresponding state descriptors.
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W   ( ,  )
A+l   (a,  )
A+r   ( , a)
...
C r   ( , ab)
C l,r   (a, b)
Fig. 7. Map D for refined states
Algorithm 1 ARIS: Automatic Rule Inference System
procedure aris(D)
for X   (d1, . . . , dn)   D do
yield X(d1, . . . , dn).
for X,Y   dom(D)2 do
(Xord, Yord)  (x < y < . . . , z < w < . . . )
for (d1, ..., dn)   O2    X,Y | {Xord, Yord}  do
for S    eliminate((d1, . . . , dn),D) do
yield S (d1, . . . , dn)  X,Y.
procedure eliminate((d1, . . . , dn),D)
for matches   all abc triplets(d1, . . . , dn) do
for i   0 . . . n/3 do
for S    remove abc triplets(matches, i) do
if S    codom(D) then
yield S 
Meta-grammars accelerated the process of creating grammars, by letting us
simply describe rules instead of explicitly defining them. ARIS builds upon this
notion to raise the level of abstraction even further; one needs only specify a
grammar’s states and its descriptors, thus eliminating the need to define rules
or even meta-rules.
3 Tools & Results
3.1 Grammar Utilities
We have implemented the modelling techniques described in Section 2 and dis-
tributed a Python package, called dyck, which provides the programmer with a
domain-specific language close to this paper’s mathematical notation. To facili-
tate experimentation, our package includes features such as grammar selection,
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time measurements, word generation and soundness/completeness checking. The
following example demonstrates the definition of G1:
from dyck import *
G_1 = Grammar([
(’S <- W’, {(x, y)}),
O(’W’, {(a, b, c)}),
O(’W <- W’, {(x, y), (a, b, c)}),
O(’W <- W, W’, {(x, y), (z, w)})
])
3.2 Visualization
As counter-examples began to grow in size and number, we realised the necessity
of a visualization tool to assist us in identifying properties they may exhibit. To
that end, we distribute another Python package, called dyckviz, which allows
the simultaneous visualization of tableau-promotion and web-rotation (grouped
in their corresponding equivalence classes). An example of a web as rendered by
our tool is given in Fig.8.
Young tableaux in an orbit are colour-grouped by their column indices, which
sheds some light on how the jeu-de-taquin actually influences the structure of
the corresponding Dyck words. Interesting patterns have began to emerge, which
still remain to be properly investigated.
3.3 Grammar Comparisons
Fig.9 displays three charts, depicting the number of rules, percentage of counter-
examples and computation times of each of our grammars for D3n with n ranging
from 2 to 6 (where n denotes the number of abc triplets). Even though none of our
proposed grammars is complete, we observe that as grammars get more abstract,
the number of failing parses steadily declines. This however comes at the cost
of rule size growth, which in turn is associated with an increase in computation
times. What this practically means is that we are unable to continue testing
more elaborate grammars or scale our results to higher orders of n (note that
||D3n|| also has a very rapid rate of expansion2).
4 Road to Completeness
To our knowledge, no other attempt has come so close to modelling D3 with a
2-MCFG. We attribute this to the combination of a pragmatic approach with
results from existing theoretical work. In this section, we present a collection of
























Fig. 8. Spider web of ”abaacbbacbabaccbcc”
First-Match Policy and Relinking Possibly the most intuitive way of check-
ing whether a word w is part of D3n is checking whether a pair of links occur that
match ai to bi and bi to ci  i   n. We call this process of matching the first-
match policy. The question arises whether a grammar can accomplish inserting
a triplet of a, b, c, that would abide by the first-match policy. If that were the
case, it would be relatively easy to generalize this ability by induction to every
n   N. Unfortunately, the answer is seemingly negative; the expressiveness pro-
vided by a 2-MCFG does not allow for the arbitrary insertions required. On a
related note, being able to produce a word state W (x, y) where w = xy and x
any possible prefix of w, gives no guarantee of being able to produce the same
word with an extra triplet inserted due to the straddling property.
However, if rules existed that would allow for match-making and breaking,
i.e. match relinking, an inserted symbol could be temporarily matched with what
might be its first match-policy in a local scope, and then relink it to its correct
match when merging two words together.
Growth Rules Although G2 comes close to realizing the growth algorithm, not
all of the growth rules can be translated into a 2-MCFG setting. It would be an
interesting endeavour to attempt to model the element-swapping behaviour of
these rules that produce two output states, without resorting to more expressive
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Fig. 9. Performance measures
a b a b a c b c a b c c
Fig. 10. First-match policy for ”ababacbcabcc”
Insights from promotion An interesting question is whether promotion can
be handled by a 2-MCFG (as a context-free rewriting system). If so, it could
be worth looking into the properties of orbits, to test for instance if there are
promotions within an orbit that can be easier to solve than others. Solving a
single promotion and transducing the solution to all equivalent words could then
be a guideline towards completeness.
5 Conclusion
We tried to accurately present the intricacies of D3 and the di culties that arise
when attempting to model it as a 2-MCFL. We have developed and introduced
some novel techniques and tools, which we believe can be of use even outside
the problem’s narrow domain. We have largely expanded on the existing tools to
accommodate MIX-style languages and systems of meta-grammars in general.
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Despite our best e orts, the question of whether D3 can actually be encap-
sulated within a 2-MCFG still remains unanswered. Regardless, this problem
has been very rewarding to pursue, and we hope to have intrigued the inter-
ested reader enough to further research the subject, use our code, or strive for a
solution on her own.
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Abstract. The Web has become an important language resource for
NLP. However, automatically crawled corpora have some shortcomings:
lots of data but the content is unknown. Most research has focused on
classifying multiple genres, but this paper describes the binomial classi-
fication of Estonian Web texts. The goal was to classify texts into two
categories, i.e. texts following standard written language norms and texts
following non-standard written language norms. Classification models
were built using diﬀerent supervised machine learning algorithms and
BoW as features. 10-fold cross-validation was used to measure the qual-
ity of these classification models, best result was achieved by the multi-
layer perceptron achieving over 0.99 on accuracy. The results of classify-
ing the manually labelled test set show that neural networks yet again
outperformed other machine learning algorithms, achieving over 0.7 on
accuracy.
Keywords: automatic classification, Web corpus, standard vs non-standard
written language, Estonian
1 Introduction
Increasingly, corpus linguists and language technologists are turning to the Web
as a source of language data. It is freely available and oﬀers a big variety of
texts. Besides traditional standard written texts (e.g. news, fiction) there is also
noisy user-generated content containing lots of variation and not meeting the
standardized language norms. The multitude of traditional and new genres on
Web has initiated a lot of tasks in NLP. One such task is automatic Web genre
identification or classification.
Automatic Web genre classification is a complex task. Diﬀerent researchers
have developed a variety of genre classification schemes which are mainly done
using two approches: bottom-up and top-down [5,17]. In bottom-up approach
researchers ask a group of people to come up with a genre classification, e.g.
[4,2,6]. In top-down approach researchers use existing classifications or rely on
their own knowledge of genres in order to define genre classes, e.g [27,3,15,28].
Some combine both bottom-up and top-down approaches [21]. There is no uni-
versal classification, because there is a lack of consensus about how to define
genre and genre classification. Genres are recognized, yet there is a lot of dis-
agreement in definitions, boundaries and level of specificity.
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In automatic genre classification feature selection has also a very important
role to play. Features used for genre classification can be grouped into three main
categories – structural (i.e. PoS tags and n-grams, e.g. [13,18,28,1,22]), lexical
(i.e. common words [26,20,22], function words [1], word n-grams [9,7,23,18,27],
character n-grams [11,23]) and other features (i.e. keywords from the URL
[29,16]). In addition to structural and lexical features text statistics (e.g. type
and token ratio, average word and sentence length, frequency of punctuation
marks, frequency of HTML tags, e.g. [12,14,18,22]) can also be beneficial in
discriminating genres.
While most research on text classification has focused on classifying multiple
genres, the objective of this paper is to describe the preliminary experiments
on doing a simplified version of the standard text classification – a binomial
classification of the Estonian Web corpus called the etTenTen131 [10]. The corpus
has been semi-automatically2 classified into seven genres (government, periodical,
informative, religion, forum, blog, unknown). Although these texts have already
been classified, the quality of this classification is questionable – third of these
texts are labelled as unknown. Hence, there is a new situation: there is a large
corpus, but the content is unknown.
The long-term aim is to create a new classification or modify the existing
one, however prior to that the Estonian Web texts need to be classified into two
categories: either following or not following standard written language norms.
The reason behind it is very practical – there are no classification tools for Es-
tonian that can discriminate noisy textual data from well-written texts. These
tools are needed for checking whether there is a need for text normalization and
also allows to choose appropriate preprocessing methods (paragraphs, sentences,
words, morphological analysis, PoS). For example, the etTenTen has been an-
notated by parsers that were trained on standard written texts, therefore the
quality of the annotation (e.g. morphological analysis) is a bit dubious.
There has been some research on classifying texts based on being formal or in-
formal [24,25] and blog or non-blog [19], but that research is not directly relevant
to this work. Therefore, to the author’s knowledge, this is the first approach on
classifying texts as following or not following standard written language norms.
The aim of this paper is to find out whether it is even possible to do this kind
of discrimination and what kind of classification models are best suited for this
task. This classification is done by using supervised machine learning approach.
These supervised models were trained on two corpora: the Balanced Corpus
of Estonian 3 (representing the standard written language) and a subset from
1 EtTenTen13 is a collection of Estonian texts automatically crawled from the Web
in 2013.
2 , Classification was based on: 1) domain classification done by the Institute of the
Estonian Language (EKI), 2) information in the URLs name (e.g. an URL containing
a word comments was classified as a forum type t,ext), 3) text representation (e.g.
frequent appearance of times and dates or word Vasta (Reply) was classified as





the Estonian Reference Corpus called the New Media4 (representing the non-
standard written language). Ideally, the test and training set should follow the
same probability distribution. However, since there isn’t a corpus which has been
classified into two categories (texts following standard written language norms
and texts following non-standard written language norms), these corpora were
used because they have been manually compiled, meaning their language usage
is well-known. As the aim is to classify Web texts, a test set was composed by
randomly selecting texts from the etTenTen13 corpus.
This paper presents the results of the preliminary experiments on the bi-
nary classification and discusses how to improve the quality of the classification
models.
2 Datasets and Methods
Datasets. For this study three diﬀerent corpora were used: the Balanced Corpus
of Estonian, a subset from the Estonian Reference Corpus called the New Media
and the etTenTen13. The core diﬀerence between these corpora is that the genres
in the Balanced Corpus and New Media are known, while the classification in
the etTenTen remains mistrustful. Balanced Corpus consists of fiction, journal-
istic and science texts, New Media consists of 4 subsets: chatroom, newsgroups,
forums and comments. For this study chatroom texts were left out because of its
distinctive language. Classification models were trained using Balanced Corpus
as an example of a standard written language and New Media as an example of
a non-standard written language. A subset of the etTenTen was used to compose
a test set in order to validate the quality of the classification models.
Preprocessing. For noise reduction the data had to be preprocessed and nor-
malized. Xml tags and line breaks in all documents were removed, certain strings
were replaced with a placeholder string: web addresses with <hyperlink>, email
addresses with <email> and numerals with <number>. Finally each document
was labelled as standard or non-standard. As a result each document contained
label, filename and text data columns. Commonly all punctuation marks are
removed and all characters are lowercased, but for this task it seemed coun-
terproductive. It is partly because on the Internet (e.g. comments, chatrooms)
people tend to ignore the capitalization rules and it is common to use repeated
punctuation marks for exaggeration (e.g. ??!!!, !!! ), or conversely not using punc-
tuation at all. Thus using capitalization and interpunctuation could be helpful
features distinguishing if a text follows standard or non-standard written lan-
guage norms.
Features and classifiers. For setting a baseline word unigrams, i.e. Bag-of-
Words (BoW) were chosen as features. BoW is essentially a very simplistic
method, yet it produces surprisingly good results, e.g. [23,15]. Classification
models were built using the scikit-learn machine learning library. Diﬀerent super-




logistic regression, 3) linear support vector, 4) random forest and 5) multi-layer
perceptron.
Procedure. 10-fold cross-validation was used to measure the qualities of these
classification models. In every cycle the learning algorithm will go through these
steps: 1) texts are divided into training and test set; 2) training and test set
texts are converted into word vectors by varying the minimal term frequency5
(mindf ), which are converted into frequency vectors using TF-IDF (term fre-
quency–inverse document frequency) normalization; 3) training set is used for
creating a classification model for given learning algorithm; 4) the model labels
every text in the test set with two possible categories: standard or non-standard;
5) the accuracy measure is saved.
3 Results
3.1 Description of the Training Data, Classification Results of the
First Experiment




















414 12.9 31215science 138
journalism 138
TOTAL 752 26.5 35765
The description of the training data is shown in Table 1. For training a
total of 752 texts were used. The standard written language was represented
by 414 fictional, journalistic and scientific texts from the Balanced Corpus (in
total 55%). The non-standard written language was represented by 338 forum,
comment and newsgroup type texts from the New Media subset (in total 45%).
Table 2 presents the accuracy results of the classification models obtained
from the 10-fold cross-validation. It can be seen from the data that the pre-
diction accuracy for all models is suprisingly good: regardless of the minimal
term frequency, there is at least a 90% probability that a text will be labelled
with the correct category by all models. The top performer was the multi-layer
perceptron with an accuracy up to 99.7%. The aim of this experiment was to
5 It is used to remove terms that appear infrequently, e.g. if mindf = 2, ignore tokens
appearing in less than 2 documents.
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Table 2: Accuracy results of the cross-validation
Model df=1 df=2 df=3 df=4 df=5 df=6 df=7 df=8
MNNB 0.940 0.949 0.941 0.943 0.942 0.943 0.953 0.952
LR 0.983 0.988 0.986 0.984 0.987 0.985 0.983 0.985
LSVC 0.992 0.992 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.995 0.991
RF 0.956 0.962 0.976 0.974 0.969 0.965 0.976 0.974
MLP 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996
Notes: MNNB = multinomial Naive Bayes, LR = logistic
regression, LSVC = linear support vector, RF = random
forest, MLP = multi-layer perceptron.
see whether this combination of features and training set will be suitable for
Estonian. Although the BoW method is simplistic, based on these results it still
produces good results and could be applied for classifying Estonian texts.
3.2 Description of the Manually Labelled Test Set and Classification
Results of the Second Experiment
This second experiment sets out to use these classification models which were
built during the first experiment in order to find out how well these models
perform on classifying the target input, i.e. the Estonian Web texts.
Manually Labelled Test Set. For evaluation a subset of Estonian Web texts
from the etTenTen13 corpus was used as a test set. It consisted of 220 texts
which were chosen randomly, all categories from the original genre classification
were present (see Table 3).















In NLP reliably annotated dataset always plays an important role. The re-
sults of research based on unreliable annotation can be considered as untrust-
worthy and doubtful. In order to measure the reliability of annotation, diﬀerent
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annotators judge the same data and the observed agreement and the Fleiss’
kappa for measuring the inter-coder agreement are calculated for their judge-
ments.
The test set was manually annotated into two categories – standard and
non-standard. Manual annotation was done by three annotators. Every text was
labelled by each annotator, i.e. each text got three labels. The annotator had to
choose one category from a set of labels (standard, non-standard, could not deter-
mine). The final category for each text depended on the majority voting scheme,
e.g if a text is labelled as standard, standard and could not determine, then the
final category will be standard. If there was a disagreement between annotators
(e.g text got judged as standard, non-standard and could not determine), then
a fourth person was included for the final decision.
The annotators were given some instructions, but the exact amount of non-
standard features (deviating ortography etc) a text had to contain in order to
be labelled as non-standard was not given. The decision relied on the raters’
intuition. For instance a text should be labelled as non-standard if a) it contains
orthographic errors, b) the author of the text is ignoring the spelling conventions
(e.g not capitalizing the first word of a sentence or the first letter of a proper
name, ignoring the punctuation rules), c) the author of the text abbriviates
words (e.g krt & kurat “damn it”, pmst & põhimõtteliselt “in principle”, nv &
nädalavahetus “weekend”), d) it contains particles that are common for spoken
language (e.g aaa, hmm, mkm) and e) it contains loanwords that are common
for spoken language (e.g poindile pihta saama “to get the point”, khuul “cool”).
The observed and inter-annotator agreement measures of the manual anno-
tation are depicted in Table 4. Overall, a substantial reliability with the observed
agreement of 72% and Fleiss’ kappa [8] of 0.656 was achieved. Both measures
were also computed for each original genre category in order to identify the most
and least agreed-on genre class. Fleiss’ kappa values for the blog, unknown, in-
formative and periodical categories illustrate substantial or moderate agreement
among the raters, i.e. accordingly 0.531, 0.586, 0.589 and 0.689.
The results for the rest of the original genres was a bit alarming. The Fleiss’
kappa values for religion and forum categories illustrate a slight agreement, i.e.
0.077 and 0.118. The kappa value for the government type texts is below zero, i.e.
-0.043, indicating that there is no agreement between the raters. But if looking
closely at Table 4, one can see that the observed agreement for the government
category is the highest, i.e. 88%. Then, why is the inter-annotator agreement so
low? These results imply that if one of the categories is much more likely than the
other, then some probablities are going to be higher and this in turn will make
the Fleiss’ kappa much lower. In other words, government type texts are more
likely to follow standard written language norms6 which means that the data is
highly homogeneous in that sense and the lack of heterogeneity produces a lower
6 In the end 100% of the texts originating from the government category were labelled
as following standard written language norms
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kappa score. The same applies for the forum7 and religion8 genre categories. The
aim of this paper is not about redoing the semi-automatic classification, the aim
of this part is just to describe the test set according to its original environment.
Table 4: The observed and inter-annotator agreement of the manual annotation











According to the annotators’ feedback there were some issues. For instance,
it was diﬃcult to classify texts that were originally labelled as forum because
these texts are heterogeneous consisting of posts and replies from diﬀerent users
(with each user having their own writing preferences). In addition, there were
texts in which the standard language content was followed by the non-standard
content (e.g. news text which was followed by the comments section). This has
nothing to do with the text per se, but rather because the XML parsing was not
done properly. In fact, it is very diﬃcult to decide firmly if a text belongs to a
certain category or not. How many orthographic and spelling errors does it take
for a text to be categorized as non-standard? It would be wiser to handle texts
as a continuum where some texts are more and others less standard. However,
for this study it was necessary to firmly divide these texts into two diﬀerent
categories.
Classification Results of the Second Experiment. This second experiment
uses those classification models which were built during the first experiment in
order to find out how well these models perform on classifying the target input.
All parameters were the same as in the first experiment. The results of classifying
the manually labelled test set are shown in Table 5.
In summary, compared to the results of the first experiment there is a clear
tendency of decreasing accuracy results in the second experiment (see Table 2
and 5). From the data in Table 5, it can be seen that the random forest was the
7 In the end 95% of texts originating from the forum category were labelled as following
the non-standard written language norms
8 In the end 100% of the texts originating from the religion category were labelled as
following the standard written language norms
46
48
Table 5: Accuracy results on the Manullay Labelled Test Set
Model df=1 df=2 df=3 df=4 df=5 df=6 df=7 df=8
MNNB 0.677 0.686 0.686 0.691 0.695 0.695 0.705 0.709
LR 0.645 0.595 0.600 0.595 0.595 0.605 0.595 0.595
LSVC 0.591 0.65 0.645 0.645 0.641 0.645 0.645 0.641
RF 0.486 0.509 0.523 0.509 0.514 0.527 0.595 0.500
MLP 0.727 0.727 0.727 0.727 0.732 0.736 0.736 0.736
Notes: MNNB = multinomial Naive Bayes, LR = logistic
regression, LSVC = linear support vector, RF = random
forest, MLP = multi-layer perceptron.
most poorly performing learning algorithm with the accuracy between 0.486–
0.595, i.e. every other text was labelled into the wrong category. Support vector
machine and logistic regression performed equally poorly – every third text was
labelled into the wrong category. Yet again, the best performer was the multi-
layer perceptron with an accuracy of 0.736 (mindf=6), i.e. it labelled 3 out of 4
texts into the right category.
Since the accuracy metric alone can be misleading if the number of observa-
tions per category in the training set are unbalanced (see Tabel 1), a confusion
matrix and other evaluation metrics (i.e. precision, recall and F-score) for the
best performing learning algorithm, i.e. MLP model, will be presented. Figure
1 shows how the evaluation metrics diﬀer throughout the mindf value. As you
can see, the results are very stable, but for each metric there is a slight increase
with the rise of the mindf .













Fig. 1: Evaluation metrics for MLP
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Tabel 6 presents the prediction results while the mindf equals to 6 while the
accuracy was 0.736 (see also Table 5). The idea behind presenting the confusion
matrix is to see in which cases the MLP model does a wrong decision. If we look at
the Table 6, the total of texts originally categorized as standard is 120 (91+29)
and the total of texts originally categorized as non-standard is 100 (29+71).
The total of texts that should have been categorized as standard but weren’t
is 29, which means that 25% (29 texts) of texts were incorrectly classified into
the non-standard category (false positives) and 75% (91 texts) were classified
correctly (true postives). The total of texts that should have been categorized
as non-standard but weren’t is 29, which means that 29% (29 texts) of texts
were incorrectly classified into the standard category (false negatives) and 71%
(71 texts) were classified correctly (true negatives). This means that the MLP
model isn’t biased towards one or the other category since the false negatives
and false positives have roughly the same percentage.






standard TP = 91 FN = 29
Actual:
non-standard FP = 29 TN = 71
Overall, based on the second experiment it can be assumed that the language
diversity in the etTenTen13 can not be modelled using that kind of a training
set, i.e. the Balanced Corpus of Estonian and the New Media corpus. Also, there
is a possibility that the decreased performance is because the user-generated
content of the Estonian Web corpus is a bit diﬀerent from the content of the
New Media corpus (texts originating from the years of 2000–2008). It has been
witnessed that language of the Estonian Web is shifting into being more like the
standard written language. These results further support this idea.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
Corpus linguists and language technologists are turning to the Web as a source
of language data which is freely available and oﬀers a big variety of texts. Next
to traditional standard written texts (e.g. news, fiction) there is also noisy user-
generated content which does not meet the standardized language norms and
contains a lot of variation. This has aroused an interest in automatic Web genre
classification. While most research on automatic classification has focused on
classifying multiple genres, but the objective of this paper is to do a binary clas-
sification: classify texts as following or not following standard written Estonian
language norms. The reason behind it is practical – there are no classification
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tools for Estonian that can discriminate noisy textual data from well-written
texts. These tools are needed for checking whether there is a need for text nor-
malization and also allows to choose appropriate preprocessing methods.
The aim of the article is to describe and present the results of the auto-
matic classification of Estonian Web texts which is a type of supervised learning
problem that aims to categorize texts into a set of predefined categories based
on the labelled training data. This paper evaluates the quality of the diﬀerent
classification models on the training set and manually labelled test set.
These models were trained on the Balanced Corpus of Estonian (example
of standard written language) and New Media corpus (example of non-standard
written language). To test the classification models it was necessary to compose a
manually labelled subcorpus of Estonian Web texts. Classification models were
built by using diﬀerent supervised machine learning algorithms and BoW as
features. The results obtained from the preliminary experiments show that neural
networks outperformed other supervised machine learning algorithms, achieving
over 0.7 on accuracy.
These results are good, but in order to increase the performance of the classi-
fiers adding new structural, lexical features and text statistics (e.g. POS count,
sentences per paragraph, words per sentence, uppercase and lowercase letters
per sentence etc) should be tested. The best model, neural network classifier,
achieved an accuracy of 0.99 on training set, but on test set it only achieved
little over 0.73. This suggests that future work requiers a bigger and more ap-
propriate training set. Ideally, the test and training set should follow the same
probability distribution. However, since there isn’t a corpus which has been clas-
sified into two categories (texts following standard written language norms and
texts following non-standard written language norms), these corpora were used
as a training set because they have been manually compiled – hence, their lan-
guage usage is known.
The manual labelling task showed that the transition from being standard
written Estonian to non-standard is very smooth. At the moment models produce
a score between 0 and 1, indicating belonging to a class or not. Therefore, the
classification model should be tuned to be predictive, i.e. instead of giving a
discrete value, its output should be the probability score. Then, the text will be
categorized based on that score.
The long-term aim is to create a new classification or modify the existing
one (i.e. the etTenTen classification), however prior to that the Estonian Web
texts need to be classified into two categories: either following or not following
standard written language norms. The rest of the classification will be built on
that.
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Abstract. In neural machine translation (NMT), researchers face the
challenge of un-seen (or out-of-vocabulary OOV) words translation. To
solve this, some researchers propose the splitting of western languages
such as English and German into sub-words or compounds. In this paper,
we try to address this OOV issue and improve the NMT adequacy with
a harder language Chinese whose characters are even more sophisticated
in composition. We integrate the Chinese radicals into the NMT model
with di erent settings to address the unseen words challenge in Chinese
to English translation. On the other hand, this also can be considered as
semantic part of the MT system since the Chinese radicals usually carry
the essential meaning of the words they are constructed in. Meaningful
radicals and new characters can be integrated into the NMT systems with
our models. We use an attention-based NMT system as a strong baseline
system. The experiments on standard Chinese-to-English NIST trans-
lation shared task data 2006 and 2008 show that our designed models
outperform the baseline model in a wide range of state-of-the-art eval-
uation metrics including LEPOR, BEER, and CharacTER, in addition
to BLEU and NIST scores, especially on the adequacy-level translation.
We also have some interesting findings from the results of our various
experiment settings about the performance of words and characters in
Chinese NMT, which is di erent with other languages. For instance, the
fully character level NMT may perform well or the state of the art in
some other languages as researchers demonstrated recently, however, in
the Chinese NMT model, word boundary knowledge is important for the
model learning. 3
Keywords: Machine Translation · Chinese-English Translation · Chi-
nese Radicals · Neural Networks · Translation Evaluation.
1 Introduction
Neural Machine Translation (NMT) models treat MT task as encoder-decoder
work-flow which is much di erent from the conventional SMT structure [7]. The
3 * parallel authors, ranked by alphabet order
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森 樹 橋
木 : mù (wood)
森 (forest) 樹 (tree) 橋 (bridge)
Fig. 1: Radical as independent character.
encoder applies in the source language side learning the sentences into vector
representations, while the decoder applies in the target language side generat-
ing the words from the target side vectors. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN)
models are usually used for both encoder and decoder, though there are some
researchers employing convolutions neural networks (CNN) like [6, 15]. The hid-
den layers in the neural nets are designed to learn and transfer the information
[22]. There were some drawbacks in the NMT models e.g. lack of alignment in-
formation between source and target side, and less transparency, etc. To address
these, attention mechanism was introduced to the decoder first by [1] to pay
interests to part information of the source sentence selectively, instead of the
whole sentence always, when the model is doing translation.
Another drawback of NMT is that the NMT systems usually produce better
fluent output, however, the adequacy is lower sometimes compared with the
conventional SMT, e.g. some meaning from the source sentences will be lost
in the translation side when the sentence is long [28, 29, 16, 22, 6]. One kind of
reason of this phenomenon could be due to the unseen words problem, except
for the un-clear learning procedure of the neural nets. With this assumption, we
try to address the unseen words or out-of-vocabulary (OOV) words issue and
improve the adequacy level by exploring the Chinese radicals into NMT.
For Chinese radical knowledge, let’s see two examples about their construc-
tion in the corresponding characters. This Figure 1 shows three Chinese char-
acters (forest, tree, bridge) which contain the same part of radical (wood) and
this radical can be a character independently in usage. In the history, Chinese
bridge was built by wood usually, so apparently, these three characters carry the
similar meaning that they all contain something related with woods.
The Figure 2 shows three Chinese characters (grass, medicine, tea) which con-
tain the same part of radical (grass) however this radical can not be a character
independently in usage. This radical means grass in the original development of
Chinese language. In the history, Chinese medicine was usually developed from
some nature things like the grass, and Chinese tea was usually from the leafs that
are related with grass. To the best knowledge of the authors at the submission
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草藥茶 
  : cǎo (grass)
草 (grass) 藥 (medicine) 茶 (tea)
Fig. 2: Radical as non-independent character.
2 Related Work
MT models have been developed by utilizing smaller units, i.e. phrase-level to
word-level, sub-word level and character-level [24, 8]. However, for Chinese lan-
guage, sub-character level or radical level is also a quite interesting topic since
the Chinese radicals carry somehow essential meanings of the Chinese characters
that they are constructed in. Some of the radicals splitted from the characters
can be independent new characters, meanwhile, there are some other radicals
that can not be independent as characters though they also have meanings. It
would be very interesting to see how these radicals or the combination of them
and traditional words/characters perform in the NMT systems.
There are some published works about the investigation of Chinese radicals
embedding for other tasks of NLP, such as [25, 18] explored the radical usage for
word segmentation and text categorization.
Some MT researchers explored the word composition knowledge into the
systems, especially on the western languages. For instance, [21] developed a
Machine Translation model on English-German and English-Finnish with the
consideration of synthesizing compound words. This kind of knowledge is similar
like the splitting Chinese character into new characters.
3 Model Design
3.1 Attention-based NMT
Typically, as mentioned before, neural machine translation (NMT) builds on an
encoder-decoder framework [1, 27] based on recurrent neural networks (RNN).
In this paper, we take the NMT architecture proposed by [1]. In NMT sys-
tem, the encoder apples a bidirectional RNN to encode a source sentence x =
(x1, x2, ..., xTx) and repeatedly generates the hidden vectors h = (h1, h2, ..., hTx)












hj can be computed as follows:
54
56





where function f is defined as a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [9].
The decoder is also an RNN that predicts the next word yt given the context
vector ct, the hidden state of the decoder st and the previous predicted word
yt 1, which is computed by:
p(yt|y<t, x) = softmax(g(st, yt 1, ct)) (2)
where g is a non-linear function. and st is the state of decoder RNN at time step
t, which is calculated by:
st = f(st 1, yt 1, ct) (3)
where ct is the context represent vector of source sentence.











a tanh(st 1, hj) (6)
We also follow the implementation of attention-based NMT of dl4mt tutorial
4, which enhances the attention model by feeding the previous word yt 1 to it,
therefore the etj is calculated by:
etj = v
T
a tanh( st 1, hj) (7)
where  st 1 = f(st 1, yt 1), and f is a GRU function. The hidden state of the
decoder is updated as following:
st = f( st 1, ct) (8)
In this paper, we use the attention-based NMT with the changes from dl4mt
tutorial 5 as our baseline and call it RNNSearch*6.
4 github.com/nyu-dl/dl4mt-tutorial/tree/master/ session2
5 github.com/nyu-dl/dl4mt-tutorial
6 To distinguish it from RNNSearch as in the paper [1]
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Fig. 3: Architecture of NMT with multi-embedding.
3.2 Our model
Traditional NMT model usually uses the word-level or character-level informa-
tion as the inputs of encoder, which ignores some knowledge of the source sen-
tence, especially for Chinese language. Chinese words are usually composed of
multiple characters, and characters can be further splitted into radicals. The
Chinese character construction is very complected, varying from upper-lower
structure, left-right structure, to inside-outside structure and the combination
of them. In this paper, we use the radical, character and word as multiple inputs
of NMT and expect NMT model can learn more useful features based on the
di erent levels of input integration.
Figure 3 illustrates our proposed model. The input embedding xj consists of
three parts: word embedding wj , character embedding zj 7 and radical embed-
ding rj , as follows:
xj = [wj ; zj ; rj ] (9)
where ‘;’ is concatenate operation.
For the word wj , it can be split into characters zj = (zj1, zj2, ..., zjm) and
further split into radicals rj = (rj1, rj2, ..., rjn). In our model, we use simple ad-
ditions operation to get the character representation and radical representation









7 We use the character ‘z’ to represent character, instead of ‘c’, because we already
used ‘c’ as representation of context vector.
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Each word can be decomposed into di erent numbers of character and radical,
and, by addition operations, we can generate a fixed length representation. In
principle our model can handle di erent levels of input from their combinations.
For Chinese character decomposition, e.g. the radicals generation, we use the
HanziJS open source toolkit 8. On the usage of target vocabulary [14], we choose
30,000 as the volume size.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experiments Setting
We used 1.25 million parallel Chinese-English sentences for training, which con-
tain 80.9 millions Chinese words and 86.4 millions English words. The data
is mainly from Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC) 9 parallel corpora, such as
LDC2002E18, LDC2003E07, LDC2003E14, LDC2004T07, LDC2004T08, and
LDC2005T06. We tune the models with NIST06 as development data using
BLEU metric [23], and use NIST08 Chinese-English parallel corpus as testing
data with four references.
For the baseline model RNNSearch*, in order to e ectively train the model,
we limit the maximum sentence length on both source and target side to 50. We
also limit both the source and target vocabularies to the most frequent 30k words
and replace rare words with a special token “UNK” in Chinese and English.
The vocabularies cover approximately 97.7% and 99.3% of the two corpora,
respectively. Both the encoder and decoder of RNNsearch* have 1000 hidden
units. The encoder of RNNsearch consists of a forward (1000 hidden unit) and
backward bidirectional RNN. The word embedding dimension is set as 620. We
incorporate dropout [13] strategy on the output layer. We used the stochastic
descent algorithm with mini-batch and Adadelta [31] to train the model. The
parameters   and   of Adadelta are set to 0.95 and 10 6. Once the RNNsearch*
model is trained, we adopt a beam search to find possible translations with
high probabilities. We set the beam width of RNNsearch* to 10. The model
parameters are selected according to the maximum BLEU score points on the
development set.
For our proposed model, all the experimental settings are the same as RNNSearch*,
except for the word-embedding dimension and the size of the vocabularies. In
our model, we set the word, character and radical to have the same dimension,
all 620. The vocabulary sizes of word, character and radical are set to 30k, 2.5k
and 1k respectively.
To integrate the character radicals into NMT system, we designed several
di erent settings as demonstrated in the table. Both the baseline and our settings












Table 1: Model Settings
4.2 Evaluations
Firstly, there are many works reflecting the insu ciency of BLEU metric, such
as higher or lower BLEU scores do not necessarily reflect the model quality im-
provements or decreasing; BLEU scores are not interpretive by many translation
professionals; and BLEU did not correlate better than later developed metrics
in some language pairs [5, 4, 17].
In the light of such analytic works, we try to validate our work in a deeper
and broader evaluation setting from more aspects. We use a wide range of state
of the art MT evaluation metrics, which are developed in recent years, to do
a more comprehensive evaluation, including hLEPOR [11, 12], CharacTER [30],
BEER [26], in addition to BLEU and NIST [23].
The model hLEPOR is a tunable translation evaluation metric yielding higher
correlation with human judgments by adding n-gram position di erence penalty
factor into the traditional F-measures. CharacTER is a character level editing
distance rate metric. BEER uses permutation trees and character n-grams in-
tegrating many features such as paraphrase and syntax. They have shown top
performances in recent years’ WMT10 shared tasks [20, 19, 10, 3].
Both CharacTER and BEERmetrics achieved the parallel top performance in
correlation scores with human judgment on Chinese-to-English MT evaluation
in WMT-17 shared tasks [2] . While LEPOR metric series are evaluated by
MT researchers as one of the most distinguished metric families that are not
apparently outperformed by others, which is stated in the metrics comparison
work in [10] on standard WMT data.
Evaluation on Development Set On the development set NIST06, we got the
following evaluation scores. The cumulative N-gram scoring of BLEU and NIST
metric, with bold case as the highlight of the winner in each n-gram column
situation, is shown in the table respectively. Researchers usually report their
4-gram BLEU while 5-gram NIST metric scores, so we also follow this tradition
here:
From the scoring results, we can see that the model setting one, i.e. W+C+R,
won the baseline models in all uni-gram to 4-gram BLEU and to 5-gram NIST
scores. Furthermore, we can see that, by adding character and/or radical to the
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1-gram 2-gram 3-gram 4-gram
Baseline .7211 .5663 .4480 .3556
W+C+R .7420 .5783 .4534 .3562
W+C .7362 .5762 .4524 .3555
W+R .7346 .5730 .4491 .3529
C+R .7089 .5415 .4164 .3219
Table 2: BLEU Scores on NIST06 Development Data
1-gram 2-gram 3-gram 4-gram 5-gram
Baseline 5.8467 7.7916 8.3381 8.4796 8.5289
W+C+R 6.0047 7.9942 8.5473 8.6875 8.7346
W+C 5.9531 7.9438 8.5127 8.6526 8.6984
W+R 5.9372 7.9021 8.4573 8.5950 8.6432
C+R 5.6385 7.4379 7.9401 8.0662 8.1082
Table 3: NIST Scores on NIST06 Development Data
However, the setting 4 that only used character and radical information in the
model lost both BLEU and NIST scores compared with the word-level base-
line. This means that, for Chinese NMT, the word segmentation knowledge is
important to show some guiding in Chinese translation model learning.
For uni-gram BLEU score, our Model one gets 2.1 higher score than the
baseline model which means by combining W+C+R the model can yield higher
adequacy level translation, though the fluency score (4-gram) does not have
much di erence. This is exactly the point that we want to improve about neural
models, as complained by many researchers.
The evaluation scores with broader state-of-the-art metrics are shown in the
following table. Since CharacTER is an edit distance based metric, the lower
score means better translation result.
Metrics on Single Reference
Models hLEPOR BEER CharacTER
Baseline .5890 .5112 .9225
W+C+R .5972 .5167 .9169
W+C .5988 .5164 .9779
W+R .5942 .5146 .9568
C+R .5779 .4998 1.336
Table 4: Broader Metrics Scores on NIST06 Development Data
From the broader evaluation metrics, we can see that our designed models
also won the baseline system in all the metrics. Our model setting one, i.e. the
W+C+R model, won both BEER and CharacTER scores, while our model two,
i.e. the W+C, won the hLEPOR metric score, though the setting four continue
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to be the worest performance, which is consistent with the BLEU and NIST
metrics. Interestingly, we find that the CharacTER score of setting two and
three are both worse than the baseline, which means that by adding of character
and radical information separately the output translation needs more editing
e ort; however, if we add both the character and radical information into the
model, i.e. the setting one, then the editing e ort became less than the baseline.
Evaluation on Test Sets The evaluation results on the NIST08 Chinese-to-
English test date are presented in this section.
Firstly, we show the evaluation scores on BLEU and NIST metrics, with four
reference translations and case-insensitive setting. The tables show the cumula-
tive N-gram scores of BLEU and NIST, with bold case as the winner of each
n-gram situation in each column.
1-gram 2-gram 3-gram 4-gram
Baseline .6451 .4732 .3508 .2630
W+C+R .6609 .4839 .3572 .2655
W+C .6391 .4663 .3412 .2527
W+R .6474 .4736 .3503 .2607
C+R .6378 .4573 .3296 .2410
Table 5: BLEU Scores on NIST08 Test Data
1-gram 2-gram 3-gram 4-gram 5-gram
Baseline 5.1288 6.6648 7.0387 7.1149 7.1387
W+C+R 5.2858 6.8689 7.2520 7.3308 7.3535
W+C 5.0850 6.5977 6.9552 7.0250 7.0467
W+R 5.1122 6.6509 7.0289 7.1062 7.1291
C+R 5.0140 6.4731 6.8187 6.8873 6.9063
Table 6: NIST Scores on NIST08 Test Data
The results show that our model setting one won both BLEU and NIST
scores on each n-gram evaluation scheme, while model setting three, i.e. the
W+R model, won the uni-gram and bi-gram BLEU scores, and got very closed
score with the baseline model in NIST metric. Furthermore, the model setting
four, i.e. the C+R one, continue showing the worst ranking, which may verify
that word segmentation information and word boundaries are indeed helpful to
Chinese translation models, so we can not omit such part.
What worth to mention is that the detailed evaluation scores from BLEU
reflect our Model one yields higher BLEU score (1.58) on uni-gram, similar with
the results on development data, while a little bit higher performance on 4-gram
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(0.25). These mean that in the fluency level our translation is similar with the
state-of-the-art baseline, however, our model yields much better adequacy level
translation in NMT since uni-gram BLEU reflects the adequacy aspect instead
of fluency. This verifies the value of our model in the original problem we want
to address.
The evaluation results on recent years’ advanced metrics are shown below.
The scores are also evaluated on the four references scheme. We calculate the
average score of each metric from 4 references as the final evaluation score. Bold
case means the winner as usual.
Metrics Evaluated on 4-references
Models hLEPOR BEER CharacTER
Baseline .5519 .4748 0.9846
W+C+R .5530 .4778 1.3514
W+C .5444 .4712 1.1416
W+R .5458 .4717 0.9882
C+R .5353 .4634 1.1888
Table 7: Broader Metrics Scores on NIST08 Test Data
From the broader evaluations, we can see that our model setting one won both
the LEPOR and BEER metrics. Though the baseline model won the CharacTER
metric, the margin between the two scores from baseline (.9846) and our model
three, i.e. W+R, (.9882) is quite small around 0.0036. Continuously, the setting
four with C+R performed the worst though and verified our previous findings.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented the di erent performances of the multiple model settings by in-
tegrating Chinese character and radicals into state-of-the-art attention-based
neural machine translation systems, which can be helpful information for other
researchers to look inside and gain general clues about how the radical works.
Our model shows the full character+radical is not enough or suitable for
Chinese language translation, which is di erent with the work on western lan-
guages such as [8]. Our model results showed that the word segmentation and
word boundary are helpful knowledge for Chinese translation systems.
Even though our model settings won both the traditional BLEU and NIST
metrics, the recent years developed advanced metrics indeed showed some dif-
ferences and interesting phenomena, especially the character level translation
error rate metric CharacTER. This can encourage MT researchers to use the
state-of-the-art metrics to find useful insight of their models.
Although the combination of words, characters and radicals mostly yielded
the best scores, the broad evaluations also showed that the model setting W+R,
i.e. using both words and radicals information, is generally better than the model
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setting W+C, i.e. words plus characters without radical, which verified the value
of our work by exploring radicals into Chinese NMT. Our Model one yielded
much better adequacy level translation output (by uni-gram BLEU score) com-
pared with the baseline system, which also showed that this work is important
in exploring how to improve adequacy aspect of neural models.
In the future work, we will continue to optimize our models and use more
testing data to verify the performances. In this work, we aimed at exploring
the e ectiveness of Chinese radicals, so we did not use BPE for English side
splitting, however, to promote the state-of-the-art Chinese-English translation,
in our future extension, we will apply the splitting on both Chinese and English
sides. We will also investigate the usage of Chinese radicals into MT evaluation
area, since they carry the language meanings.
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Abstract. There has been much work in linguistics and cognitive sci-
ence regarding the semantics of spatial prepositions, highlighting the
complexity of representing their meaning. However, much of this insight
has not yet been translated into a satisfactory computational model. A
central problem with existing frameworks is the lack of non-geometric
features. In this paper we firstly argue for cognitive adequacy of the se-
mantic representation and we consider how conceptual spaces may aid
this representation task. We then consider how salient features, both ge-
ometric and non-geometric, may be integrated into the framework such
that the model is more closely aligned with the way humans conceptu-
alize spatial prepositions.
Keywords: Semantics · Spatial cognition · Conceptual spaces
1 Introduction
The aim of this project is to provide a robust, cognitively-aligned framework
for modelling spatial prepositions that can be used for natural language under-
standing and generation. In particular we consider (1) the problem of selecting
appropriate objects when given locative descriptions and (2) the problem of
generating appropriate locative referring expressions.
There are a relatively small number of spatial prepositions in the English
language which are used to encode a potentially infinite set of possible configu-
rations of entities. This necessitates spatial prepositions to be broad and flexible
in their meaning, exhibiting vagueness and polysemy, and poses problems for
many systems where commands or queries are given in natural language.
There has been much work in linguistics and cognitive science regarding
the meaning of spatial prepositions, highlighting the di erent roles various fea-
tures can play in influencing preposition use. However, this insight has not yet
been translated into a satisfactory computational model. Existing computational
models of spatial prepositions for robots/visual systems tend to be on very con-
strained environments or give preference to big data over linguistic understand-
ing.
As a preliminary task to assess the adequacy of our model we intend to con-
struct virtual table top environments containing many similar objects in various




to assess features such as ‘the degree of location control’. Human subjects will
firstly be asked to annotate the environments by assigning spatial prepositions
to pairs of objects. Subjects will also be asked to identify specific objects when
given spatial definite descriptions e.g. ‘the pencil in the mug’. We will then use
this data to help construct and test our framework.
1.1 Motivation
The main motivation for this project is to help mediate human-robot interaction.
Humans often prefer brief, ambiguous descriptions over lengthy, unambiguous
descriptions [41] and locative expressions often fulfil this desire for brevity. For
example, rather than referring to objects based on elaborate visual attributes
like ‘the yellow cup with two pink dots on it’, humans often refer to objects using
simple locative expressions, say ‘the cup next to the stapler’. We also see many
examples of these expressions in the SemEval-2014 corpus [16] and the HuRIC
corpus [6], both of which consider natural language commands given to robots.
2 Related Work
In this section we firstly give a brief description of some attempts to model the
semantics of spatial prepositions, in particular those creating representations in
a geometric space. We then consider more practical implementations.
2.1 Geometric Models
Though the main focus of cognitive modelling using geometric spaces has often
been on non-relational concepts such as natural kinds [39], there has been more
recent work focussing on relational concepts.
We first consider the early work of Abella and Kender [1] who aim to represent
the semantics of spatial prepositions in a multidimensional geometric space. They
define the prepositions near, far, inside, above, below, aligned and next based on
twelve physical properties such as object area and shortest distance between two
objects. These properties form the dimensions of the space. Each preposition is
then represented as a set of inequalities along each dimension which creates a set
of points in the given 12-D space. Though their work is preliminary, Abella and
Kender hope that by using a spatial representation new insights will be gained
into the prepositions and how they relate to each other. Due to the inherent
vagueness of spatial prepositions Abella and Kender argue for ‘fuzzification’ to
be incorporated in the model. This fuzzification is to be achieved using fuzzy
sets [46], beginning with ‘ideal’ regions for prepositions, this is a crisp set, and
then a fuzzy set is given by a distance function from the ideal region.
Since the influential work of Ga¨rdenfors on conceptual spaces [24] there has
been an increased interest in geometric semantic representations, see [13, 42, 49].
The geometric structure that makes up a conceptual space is a one or multi-
dimensional metric space where the dimensions of the space, known as ‘quality
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dimensions’, represent qualities of concepts such as temperature, weight, bright-
ness etc.. Some quality dimensions are grouped as ‘domains’, for example the
colour domain is composed of the hue, saturation and brightness dimensions.
The work of Ga¨rdenfors on spatial prepositions [25] provides strong motiva-
tion for the direction taken in the current paper, so we outline this work here.
The central thesis of his paper is that prepositions can be represented by convex1
sets in a single domain. Ga¨rdenfors considers two classes of prepositions, those
based on the spatial domain and those based on the force domain. For those
based on the spatial domain Ga¨rdenfors provides various representations using
a notion of ‘betweenness’ based on polar co-ordinates such that the representing
sets are convex. Ga¨rdenfors then posits that ‘in’, ‘on’ and ‘against’ belong to the
force domain but does not provide an explicit method for representing them.
We however diverge from this thesis as, though we agree that some spatial
prepositions may be based on a single domain, we believe that it is necessary to
take into account various aspects of meaning in the representation. The spatial
and force domains are intimately linked, which Ga¨rdenfors does also concede
in stating that, for example, “there are examples where “in” is used purely
spatially”. See Sections 3.2 & 4 for further discussion on this issue.
2.2 Implementations
Here we consider related implementations, what we can learn from them and
how they may be improved.
In a task focussed on discourse and interaction [32] Moratz and Tenbrink
consider real world scenarios in which human subjects give locative descriptions
of objects to a robot which then has to move to the correct ‘goal’ object. They
create a computational model of projective prepositions, incorporating intrinsic
and relative reference frames and then experiment in a real environment.
Moratz and Tenbrink take an iterative approach, experimenting, analysing
and improving their system. This type of iterative approach recognizes the com-
plexity of discourse and allowed the researchers to identify strategies adopted by
the speakers in order to improve the system. We intend to emulate this iterative
approach in our implementations. From the experiments carried out they were
able to recognize various tendencies of the human subjects, for example ‘speak-
ers intuitively use the robot’s perspective’ and ‘applicability regions for spatial
expressions seem to be fairly large; they are not mutually exclusive’ [32].
So far, we have only considered hard-coded models of spatial prepositions
though there are many instances of trained models for similar tasks [3, 22, 23].
Guadarrama et al. [23] consider a task similar to [32], where objects are set
out on a table top and a robot must select the correct figure object2 when given
1 A region R is convex if for any two points x, y in R, if z is between x and y then
z is also in R. Note that various metrics can be assigned which alter the notion of
between
2 The figure object (also known as: target, trajector, referent) is the entity whose




a ground object3 and spatial preposition. They consider that trained models
of spatial prepositions perform better than hard-coded ones and so they use a
statistical model which is trained using annotated 3-D GoogleSketchup4 models.
They consider various models of features (simple, complex, psycholinguistic)
which allow for the creation of a hybrid model. The simple and complex features
are similar to that of [1] while the psycholinguistic features come from the more
cognitively motivated discussion of [36].
The recent work of Alomari et al. [3], though heavily focused on machine
learning, contains similar ideas to the current project; in particular with respect
to concept formation. Their work considered a robot with a table top envi-
ronment where the robot had to perform various manipulation tasks based on
natural language commands such as ‘place the apple in the bowl’. The robot was
able to successfully ground the language by training on segmented videos paired
with corresponding natural language commands as well as using a surprisingly
small amount of hard-coded knowledge.
Though machine learning and big data techniques for such commonsense
tasks can be attractive, as we discuss in [38], an over-reliance on statistical meth-
ods can be problematic when dealing with the intricacies of natural language. It
may be the case that with enough training data one of these statistical models
creates an internal representation that is closely aligned with a satisfactory cog-
nitive model. However, such models are likely to be highly context sensitive [14,
33], uninterpretable by humans and di cult to update on-the-fly. Also, there is
a lack of corpora for training for this task [5, 6].
The current project will be closely aligned with a lot of the themes present in
the pieces of work above, though as a fundamental di erence we will explicitly
incorporate functional and commonsense aspects of preposition use.
3 Modelling Spatial Prepositions
There has been much debate on what can be meaningfully said about spatial
prepositions and how they can be appropriately modelled [7, 12, 26, 47]. From
this we see a clear general consensus that to provide an adequate account of the
semantics of spatial prepositions non-geometric features must be considered.
There have been numerous attempts to model spatial prepositions [22, 28, 30,
40]. However, these methods do not yet incorporate significant non-geometric
salient features.
3.1 Cognition, Discourse & Conceptual Spaces
We believe that to appropriately pin down the semantics of natural language
one must use cognition as a basic point of reference — an ideal semantic repre-
sentation should be cognitively adequate [44]. Cognitive adequacy aids in under-
standing the conceptual representation employed by the people we are speaking
3 The ground object (also known as: reference, landmark, relatum) is the entity used
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to. We therefore believe that ideal semantic models for this task should be akin
to human conceptual models.
Relating to cognition and processing visual scenes, Herskovits [27] proposes
that humans generate locative expressions via schematization. Schematization is
the process of abstracting a physical scene from rich perceptual data to a sparse
semantic representation via idealization and approximation. In order to ade-
quately capture the meaning of spatial prepositions we must therefore consider
the mapping between language and the perceptual system [12].
Further, we recognize that, particularly during situated discourse, meaning is
not fixed across domains and individuals; nor even do individuals hold permanent
interpretations of the meaning of terms [17]. Context and individual preference
strongly influence how words are used and how their meaning is understood.
Therefore, attaining an understanding of an interlocutor’s conceptual represen-
tation is often a process that continues throughout discourse; the meaning of
terms emerge and are refined through conversation and context. We therefore
desire a semantic model which can be updated in a natural way throughout
discourse.
We propose that the influential cognitive framework of conceptual spaces
[24] provides a fitting semantic framework for this task. Conceptual spaces are
cognitively motivated, aim to make explicit the link between perceptual informa-
tion and symbolic expressions and provide potential mechanisms for naturally
updating concepts.
Regarding the ability to naturally update concepts, regions in a conceptual
space are ideally convex. Therefore, if it is necessary to generalize a concept by
including a new point or region, we can update the concept via taking the convex
hull5 of the new points with the old region. This hopefully provides a felicitous
way for generalizing concepts. This proposal requires further investigation, how-
ever, as of course this would not help when refining a concept and also depends
on the ability to achieve convex representations.
This section has provided motivation for the use of conceptual spaces. In
Section 4, after further discussion on the semantics of spatial prepositions, we
outline more precise details of which features should be included in the concep-
tual space.
3.2 Non-Geometric Aspects of Spatial Preposition Meaning
Distinguishing between the uses of spatial prepositions requires a consideration
of more than just relative locations of objects. This is a widely accepted view
in linguistics and cognitive science [12, 20, 21, 26, 48]. For example, the curvature
of a ground object influences the choice of ‘in’ or ‘on’ — explaining the use of
‘in’ for bowls and ‘on’ for plates [20]. Further, it is well accepted that the force
dynamics of objects heavily influences preposition use and that this should be
included in semantic models [12].




Some salient features, such as distance between two objects or their functional
interaction, may be identifiable through perception of a scene. We call these
features contextual. However, there are also many non-contextual features that
influence preposition use such as a ordances of objects and convention [12, 26].
We call these features inherent.
Identifying the inherent features requires commonsense knowledge of proper-
ties of objects and how they relate to each other. Though recognized as essential
for a full understanding of preposition use, the incorporation of commonsense
knowledge is an unexplored avenue in attempts to model spatial prepositions.
Indeed, most related work considers indistinct objects such as square blocks that
are not associated with particular conventions.
Tentative proposals for which features to include and how they can be incor-
porated into a conceptual space are discussed in the following section.
4 Salient Features
In order to provide more detail regarding salient features and their integration
into a conceptual space, we outline some important categories of features and
begin to construct a taxonomy.
4.1 Taxonomy of Features
We believe that the majority of features discussed in the literature can be split
into the following three broad categories :
1. Geometric: Relating to spatial aspects of a given scene e.g. the shortest
distance between two objects
2. Functional: Relating to the functional interplay between objects in a scene
e.g. the extent to which one object supports another or if there is a functional
electric connection between two objects
3. Conventional: Relating to how terms are commonly used e.g. one usually
says ‘on the bus’ but ‘in the car’ even though the geometric and functional
relations are very similar
These broad categories provide a basis for most spatial prepositions. In this
paper we further restrict attention to the particular case of ‘in’, see Figure 1.
We highlight two particularly salient geometric features for ‘in’ as ‘contain-
ment’ and ‘contact’. Next, we consider functional aspects of ‘in’ — the extent
to which the ground object exerts location control over the figure object and
the ‘usual’ degree of location control that this type of ground object can assert.
Finally we consider typical usage of prepositions in order to account for conven-
tional distinctions e.g. ‘in the bus’ or ‘on the bus’. The process of assessing and
refining these features is ongoing.
As shown in Figure 1 we recognize that there is significant interplay between
these categories e.g. geometric features can directly imply functional ones, con-
ventional features can imply functional ones etc..
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Fig. 1. The yellow section represents contextual features while teal represents inherent
features
We now consider each of these features in turn and how they can be appro-
priately categorized, providing some motivation for the distinctions drawn and
descriptions of how they may be valued. At present, due to the significant re-
search challenge that it presents (see [2, 11, 18, 19, 34, 45]), we omit some issues
relating to the extraction of qualitative spatial descriptions from visual scenes.
Containment The notion of containment is often cited as fundamental to the
preposition ‘in’ [7, 26]. Containment, however, arises in many di erent forms
depending on how the objects and the environments are idealized, consider the
usage of ‘in’ for ‘in a cup’, ‘crack in a glass’ and ‘in the town’ [7].
Considering the work of Cohn et al. [10], we can see that the Region Connec-
tion Calculus [35] with the convex hull operator is expressive enough to distin-
guish various important types of containment. Some empirical support for the
cognitive adequacy of the Region Connection Calculus is provided in [29, 31, 37].
Contact Though ‘in’ isn’t immediately associated with contact, we believe that
it can still play an important role. For example, it may be helpful for distin-
guishing ‘location control via containment’ and ‘location control via contact’.
Motivated by the distinctions drawn in results from experimental psychology
[4], we intend to distinguish various types of contact e.g. ‘on’ and ‘against’.
Degree of Location Control This feature is functionally motivated but (mostly)
geometrically derived. With initial implementations we will determine this by
running various simulations which assess whether a movement of the ground
object moves the figure object. However, it may be that crude methods for de-
termining location control, which translate better to the real world, will su ce
and this is an avenue of further work. The inclusion of location control is moti-




Usual Degree of Location Control There appears to be general consensus
that ‘in’ rather than ‘on’ is appropriate in cases where the ground object could
be described as a container. This is likely motivated by the location control
that containers usually a ord. However, the way humans conceptualize items
a ects preposition use [12]. When given exactly the same scene of an object on
a plate/dish, humans will describe the configuration as in when the ‘plate’ is
labelled as a dish, and on when labelled as a plate. For this reason, we consider
it important to incorporate such information in the semantic model.
We propose achieving this via two stages. First we intend to identify cer-
tain attributes which are associated with location control such as ‘concavity’ or
‘container’. Secondly, we intend to use commonsense knowledge in order to at-
tain a value for how closely related the ground object is to these attributes. For
example, this may be achieved by considering the weightings applied between
concepts in ConceptNet [43].
We, however, recognize that this feature may be subsumed by the following
conventional feature on typical word usage.
Typical Word Usage In order to further integrate conventional language
use we should consider how common certain prepositions are with certain fig-
ure/ground objects. This may be achieved via simple metrics such as results
from search engines or by combing through corpora. We make no reference to
the cognitive adequacy of conventional features, though we believe their inclusion
is clearly justified.
4.2 Integration within a Conceptual Space
We propose that each feature is used as a quality dimension where the functional
and conventional dimensions have numerical values representing, for example,
the degree of which the ground object exerts location control over the figure
object. In these cases the standard Euclidean metric can be applied.
Some of the geometric quality dimensions will, however, take distinct geomet-
ric relations as values. We propose that containment, for example, be described
by a set qualitative spatial relations. In order to represent this in a conceptual
space we can apply a metric between these relations via a conceptual neighbour-
hood graph, as in [42].
5 Implementation
In initial implementations we intend to model 3D table-top environments. These
models will also integrate physics engines, allowing for assessment of factors such
as location control. This allows preliminary testing of the semantic model prior
to a full-blown real-world implementation.
These models will be used to collect data and also to test the semantic
representation, as described below.
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5.1 Data Collection
Firstly, we highlight that there are distinct tasks that require distinct represen-
tations and/or methods of interpretation. In this project we consider the two
broad categories of language generation and language interpretation. The gener-
ation side requires that the system can produce appropriate locative expressions
to describe objects in a given scene. The interpretation side requires that the
system can identify objects being referred to in a scene when given locative
expressions.
We can see that there are slight di erences in how the semantics are dealt
with for these two tasks. For example, when describing somebody, Alan say, sat
on a bus it would be inappropriate for the system to generate ‘Alan is in a bus’.
However, given that, say, Alan is sitting alone on a bus, it would be expected
that the system interpret ‘the person in the bus’ as ‘Alan’.
The data collected will reflect this distinction. We intend to have human
subjects firstly annotate visual scenes describing relationships between objects
using spatial prepositions. We will then ask subjects to identify objects in the
scene when given definite descriptions e.g. ‘the book on the chair’ as well as
answer questions such as ‘is the book on the chair?’.
5.2 Concept Creation & Testing
Assuming that quality dimensions have been assigned, the data collected will
be input into the conceptual space, giving a conceptual space populated by
numerous points, or instances, of a given preposition. In order to do this, various
features from the scene must be extracted and initially this will be done by a
human expert. Acquisition of the geometric features by an expert is likely to
be simple and accurate, however the precise details of evaluating functional and
conventional features are still to be determined.
The resulting conceptual space must then be analysed to assess if the in-
stances can be grouped in a meaningful way. In an ideal scenario this would be
done by taking the convex hull of every point in the space. However, this is likely
to create over-generalized representations. What we expect to find is that pol-
ysemes become apparent in the space. If this is the case we will need to cluster
the points together. This is not a novel idea, see [9, 15]. Also, the conceptual
space implementation of [8] supports su cient operations for creation of such
clustering algorithms.
The process of creating an appropriate conceptual space will be iterative —
creating quality dimensions, inputting data and then using clustering to distin-
guish concepts. We will then analyse the clusters that arise to decide if they are
meaningful and/or if they miss important examples.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
We believe that we can provide a framework for understanding and generat-




broader range of features. We intend to achieve this by drawing on the existing
wealth of research in the topic, deepening the semantic analysis and adding qual-
ity dimensions in the conceptual space to reflect non-geometric salient features.
Once a representation space has been established we intend to analyse exactly
how this can be employed in discourse and to further investigate the semantics
of spatial prepositions. Firstly, we will consider how the representation can be
updated to model an interlocutor’s standpoint during discourse. Secondly, we
will examine whether prototypes can be assigned in the space along with an ap-
propriate metric. This will aid the process of disambiguating ambiguous definite
descriptions. Finally, we will investigate whether the framework sheds light on
the polysemous nature of spatial prepositions and if distinct polysemes can be
identified.
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Abstract. We tackle the practical problem of finding a good rule to
recommend a collective set of news items to a group of media consumers
with possibly very disparate individual interest in the available items.
For our analysis, we adapt a formal framework from voting theory in
Computational Social Choice to the media setting in order to compare
the performance of five recommendation rules with respect to several
desirable properties of recommendation sets. Through simulations, we
find that polarization of the audience limits how well these rules can
perform in general. On the other hand, greater diversity or universality
can be achieved at only low cost in utility.
1 Introduction
How to balance the media’s core function of providing news that is relevant to
society at large against the increasing economic necessity of o ering an individ-
ually tailored product? News media face a dilemma: Either submit to highly
personalized news feeds on online social media networks that drive political
fragmentation, partisanship and contribute to the erosion of society’s commonly
accepted factual base; or risk losing disgruntled readers, who feel that the issues
which they consider important are inadequately represented in the mainstream
media, to less reliable Internet news outlets.
Common recommender systems such as matrix factorization algorithms cre-
ate highly individualized rankings over items based on the users’ past behavior
(Jannach, Resnick, Tuzhilin, & Zanker, 2016). Could those rankings be aggre-
gated in a principled way to generate a common set of essential readings for the
whole user group?
The present paper takes a step towards addressing this problem by designing
and testing a number of such aggregation rules for news articles using the tools of
Social Choice Theory. All that is needed for the rule to work is an ordering of the
news articles from first to last according to their importance for each agent. The
way in which this preference ordering is elicited from the individual is left open;
depending on the concrete application, the data can be thought of as output of
a recommender system as suggested above, but could also be explicitly provided
by the consumers or gathered by data mining techniques.
Naturally, there are certain properties one would expect such a collection
of essential articles to have. The total length of recommended articles for a
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newspaper’s title page, for example, should not exceed its character limit which
relates to a problem of making collective choices with a restricted budget (Lu
& Boutilier, 2011). Likewise, there are relations between the essential articles
and the rankings by the individuals one would like to see respected by a recom-
mendation rule. For instance, if all consumers detest a certain news item, then
it should certainly not be featured in the essential collection instead of another
item prioritized by everybody.
This paper aims at better understanding of collective recommendation rules
in media settings by formally studying the interaction between rules and proper-
ties of their recommendations. We suggest performance metrics to analyze ben-
efits and drawbacks of various ways to determine a set of essential news items
for a group, given each member’s individual preferences over said items. We
proceed by running simulations to estimate the performance of the aggregation
rules according to those metrics.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we provide the formal defi-
nition of the recommendation problem as we want to study it. In Section 3 we
propose and formally present desirable properties a collection of recommended
articles ought to have. In Section 4 we propose five rules for the task of turn-
ing individual preferences into a single recommendation. Section 5 contains the
methodology, presentation and discussion of our simulation results and suggests
directions for future work while Section 6 concludes.
2 Formal Framework
This section specifies the formal framework we use. There is a set of news items
A = {a1, . . . , am}, a subset of which are the recommended items W   A for a
group of consumers N = {1, . . . , n}. Each consumer i   N has preferences over
A represented by a strict, total order  i. Let L(A) be the set of such orders.
Then the preference orders of a set of consumers N over news items A form a
profile of preferences R   Ln.
Depending on the context, the cost could be interpreted as the time it takes
to read an article, the cognitive resources it takes a consumer to digest it or
simply character length. Consequently, each item in A is assigned a specific cost
by a function C : A  N. Notice that the notion of cost can be straightforwardly






In addition, Cm(A) denotes the Cartesian product over C(a1)  ... C(am).
Furthermore, we consider the utility that the inclusion of an article in the rec-
ommendation set gives to particular readers. We follow Lu and Boutilier (2011)
in deriving pseudo-utilities from readers’ preference orders. For present purposes
we used the Borda score, that is, ui outputs the value m 1 for consumer i’s top
item, m  2 for the second one and so forth. This choice allows for simplicity of
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the considered setting. It provides a straightforward conversion of rankings over
objects to their utility for users. This approach can be useful when a designer
of a recommendation system only has information about rankings of options
for particular users, not about the extent to which agents would desire them.
Other ways of defining utilities are also compatible with our framework. Their
exploration would be an interesting direction for future research.
The utility for a consumer i is given by a function:
ui : Ln  N  A  N
Similarly to the cost of articles, their utility can also be generalized to sets







i=1 ui(a). In addition, C
m(A) denotes the Cartesian product
over C(a1)  ...  C(am).
Finally, as these resources are limited we assume a budget B   N 0. In
addition, for any B   N 0, denote by WB the set of all elements of P(A) s.t.
C(W )   B.
Given the notions provided above, we can formulate the definition of a rec-
ommendation rule. The recommendation rule then is a function from profiles,
cost and the budget to recommended items:
F : Ln   Nm   N 0   2A
3 Performance Metrics
We study what properties might justify calling a recommendation “essential”.
The desired properties of functions selecting a number of options from a set, such
as those provided by Elkind, Faliszewski, Skowron, and Slinko (2017), are often
binary. A specific function either satisfies them, or it does not. Such properties
are standardly referred to as axioms. Compared to the sinlge winner case, axioms
on multiwinner rules tend to be less salient and enlightening. Therefore, in this
work we chose to study properties which functions might satisfy to a certain
degree.1 This choice allows for a more robust comparison between performance
of di erent functions. We refer to those properties as metrics.
3.1 Utility Maximization
This metric follows the long tradition arguing in favor of utilitarian social welfare
functions (e.g. (Mill, 1874)). Recall that WB is the set of all elements of P(A)
s.t. C(W )   B. A recommendation set W satisfies Utility Maximization i :
1 We also obtained results of the axiomatic variant but chose to omit them to be able






The motivation behind this property is that, arguably, a recommendation set
should get consumers the highest possible payo . For example, highly popular
items about viral memes or the latest celebrity scandals would be favored under
a rule that maximizes utility. Even if it does not, it is of interest to assess how
far away it is from the optimum. When investigating rules along various other
performance dimensions, this allows us to determine the price in terms of utility
of improving recommendation sets with respect to those metrics.
3.2 Gini-Coe cient
The Gini-coe cient is the most commonly used measure of inequality in a pop-
ulation. There are many equivalent definitions of the Gini-coe cient (Yitzhaki
& Schechtman, 2012, Chapter 2), we define it here in terms of the mean absolute
di erence between utilities, i.e.:
G(W ) =
E[|ui   uj |]







|ui   uj |





|ui   uj |
2|W |u(W )
The Gini-coe cient ranges from 0 (perfect equality, i.e. everybody has the
same amount of utility) to 1 (perfect inequality, one agent has all the utility). We
care about the Gini-coe cient since unequal distributions of utility increase the
likelihood that the worst-o  consumers lose interest. But desertion of too large
a part of the audience would defeat the point of a common recommendation set.
Instead the goal might be to keep everyone just happy enough to keep engaged.
For example, construing the recommendation set as the set of characters
on a popular TV show, a producer might face the choice, which, if any, of the
characters they should kill o . Killing nobody may take away from the show’s
suspense. Killing too popular a character may outrage the character’s fans too
the point of losing interest in the show. Instead, hurting everybody a little may
just be the best option. Recommendation sets with a low Gini-coe cient are
thus arguably preferable to highly unequal ones.
3.3 Condorcet-Based Metrics
The next two metrics are inspired by the influential Condorcet-criterion for as-
sessing voting rules. The intuition behind the Condorcet method is that pairwise
contests should determine winners in an election. An item a is a Condorcet-
winnner i  it beats every other item b in a majority contest. I.e., a is ranked
above b on a majority of the preference orders in the profile for every b   A.
There are always either one or zero Condorcet-winners. A voting rule satisfies
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the Condorcet-criterion i  it always elects the Condorcet-winner if it exists.
Condorcet-extensions are rules that satisfy the Condorcet-criterion and elect
some other item if the Condorcet-winner does not exist. In a multiwnner setting
like ours the question is how to select further winners once the Condorcet win-
ner has been added to the recommendation set. The two metrics presented here
are two ways to do this in a way that is generalizes the intuition that pairwise
contests should determine outcomes.
General Threshold The first metric generalizes the Condorcet method by not
only considering the items that win a majority of the votes in each contest but
also the ones that win a qualified minority of votes. Let Na b denote the set
of all consumers who rank a over b. We call     [0, 1] a general threshold for a
recommendation set W i 
a  W whenever |Na b||N |     for all b   A \ {a}
A recommendation setW is  -consistent if   is a general threshold forW . The
intuition here is that an item should be in the recommendation set if a qualified
minority of the consumers likes the item a lot. The lower the general threshold,
the smaller the coalition of consumers needed to predictably push items “on the
agenda” as long as they rank those items high enough. If one assumes that an
issue’s rank corresponds in some sense to how much it a ects an individual, the
general threshold is a measure of how much importance a recommendation rule
assigns to pressing minority issues compared to less salient mainstream topics.
E.g., given a profile containing a small group of people at high risk of strokes and
a large majority of people su ering from mild headaches, a rule that attempts
to optimize the general threshold would favor reports on the stroke issue. Note
that the general threshold really is Condorcet-consistent: for any profile, if the
Condorcet winner c exists, it will be inW and at   = 0.5, we have thatW = {c}.
Majority Support Next we consider another generalisation of the Condorcet
method. Here we care not only about items that win a majority of pairwise
contests but also about items that win at least a qualified minority of contests.
Note that the number of pairwise majority contests for a given news item is
|N | 1. Then     [0, 1] is called a majority support (majority support) threshold
for a recommendation set W i 
a  W whenever
|{b   A \ {a} : |Na b||N | > 12}|
|N |  1    
A recommendation set is  -consistent if   is a majority support threshold
for W .
In contrast to the general threshold, a low majority support threshold allows
consumers to put items on the agenda by establishing a majority coalition, even
if they do not consider these items as essential. So a rule that minimises the
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majority threshold may favor reports on mild headaches over reports on strokes
in the previous example.
Again, the Condorcet winner, if it exists, will be in the recommendation set.
Furthermore, it should be noted that in the single winner case the majority
support rule is known as the Copeland method. In fact, for any  , any item with
a Copeland score (share of majority contests it wins) above   will also be in W .
Note that utility maximization and Gini-coe cient as well as general thresh-
old and majority support are somewhat complementary: intuitively, a rule which
performs well for one of them will have to trade o  on the others. When design-
ing a rule one thus has to decide upon a point in the space delimited by the
poles optimality and equality on one axis and diversity and universality along
another.
This is not an easy task: leaning towards optimality may incur high inequal-
ity and desertion of a part of the audience. On the other hand focussing on
equality may make for a recommendation set that does not appeal to anyone.
Prioritizing universality could lead to neglecting pressing issues that a ect only
minority groups. Favoring diversity on the other hand risks alienating the aver-
age consumer by pushing issues on them which do not a ect or interest them.
4 Recommendation Rules
In this section, we study three rules (LGBT, Budgeted Utility Maximization,
Budgeted Copeland) that are designed to perform optimally on the metrics
utility maximization, general threshold and majority support, respectively, and
compare them with two more traditional rules (Budgeted Borda, Budgeted Plu-
rality). Budgeted Utility Maximization is equivalent to the well-known Knapsack
problem. Budgeted Colpeland, Borda and Plurality are budgeted versions of the
well-known k-multiwinner voting rules (Elkind et al., 2017). The LGBT-rule is
novel to the best of our knowledge.
4.1 Extending Multiwinner Rules
We chose to adapt three k-multiwinner voting rules proposed by Elkind et al.
(2017) for our setting: A budgeted Plurality rule (Budgeted Plurality) as a base-
line, a budgeted Borda rule (Budgeted Borda) as a more sophisticated represen-
tative of the positional scoring rules and a budgeted Copeland rule (Budgeted
Copeland) to represent the Condorcet extensions. All of these rules assign a score
to each item based on the current profile: SF : Ln   A  R; for brevity we will
henceforth refer to all rules that assign a score by fit-by-score rules and denote
an item’s score, given a profile and a rule, as SF (a), instead of SF (R, a).
The fit-by-score rules use their respective scores to recommend items in the
following way: Start with the complete budget B and put the highest scoring
budget-fitting items in the recommendation set. Then do the same for the re-







Wk =Wk 1   ({ argmax
a A\Wk 1
S(a)}  WB C(Wk 1))
Then the recommended set is:
F (R, Cm(A), B) =W|A|
4.2 Rules Designed for Optimal Performance
It is easy to see that fit-by-score combined with the Copeland-Score performs
optimally with respect to majority support. It elects the winning set with the
lowest possible majority support threshold  . Intuitively, this means that it
enables majority coalitions to kick an item o  the agenda even if they dislike
that item only a bit. Similarly, we designed rules to perform optimally with
respect to utility maximization and general threshold.
Lowest General Budget-compatible Threshold (LGBT) The first such
rule is the Lowest General Budget-compatible Threshold Rule (LGBT). It is de-
signed to yield optimal results with respect to general threshold. To achieve this,





Then LGBT applies the fit-by-score method to elect the recommended set.
LGBT recommends the set that is optimal for minority preferences in the
sense that it chooses the recommendation set with the lowest possible general
threshold, thus enabling comparatively small coalitions to push the issues they
consider important onto the agenda. For this it is su cient but not necessary
that a plurality of  |N | voters rank the desired item first.
Budgeted Utility Maximization The second novel recommendation rule is
the Budgeted Utility Maximization. Budgeted Utility Maximization is designed
to perform optimally with respect to utility maximization. It selects the set of
articles which has the greatest overall utility for the consumers while fitting the
budget.
F (R, Cm(A), B) = argmax
W WB
u(W )
Although computing the Budgeted Utility Maximization recommendation is
an NP-hard problem because it corresponds to the 0-1 Knapsack Problem, there
exist algorithms to solve it in pseudo-polynomial time (Kellerer, Pferschy, &




We investigated how the rules behave with respect to the metrics of performance
defined earlier.
5.1 Method
The distribution of individual preference orders in a profile possibly a ects the
performance of an aggregation rule. Some rule could function well for very ho-
mogeneous preferences, while performing poorly when preferences are very frag-
mented or even polarly oppose each other. Since only a very limited number of
naturally occurring preference profile datasets are available, we generated pro-
files ourselves in order to capture some plausible types of distributions of pref-
erences amongst a group of individuals. Thereafter we automatically checked
the performance of the considered rules with respect to the four desirable prop-
erties: Utility Maximization, Gini-Coe cient, General Threshold and Majority
Support. The performance was compared with respect to specific profiles.
In order to generate preference profiles as they might naturally occur in
di erent types of consumer populations, we specified seven di erent base profiles.
Each of them represented a possible distribution of individual preferences over
10 and 20 items respectively. Every profile contained preference orders of 5000
individual consumers.
The seven base preference orders fall in four categories: random profiles —
each individual’s preference order is sampled independently from the other 4999
preferences in the profile; fraction profiles — there are five di erent clusters
of individual preferences which are more similar to each their clustered peers
than to the other clusters (there are, in turn, two types of cluster-size distribu-
tions: one where the biggest cluster comprises 50% of individual orders and five
smaller ones 10% each, and another one where the division is 80% and four times
5%); polarized profiles — where two consumer populations have polarly opposed
preference orders; and similar profiles — where two consumer populations have
di erent preferences orders, but not in a polarized way.
A specific profile, then, is a noisy copy of a base profile. After specifying the
base profiles we applied noise to model variety amongst individual consumers.
The noise was introduced by employing a probabilistic model to swap items
in the preference orders, where farther swaps occurred with smaller probability
than closer swaps. Namely, a rank r in the preference order and a swap direction
(upwards or downwards) are sampled random-uniformly. Then for each rank r 
lower (or higher respectively) than the sampled rank, a swap of the corresponding
items is attempted. The success probability of the swap is:
1
(|r   r |+ 1)2
This way of introducing noise allows to control the swapping distance be-
tween profiles within a cluster by varying the number of ranks to be sampled.
It captures the intuition that within a cluster, profiles should be similar to each
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other. In this fashion we generated 100 profiles each for the cases of 10 and 20
news items for all seven profile-types.
In terms of the results presented below, the most important base profiles
are the following two with two clusters of underlying preferences each. They are
meant to account for the di erences in the performance of rules in situations
when consumers’ opinions are homogeneous, and when they are diversified.
For the first, the two clusters are simply noisy copies of a third underly-
ing preference order. We randomly generated one preference order, applied high
noise to it twice to get two di erent preference orders and then generated 2500
moderately noisy copies of both. This resulted in profiles with two clusters of
fairly similar consumer groups whose orderings agree mostly, but not completely,
amongst themselves. We call them similar-cluster profiles. For the other base pro-
file with two underlying preference orders, we randomly generated a preference
order and created 2500 noisy copies of it. We then reversed the initial ordering
and generated 2500 noisy copies of it as well. We call the result polarized-cluster
profiles.
5.2 Results
We present here our most salient results which pertain to a) how di erent profiles
a ect performance on average with respect to our desired properties for all of
our rules and b) how the rules perform against each other on the generated
profiles. This allowed us to test for di erences across distinct profiles for each
rule.
To test the significance of the obtained results, we employed ANOVA in
combination with Tukey post hoc analysis.
Results of Type a) Firstly, concerning utility maximization, we found that for
all profiles with 20 candidates and two clusters of consumers, the rules performed
on average 5 to 10 percentage points worse on polarized-clusters populations than
on similar-clusters populations.
Secondly, with respect to general threshold and profiles with two clusters
of consumers, all rules perform between 30 and 55 percentage points worse on
the polarized-cluster populations than on the similar-cluster populations. This
can be seen in Figure 1. For LGBT, these di erences were significant on a 95%
confidence level for both the 10 and 20 items case. For Budgeted Borda, Budgeted
Copeland and Budgeted Plurality they were only significant for the profiles with
10 items.
Results of Type b) We found that both Budgeted Borda and Budgeted
Plurality perform significantly worse with respect to utility maximization than
Budgeted Utility Maximization on the 95% confidence level. While Budgeted
Copeland and LGBT performed worse on utility maximization on average, the
di erence to Budgeted Utility Maximization was not significant.
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Fig. 1. From left to right the bars stand for Budgeted Plurality, Budgeted Borda,
Budgeted Copeland, Budgeted Utility Maximization and LGBT. The left plot shows
the average general threshold for polarized profiles. The right plot shows average general
threshold for similar profiles.
With respect to general threshold, we found that for both for the populations
with 10 and 20 items, the LGBT rule performs significantly better than the other
rules on the 99%-level. The di erence is most pronounced for the Budgeted
Utility Maximization rule. For 10 items Budgeted Utility Maximization scores
on average 19.5 percentage points higher (worse) than LGBT. In the case of 20
items, Budgeted Utility Maximization scores on average 21.8 percentage points
higher (worse) than LGBT.
For the Gini-coe cient we found that for 20 and 10 items, respectively, Bud-
geted Utility Maximization performs 3.8 and 10.6 percentage points worse than
LGBT, with significance on the 99% level. There were no significant di erences
between LGBT and the other score-and-fit rules.
Another result pertains to majority support. As expected, Budgeted Copeland
performed best with respect to this metric and significantly so compared to all
other rules on the 99% interval. Less obviously, we also found that Budgeted
Borda outperforms the remaining rules with a significance on the 99% level.
Thus, both Budgeted Utility Maximization and LGBT only did approximately
as well as the baseline Budgeted Plurality rule with respect to majority support.
5.3 Discussion
The a)-type results indicate that polarization of the readership leads to both
lower utility and higher general threshold indicating what one might call a cost
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of polarization. The cost of polarization is bad news for hopes to find common
recommendations for divided audiences. An avenue for future research could be
the search for a recommendation rule that minimizes the cost of polarization.
Concerning type b) results, we conclude that no single rule performs opti-
mally with respect to all desirable properties and types of profiles. As expected
we have a “three-way-tie” between Budgeted Utility Maximization, LGBT and
Budgeted Copeland when it comes to utility maximization, general threshold
and majority support. However, looking at the other properties, a tendency can
be established: While the Budgeted Utility Maximization rule performs opti-
mally on utility maximization, the di erence to Budgeted Copeland and LGBT
was not significant which indicates that Budgeted Copeland and LGBT come
close to the optimum. A further point to make is that while LGBT and Budgeted
Copeland are tied with respect to Gini-coe cient, they clearly beat Budgeted
Utility Maximization in this respect.
To sum up: although Budgeted Utility Maximization maximizes utility by
construction, this only leads to little added utility compared to Budgeted Copeland
and LGBT. Moreover, this additional utility comes at the cost of markedly un-
equal utility distribution amongst the consumers, higher lowest general threshold
and higher lowest majority support thresholds. All of this arguably indicates that
Budgeted Utility Maximization is overall a worse rule than Budgeted Copeland
and LGBT: higher diversity or greater universality can be achieved at a fairly
low price in overall utility. This indicates that greater individualization is not
the only way forward when attempting to capture and maintain an audience.
Thus maybe the media are not doomed to ever greater splintering and catering
to special interests if essential readings are chosen prudently.
In the present paper, we have suggested and tested several rules to carry
out this choice. However, in doing so we made some strong assumptions, most
notably the equi-distance between neighboring items’ utilities. In addition, our
results are based purely on simulations. Hence it would be a natural next step to
investigate whether our simulation results carry over to an experimental setting
with utility data submitted by real media consumers, such as the users of an
online news-aggregator. In this setting, one could then also track how a common
set of essential readings a ects users’ preference orders over time. This would
also allow to research strategic behavior in the considered framework. Then, we
might identify recommendation rules which are the hardest to manipulate.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a formal Social Choice framework to recommend a
common winner set to a group of consumers given a budget constraint. Inter-
preting the items as news articles, the voters as readers and the budget as e.g.
readers’ attention span or space on a frontpage this task can be understood as
finding a principled way to balance individualization and newsworthiness by se-
lecting a set of essential readings to be recommended to all readers. We devised
novel performance metrics suitable to this setting which provide di erent ways
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to evaluate the recommended set. With these criteria in mind, we introduced
five rules, one of them novel, designed to perform especially well. For all of the
rules, we ran simulations in order to assess the rules against our performance
measures. For the simulations we defined multiple population-types and for each
type, we generated multiple profiles. We then applied our voting rules to the
profiles and performed statistical analysis on the results.
Our conclusion is that using Social Choice theory o ers an interesting avenue
to improve upon existing recommender systems. Depending on one’s value judge-
ments, Budgeted Copeland, LGBT and Budgeted Utility Maximization perform
well at generating principled common recommendations from individual pref-
erence orders. Notably however, the Budgeted Utility Maximization rule only
achieves marginal improvement in utility at the expense of diversity, universal-
ity and equality. Thus we conclude that LGBT and Budgeted Copeland are the
best rules in this setting known so far.
On the other hand we found that polarization of the audience limits what
can be achieved by any of these rules. The cost of polarization thus presents an
open challenge for designing recommendation rules in the presented setting.
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Abstract. In this paper, we o er a balanced response to the problem of
logical omniscience, whereby agents are modeled as non-omniscient yet
still logically competent reasoners. To achieve this, we account for the
deductive steps that form the epistemic state of an agent. In particular,
we introduce operators for applications of inference rules and design a
possible-worlds model which is (a) equipped with a syntactic valuation,
determining the agent’s (explicit) knowledge, and (b) suitably structured
by rule-induced transitions between worlds. As a result, we obtain a de-
tailed analysis of the agent’s reasoning processes. We then o er validities
that exemplify how the problem of logical omniscience is avoided and
compare our response to others in the literature. A sound and complete
axiomatization is also provided. We finally show how simple extensions
of this setting make it compatible with tools from Dynamic Epistemic
Logic (DEL) and open to the incorporation of empirical findings on hu-
man reasoning.
Keywords: Rule-based reasoners. Epistemic logic. Dynamic epistemic
logic. Logical omniscience. Bounded reasoning. Resource-bounded agents.
Minimal rationality. Human reasoning.
1 Introduction
Standard (S5) epistemic logic, using possible-worlds semantics, su ers from the
problem of logical omniscience ([13]): agents are modelled as reasoners with un-
limited inferential power, always knowing whatever follows logically from what
they know. This stark contrast with reality is also witnessed by experimen-
tal results indicating that subjects are systematically fallible in reasoning tasks
([21, 22]). It is even from a normative view that the standard account is in-
su cient, for it disregards the underlying reasoning of the agent and thus the
restrictions on what can be feasibly asked of her. Therefore, knowledge should
not be subject to logical closure principles. This, however, need not entail that
agents are logically incompetent. While we often fail in complex inferences (e.g.
due to lack of resources), we do engage in bounded reasoning: knowing that it is
raining, and that we need a raincoat whenever it is raining, we do take a raincoat
before leaving home. The empirical data also contributes to the case for logical
competence, and as proposed in [9], we should seek a standard of Minimal Ra-
tionality. Drawing on these, we aim at modelling how an agent should come to




In the twofold project of modelling a non-omniscient yet competent agent,
we take on board the observations found in [7]. The deductive steps underpin-
ning knowledge should be clearly reflected in an epistemic framework and this
should still be compatible with “external” informational acts, as studied in DEL.
We also place another desideratum: in principle, we should be able to employ
empirical facts provided by cognitive scientists.
While many attempts have dealt with logical omniscience, not every attempt
pursues a solution along the lines just described. Rule-based approaches, mainly
applied on Artificial Intelligence, have paved the way towards our direction.
Konolige ([16]) uses belief sets closed under an (incomplete) set of inference rules,
but such (weaker) closure properties do not su ce to capture the agent’s reason-
ing nor its cognitive load. Similar remarks apply to attempts which use modali-
ties for reasoning processes ([11]), state-transitions due to inference ([2, 3, 4]), or
arbitrary rule applications ([14]). Collapsing reasoning processes to a modality,
without a detailed analysis of their composition, would not help us determine
what eventually makes them halt nor exploit investigations in psychology of rea-
soning which usually study individual inference rules on the grounds of cognitive
di culty. Interestingly, in [17], the author develops a logic where rules, accom-
panied by cognitive costs, are explicitly introduced in the language, but he gives
no semantics, rendering the e ect of his rule-operators unclear and the choice
of axioms controversial.1 Awareness settings ([12]) discern implicit and explicit
attitudes, avoiding omniscience with respect to the latter, which additionally ask
that agents are aware of a formula. Yet, an arbitrary syntactic awareness-filter
cannot be associated with logical competence, and even if ad-hoc modifications
are imposed (e.g. awareness closure under subformulas), forms of the problem
are retained.2
The remainder is organized as follows: we first present our basic setting and
explain how it contributes to the solution of the problem (Section 2). We then
give a sound and complete axiomatization in Section 3 and in Section 4, we
discuss how the basic framework can be easily adjusted to accommodate other
directions and include sophisticated tools from logic and cognitive science.
2 The setting
We first construct our logical language, building on the following definitions:
Definition 1 (Inference rule). Given  1, . . . , n,  in the standard proposi-
tional language LP (based on a set of atoms  ), an inference rule Ri is a formula
of the form { 1, . . . , n}   .
1 In [18] an impossible-worlds semantics is presented, but again reasoning is captured
via modalities standing for a number of steps; this raises concerns analogous to the
ones discussed before.
2 A notable exception where awareness is a ected by reasoning is given in [23]; in
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We then use pr(Ri) and con(Ri) to abbreviate the set of premises and the
conclusion of Ri.3 The rule is to say that whenever the premises are true, the
conclusion is also true. We also use LR to denote the set of inference rules and
L := LP   LR.
Definition 2 (Translation). The translation of a formula in L is defined as:
Tr( ) :=  , if     LP and Tr(Ri) :=
 
  pr(Ri)
   con(Ri), if Ri   LR.
We now define the language of this framework:
Definition 3 (Language LRB). Given a countable set of propositional atoms
 , the language LRB is defined inductively as follows:
  ::= p | ¬  |       | K  |  Ri  
with p    ,    L, Ri   LR.
As usual, K  reads “the agent knows  ”. LRB includes knowledge assertions
for rules too. That is, apart of knowledge of facts, we can also express which
rules the agent knows (and is therefore capable of applying). Each  Ri  is seen
as a labeled operator for a rule-application. A formula  Ri   reads “after some
application of inference rule Ri,   is true”. Dual modalities of the form [Ri] such
that [Ri]  expresses “after any application of Ri,   is true”, and the remaining
Boolean connectives are defined as usual.
Next, we define our model motivated by the idea that reasoning steps, ex-
pressed through rule-applications, should be hardwired in it. We introduce pos-
sible worlds that are connected according to the e ect of inference rules. Since an
agent’s reasoning a ects the information she holds (rather than truth of facts),
the usual valuation function is accompanied by a function yielding which formu-
las the agent knows at each world. In this sense, each world represents what is
explicitly known at it and each rule triggers suitable transitions between them.
Definition 4 (Model). A model is a tuple M =  W,T, V1, V2  where
– W is a non-empty set of worlds.
– T : LR   P(W   W ) is a function such that a binary relation on W is
assigned to each inference rule in LR. That is, for Ri   LR, T (Ri) = Ti  
W  W , standing for the transition between worlds induced by the rule Ri.
– V1 :W   P( ) is a valuation function assigning a set of propositional atoms
to each world; intuitively those that are true at the world.
– V2 :W   P(L) is a function assigning a set of formulas of L to each world;
intuitively those that the agent knows at the world.
The truth clauses are given as follows:
3 We emphasize that Ri denotes a single rule instance. The rule, which is in fact a
pair, composed of the set of premises and the conclusion, is given in terms of the




Definition 5 (Truth clauses).
– M,w |= p if and only if p   V1(w) for p    .
– M,w |= K  if and only if     V2(w).
– M,w |= ¬  if and only if M,w  |=  .
– M,w |=       if and only if M,w |=   and M,w |=  .
– M,w |=  Ri   if and only if there exists some u   W such that wTiu and
M,u |=  .
A formula is valid in a model if it is true at every world of the model and
valid if it is valid in the class of all models. However, certain conditions have
to be imposed on our initial, general class, to capture the desired e ect of rule-
applications. To that end, we need the following:
Definition 6 (Propositional truths). Let M be a model and w  W a world
of the model. Its set of propositional truths is V  1 (w) = {    LP |M,w |=  }.
We can now fix an appropriate class of models, denoted byM. For any model
M (with T (Ri) = Ti as defined above), M  M if and only if:
1. For any inference rule Ri = { 1, . . . , n}    , if w   W is such that
Ri   V2(w) and  1, . . . , n   V2(w), then there exists a world u   W such
that wTiu.
2. For any w, u   W and inference rule Ri = { 1, . . . , n}    , if wTiu then
Ri   V2(w),  1, . . . , n   V2(w) and V2(u) = V2(w)   { }.
3. For any w  W and     L, if     V2(w) then Tr( )   V  1 (w).
4. For any w, u  W and inference rule Ri, if wTiu then V  1 (w) = V  1 (u).
Condition 1 says that if a world represents an epistemic state containing the
premises of a known rule Ri, then it must be connected to some other world
by the corresponding Ti. Condition 2 says that if w is Ti-connected to u, then
it must be that u enriches the epistemic state of w in terms of Ri. This is to
ensure that each transition is associated with some addition of a conclusion
to an epistemic state. Condition 3 is imposed to guarantee the veridicality of
knowledge and the soundness of the known rules.4 Finally, condition 4 states
that Ti-connected worlds are propositionally indiscernible, i.e. transitions stand
for purely epistemic actions.
We present some validities that illustrate desirable properties of reasoning
processes and will be instrumental for a balanced response against logical omni-
science. For notational convenience, we abbreviate sequences of rules as follows:
-  ‡  :=  R1  . . .  Rn 
-  †  :=  R 1  . . .  R m 
4 Recall that V2 :W   P(L) and that L := LP  LR. Moreover, it should be clear that
the world u whose existence is guaranteed by condition 1, is such that it contains
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standing for “after some application of R1(R 1), followed by some application of
R2(R 2), . . ., followed by some application of Rn(R m)” (in that order). Similar ab-
breviations can be defined for the dual cases; for example, by using [R1], . . . , [Rn]
for the first sequence and [R 1], . . . , [R m] for the second.
Theorem 1 (M-validities).
1.  ‡ K   Tr( ) is valid in the class M. (Factivity)
2.  ‡ K    ‡ [†]K  is valid in the class M. (Persistence)
3.  ‡ K     † K     ‡  † (K   K ) is valid in the class M. (Merge)
4. For any inference rule Ri, KRi  
 
  pr(Ri)
K     Ri Kcon(Ri) is valid in
the class M. (Success)
Proof.
1. Take arbitrary model M   M and arbitrary world w   W of the model.
Suppose M,w |=  ‡ K . Unpacking the sequence according to the abbrevi-
ation, M,w |=  R1  . . .  Rn K , for the inference rules R1, . . . , Rn. Follow-
ing Definition 5, there is a world u1   W such that wT1u1 and M,u1 |=
 R2  . . .  Rn K . Continuing like that, there is a world un   W such that
un 1Tnun and M,un |= K , which in turn amounts to     V2(un). Then,
by condition 3, Tr( )   V  1 (un). From condition 4, Tr( )   V  1 (un 1). Con-
tinuing this process backwards, Tr( )   V  1 (w). Therefore M,w |= Tr( ).
Given the arbitrariness of M  M and w  W , we finally conclude that the
formula is valid in the class M.
2. Take arbitrary model M   M and arbitrary world w   W of the model.
Suppose M,w |=  ‡ K . Unpacking the sequence according to the abbrevi-
ation, this amounts to M,w |=  R1  . . .  Rn K . As in the previous case, we
obtain a chain wT1u1 . . . un 1Tnun such that M,un |= K , which in turn
amounts to     V2(un) (1). It su ces to show that M,un |= [†]K , i.e.,
by repeating the unpacking, now for [†] = [R 1] . . . [R m], that for every world
v1  W such that unT  1v1, . . ., for every world vm  W such that vm 1T  mvm,
M, vm |= K , i.e.     V2(vm). Take arbitrary such v1, . . . , vm. Then due
to condition 2 and (1),     V2(v1) and continuing in the same fashion
    V2(vm). Therefore, M,w |=  ‡ [†]K , hence M,w |=  ‡ K    ‡ [†]K ,
as desired.
3. Take arbitrary model M   M and arbitrary world w   W of the model.
Suppose M,w |=  ‡ K    † K . So M,w |=  ‡ K  and M,w |=  † K . As
above, we obtain a chain wT1u1 . . . un 1Tnun such that M,un |= K , i.e.
    V2(un), and a chain wT  1v1 . . . vm 1T  nvm such that M, vm |= K , i.e.
    V2(vm). The rough idea of the proof is to make use of the conditions of
M to merge the two chains. By condition 2, we know that V2(w)   V2(un)
and that V2(w) contains all the premises of rule R 1, as well as the rule
itself. Therefore, V2(un) in turn contains all the premises of rule R 1 and
the rule itself. By conditions 1 and 2, there is a world z1 such that unT  1z1
and V2(z1) = V2(un)   {con(R 1)}. Now again, by condition 2, V2(v1) =




that z1 contains the premises for R 2 and the rule itself. Again by conditions 1
and 2, there is a world z2 such that z1T  2z2 and V2(z2) = V2(z1) {con(R 2)}.
Continuing like that, the alternations of condition 2 and condition 1, based on
the initial assumptions, yield a world zm such that zm 1T  mzm and V2(zm) =
V2(zm 1)   {con(R m)} with V2(vm)   V2(zm). Therefore     V2(zm). In
addition, as the constructed chain is of the form unT  1z1T  2z2 . . . T  mzm and
due to condition 2,     V2(zm). SoM, zm |= K  K , i.e.M,un |=  † (K  
K ). So finally M,w |=  ‡  † (K   K ), as desired.
4. Take arbitrary model M   M and arbitrary world w   W of the model.
Suppose M,w |= KRi  
 
  pr(Ri)
K . Then Ri   V2(w) and     V2(w), for
every     pr(Ri). Next, from conditions 1 and 2, there is v   W such that
wTiv and V2(v) = V2(w) {con(Ri)}. As a result,M, v |= Kcon(Ri). Finally,
M,w |=  Ri Kcon(Ri), as desired.
Factivity says that whatever comes to be known is true, i.e. only true informa-
tion or sound rules become known after reasoning, and Persistence says that it
remains to be known throughout subsequent reasoning processes.Merge exempli-
fies how the agent merges di erent reasoning processes, thereby coming to know
their outcomes. Success captures the e ect of applying a rule: the conclusion is




KRi  K¬¬   K(    )   DNE  MP   CI K(     ): af-
ter successive applications of specific rules, namely Double Negation Elimination
({¬¬ }    ), Modus Ponens ({ ,     }    ) and Conjunction Introduction
({ , }       ), the agent’s knowledge is gradually increased.
Logical omniscience is indeed avoided in a balanced way, i.e. still escaping
trivialized, totally ignorant agents. The values of knowledge assertions are de-
termined by V2, which need not obey any closure principle. On the other hand,
suitable applications of inference rules, reflecting the e ort to eventually reach a
conclusion, ensure that an agent can come to know consequences of her knowl-
edge, provided that she follows the appropriate reasoning track. This is how we
avoid an implausible commitment to an automatic and e ortless way to expand
one’s knowledge, as the standard validity K 1  . . . K n   K  would dictate.
Besides, Cherniak ([9]) emphasizes that we should view complex deductive rea-
soning as a task consisting of simple reasoning steps conjoined together. He also
argues for a “well-ordering of inferences” in terms of their di culty, depending
both on the rule scheme in question and the logical complexity of its compo-
nents. Similarly, according to Rips ([20]), deductive reasoning is a psychological
procedure in which sets of formulas are connected via links, that essentially
amount to applications of inference rules, just as our framework predicts. Over-
all, competence is preserved because we unfold the actual processes that result
in knowledge and account for their dynamic nature. Logical ignorance is thus
ruled out because of a more realistic modelling of the underlying reasoning and
not because of ad-hoc restrictions imposed on an inflexible notion of knowledge.
It is interesting to see how our rule-based setting fits in the landscape of
similar attempts. As in [1, 14], temporal-style connections encode the progress in
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the agent’s reasoning.5 Unlike [4, 11, 14, 18], we abstain from a generic notion of
reasoning process, instead accounting explicitly for (a) specific rules available to
the agent, (b) their individual applications, (c) their chronology, thus monitoring
the path that eventually leads to knowledge. This elaborate analysis is, as we
remarked above and will further discuss in Section 4, crucial in bridging epistemic
frameworks with empirical facts.6 Furthermore, the enterprise of providing a
semantics contributes to Rasmussen’s attempt ([17]), who keeps track of rules
applied by the agent, on one hand, but lacks a principled way to assess the
validity of his proposed axioms, on the other. Constructing a suitable semantic
model that reflects rule-based reasoning gives a concrete view on the credibility
of axioms and the adequacy of the solution. Finally, implicit and explicit notions
can be discerned, not through an arbitrary filter (as with awareness), but through
the analysis of the agent’s reasoning.
3 Axiomatization
In this section, we develop the logic  RB. We thus obtain a full-fledged logical
response against the problem and solid ground to defend our selected axioms.




PC All instances of classical propositional tautologies
K [Ri](    )  ([Ri]   [Ri] )
T K   Tr( )
Succession KRi    
  pr(Ri)
K    Ri  
Tracking knowledge  Ri K    
  pr(Ri)
K   KRi  K , for    = con(Ri)
Knowledge of conclusions [Ri]Kcon(Ri)
Prop1  Ri     , for     LP
Prop2    [Ri] , for     LP
Monotonicity K   [Ri]K 
Rules
Modus Ponens From   and     , infer  
Necessitation From   infer [Ri] 
5 We note that the frameworks described in [1, 2, 3] that extend the idea of state-
transitions to multi-agent settings are particularly interesting for the development
of multi-agent variants of our framework too.




Theorem 2 (Soundness). The logic  RB is sound with respect to M.
Proof. It su ces to show that the axioms of Definition 7 are valid in the class
M, as our rules preserve validity as usual.
- The claim for PC and K is trivial.
- The claim for T follows immediately from condition 3.
- The claim for Succession follows from condition 1.
- For Tracking knowledge: Take any model M   M and world w   W of the
model such that M,w |=  Ri K , for Ri = { 1, . . . , n}    . So there is
u  W such that wTiu and     V2(u). By condition 2,  1, . . . , n, Ri   V2(w)
and since V2(u) = V2(w)   { },     V2(w)   { }. So either     V2(w) or
  =  . Finally, M,w |= K 1   . . .  K n  KRi  K , for    =  .
- The claim for Knowledge of conclusions follows from condition 2.
- For Prop1: Take any model M   M and world w   W of the model such
that M,w |=  Ri   for     LP . Then, there is u   W such that wTiu and
M,u |=  , i.e.     V  1 (u). By condition 4,     V  1 (w), i.e. M,w |=   as
desired.
- For Prop2: Take any model M   M and world w   W of the model such
that M,w |=  . Take any u   W such that wTiu. Then by condition 4,
    V  1 (u), i.e. M,u |=   so M,w |= [Ri] , as desired.
- For Monotonicity : Take any model M  M and world w   W of the model
such thatM,w |= K , i.e.     V2(w). Take any u  W such that wTiu. From
condition 2,     V2(u), i.e. M,u |= K . But then indeed M,w |= [Ri]K .
Aiming at completeness, we follow the procedure of [8], employing canonical
models.
Lemma 1 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). If   is a  RB-consistent set of formulas,
then it can be extended to a maximal  RB-consistent set  +.
Proof. The proof goes as usual in these cases. After enumerating  0, 1, . . ., the
formulas of our language, one constructs the set  + as
 
n 0  
n where:   0 =   ,
 n+1 =  n   { n}, if this is  RB-consistent and  n   {¬ n} otherwise. The
desired properties are easily obtained due to this construction.
Definition 8 (Canonical Model). The canonical model M for  RB is a tuple
 W, T ,V1,V2  where:
– W = {w | w a maximal  RB-consistent set}.
– T : LR   P(W  W), such that for Ri   LR, T (Ri) = Ti, where wTiu if
and only if { Ri   |     u}   w.
– V1 :W   P( ) such that V1(w) = {p     | p   w}.
– V2 :W   P(L) such that V2(w) = {    L | K    w}.
It is easy to see that an equivalent formulation for the definition of Ti is
{  | [Ri]    w}   u. Given the definition of the canonical model and our
language LRB, we show:
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Lemma 2 (Existence lemma). For any formula   in our language and w  
W, if  Ri     w then there is u  W such that wTiu and     u.
Proof. Suppose  Ri     w. Take S = { }   {  | [Ri]    w}. This set is con-
sistent. Were it inconsistent, there would be  1, . . . , n such that   RB  1  
. . .    n   ¬ . Using [Ri]-necessitation, distribution and propositional tautolo-
gies we obtain   RB ([Ri] 1   . . .   [Ri] n)   [Ri]¬ . By the property of w as
maximal consistent set and since [Ri] 1, . . . , [Ri] n   w: [Ri]¬    w. Therefore
¬ Ri     w. Indeed, we have reached a contradiction. Next, we extend S to
S+ according to Lindenbaum’s lemma. Then,     S+ and [Ri]    w implies
    S+. Take u := S+. As a result, wTiu and     u.
Lemma 3 (Truth lemma). For any formula   in our language and w   W:
M, w |=   if and only if     w.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of  .
– Base cases: Consider   := p with p    . Then M, w |= p if and only if
p   V1(w), and by definition, this is the case if and only if p   w. Next, take
  := K  with     L. Then M, w |= K  if and only if     V2(w), and by
definition, this is the case if and only if K    w.
– For   := ¬  and   :=      , the claim follows easily from I.H. and the
maximal consistency of w.
– For   :=  Ri   with I.H. that the result holds for  . Then M, w |=  Ri  
if and only if there is u   W such that wTiu and M, u |=  . By I.H. this is
the case if and only if     u, and by definition of Ti, we get  Ri     w. The
other direction follows immediately from the existence lemma.
Theorem 3 (Completeness). For any set of formulas   and formula   in
our language:   |=M   only if     RB  .
Proof.
– We first expand   to a maximal  RB-consistent set  +. Then, let the canon-
ical model M as constructed according to Definition 8. Then by Lemma 3,
M, + |=   . It su ces to show that M fulfills the conditions of M.
– Condition 1 is satisfied.
Take inference rule Ri= { 1, . . . , n}    and w  W with Ri, 1, . . . , n  
V2(w), i.e. KRi, K 1, . . . ,K n   w (1). We want to show that there is a
world u   W such that wTiu. From (1), KRi  K 1   . . .  K n   w. But
from Succession, we get that  Ri     w. Using the existence lemma, there
is indeed u  W such that wTiu.
– Condition 2 is satisfied.
Suppose that wTiu with Ri = { 1, . . . , n}    , i.e. if     u then  Ri    
w. Take arbitrary     V2(u). That is, K    u. Therefore,  Ri K   
w. From Tracking knowledge,  1, . . . , n, Ri   V2(w). From Knowledge of
conclusions and definition of Ti, K    u, i.e.     V2(u). Furthermore by




V2(w)   { }   V2(u). Next take     V2(u) with    =  . Then  Ri K    w.
From Tracking knowledge, K    w. As a result,     V2(w). Clearly then,
V2(u) = V2(w)   { }.
– Condition 3 is satisfied.
Let   be a formula in L. Suppose that     V2(w). That is, K    w. Then by
T we obtain, Tr( )   w, that isM, w |= Tr( ) and therefore Tr( )   V 1 (w).
– Condition 4 is satisfied.
Take w, u   W and wTiu. By definition of Ti, if     u then  Ri     w.
Now take arbitrary     LP such that M, u |=  , i.e.     V 1 (u). This
means that     u, therefore  Ri     w. From Prop1, we obtain     w, i.e.
M, w |=   so     V 1 (w). As   was arbitrary, V 1 (u)   V 1 (w). For the other
inclusion, take arbitrary     LP such that M, w |=  , i.e.     V 1 (w). This
means that     w. From Prop2, we get that [Ri]    w too. Then we exploit
the alternative definition of Ti; since [Ri]    w,     u, i.e. M, u |=   so
    V 1 (u). As   was arbitrary, V 1 (w)   V 1 (u). Overall, V 1 (w) = V 1 (u).
4 Extensions
This setting, whose key elements have been hitherto described, can also accom-
modate more intricate scenarios and facilitate applications informed by other
disciplines. In particular, we briefly explain that other tools from (D)EL can
be naturally combined with our rule-based logic and that, apart from AI, our
syntactic approach can be also relevant for cognitive science.
First, a notion of implicit knowledge is not precluded in our framework, for
it too employs possible worlds and can be easily endowed with an accessibil-
ity relation. Notions of belief can be also included along the lines presented so
far, i.e. by simply attaching another function to the model, now yielding the
explicit beliefs. Nevertheless, one might drop conditions on factivity or mono-
tonicity. Moreover, just like public announcements of DEL,7 which may enhance
the agent’s knowledge, there can be actions for the learning of rules. Their e ect
is captured by (suitably) tweaking V2 so as to add the rule in question. Re-
garding higher-order knowledge – provided that the language and the range of
V2 are extended – we can also avoid unlimited introspection, as is arguably de-
sired for non-ideal agents. Just as with factual reasoning though, our framework
can model moderate introspective abilities, via the introduction of introspective
rules, whose semantic e ect is similarly captured via world transitions.
The use of labeled operators and the order-sensitivity of applications of rules
make it easier to exploit the observations of cognitive scientists for a precise mod-
elling of resource-bounded reasoners. For example, [15, 20, 22] suggest that not
all rules are equally di cult for agents. According to Rips ([20]), the length and
the di culty of the rules involved in the mental proof constructed for a complex
7 As usual in DEL ([5, 10]), we can add action operators to our language and capture
their e ect via model transformations triggered by the action. A formula with dy-
namic operators, of the form [ ] , is evaluated by examining what the truth value
of   is at a transformed model, obtained via action  .
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reasoning task determines its overall di culty. In [19] the need to assign di er-
ent weights to di erent rules is experimentally verified and in [24] empirically
calculated weights are attached to di erent rules. Our framework can take these
points into consideration. By fixing the agent’s capacity, attaching empirically
indicated weights to rules and introducing inequality formulas to the language,
we can place preconditions to applications of rules and therefore pinpoint where
the cuto  of a reasoning process lies.
On a more technical note, while we have presented a Hilbert-style axiomati-
zation of  RB, it would be interesting to develop a labeled sequent calculus alter-
native to this and investigate the proof-theoretic properties of our system. This
investigation can be especially relevant to the state-transition settings study-
ing single- or multi-agent reasoning processes. In this way, we can obtain other
independent technical results to motivate the use of such systems.
5 Conclusions
We argued that one of the important challenges for epistemic logic is not only to
overcome logical omniscience, but to do so while securing the logical competence
of agents. We located this endeavour’s key parameter in bounded reasoning and
spelled it out in logical terms by keeping track of the inference rules the agent
applies. We explained how this enriches existing rule-based approaches and ex-
pands the scope of their applications. A sound and complete axiomatization was
also provided, followed by a summary of our extensions of the core setting.
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Harrop: A new tool
in the kitchen of intuitionistic logic
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Abstract. The usual reading of logical implication       as “if  
then  ” fails in intuitionistic logic: there are formulas   and   such that
     is not provable, even though   is provable whenever   is provable.
Intuitionistic rules apparently cannot derive interesting meta-properties
of the logic and, from a computational perspective, the programs corre-
sponding to intuitionistic proofs are not powerful enough.
We begin our quest for a better computational understanding of the
intuitionistic connectives from Harrop’s rule, which we consider in this
paper. By adding its corresponding axiom (¬p   q   r)   (¬p   q)  
(¬p   r) to propositional logic, one obtains the Kreisel-Putnam logic
KP: we give a Curry-Howard correspondence for this system, proving
the disjunction property and all the good constructive properties.
This is a first step in understanding how the programs of admissible rules
look like.
Keywords: intuitionistic logic, admissible rules, Harrop’s rule, Curry-
Howard correspondence
1 Introduction
Axiomatic proof systems are presented by giving axioms and rules of inference,
which are respectively the ingredients and the tools for cooking new proofs.
For example, when presenting classical propositional logic (CPC) in natural de-
duction, for each of the usual connectives  , ,¬, ,  one gives a set of standard
tools to introduce or remove that connective from a formula in order to obtain
a proof.
Rules have the form  1, . . . , n/  (read “from  1, . . . , n infer  ”) where
 1, . . . , n,  are schemata of logic formulas. A rule is admissible in a proof
system if it is in a way redundant:
Definition 1 (Admissible rule). A rule  1, . . . , n/  is said to be admissible
in a system X if whenever  1, . . . , n are provable then   is provable. More
formally:
if  X  1 . . .  X  n then  X  .
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Clearly a rule of inference which is already provided by a proof system is also
admissible in that system, but this case is not interesting: surely one can use
any tool their kitchen provides. But adding or dropping rules may increase or
decrease the amount of proofs we can cook in a proof system. The e ect can
be dramatic: for example, classical logic can be obtained by simply adding the
rule of double negation elimination to intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC).
Admissible rules are all the opposite: if we decide to utilize one in order to cook
something, then we could have just done things in a di erent way and obtain
the same result.
One appealing feature of CPC is being structurally complete: all admissible
rules are derivable, in the sense that whenever  1, . . . , n/  is admissible, then
also  1   · · ·    n     is provable [3] – i.e. the system acknowledges that
there’s no need for that additional tool. This is not the case in intuitionistic
logic: the mere fact that we know that the tool was not needed, doesn’t give us
any way to show inside the system why is that. On the other hand, IPC has
other wonderful features. Relevant here is the disjunction property, fundamental
for a constructive system: when a disjunction       is provable, then one of the
disjuncts   or   is provable as well.
Our interest is in the intuitionistic admissible rules that are not derivable,
and the logic systems obtained by adding explicitly such rules to IPC. A crucial
but non-trivial question is whether admissible rules may break the constructive
nature of the logic, and interestingly we are going to prove that the disjunction
property still holds in our case.
Can one e ectively identify all intuitionistic admissible rules? The question
of whether that set of rules is recursively enumerable was posed by Friedman in
1975, and answered positively by Rybakov in 1984. It was then de Jongh and
Visser who exhibited a numerable set of rules (now known as Visser’s rules)
and conjectured that it formed a basis for all the admissible rules of IPC.
This conjecture was later proved by Iemho  in the fundamental [5]. Rozie`re in
his Ph.D. thesis [7] reached the same conclusion with a substantially di erent
technique, independently of Visser and Iemho . These works elegantly settled
the problem of identifying and building admissible rules. However our question is
di erent: why are these rules superfluous, and what reduction steps can eliminate
them from proofs?
In sequent calculus, the most iconic admissible rule is the cut rule: yes,
one can avoid chopping in intuitionistic logic and Gentzen showed how. His
cut-elimination algorithm removes redundant cut inferences, obtaining cut-free
proofs and showing that the cut is unnecessary. By the Curry-Howard corre-
spondence, one may assign proof terms to proofs in such a way that removing
cuts from proofs corresponds to normalizing proof terms according to some re-
duction rules. Let’s apply this intuition to the admissible cookware: what proof
transformation/reduction rules correspond to other admissibile rules?
First of all, note that standard reductions in natural deduction correspond
to removing unnecessary detours, i.e. introduction inferences followed by elimi-
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nation inferences. For example,  -reduction in lambda-calculus corresponds in













Reduction: ( x. u) t   u{t/x}
Our plan is to understand the phenomenon of admissibility by equipping
proofs with lambda terms and associated reductions in the spirit of the example
above. The detour removal procedure will show explicitly what is the role that
admissible rules play in a proof. In this work, we concentrate our e ort on
Harrop’s rule, historically the first admissible rule, and then we propose how
to generalize the technique to harder cases.
1.1 Outline of the paper
In Section 2, we introduce the Kreisel-Putnam logic by adding Harrop’s principle
to intuitionistic logic; we give a Curry-Howard correspondence for the calculus,
providing a computational interpretation of that principle admissible rule. In
Section 3 we discuss some usual properties of type systems, which we use to prove
the Disjunction property (Theorem 3). We conclude in Section 4 by presenting
future extensions to bigger systems.
2 The Kreisel-Putnam logic KP
The formulas of propositional intuitionistic logic are defined inductively from
propositional atoms and logical connectives. We use greek letters like  , ,  , , 
to denote formulas. The negation is defined as ¬  :=     .
Harrop’s rule [3] was the first rule to be shown to be admissible but not
derivable in intuitionistic logic. It consist of the following rule of inference
(¬         ) / (¬     )   (¬     )
and can be seen as the simplest case arising from Visser’s basis of admissible
rules. The logic KP is obtained by adding the corresponding principle (i.e.
forcing the rule to be derivable) to IPC, and was introduced by G. Kreisel
and H. Putnam in [6] to exhibit a logic stronger than IPC that preserves the
disjunction property, thus disproving the conjecture of  Lukasiewicz that no such
logic could exist.
We present KP in natural deduction: it consists of all inference rules of IPC
(ax, I , iE , iI , E , I , E , E) plus Harrop’s rule in the following form:
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t, u, v ::= x (variable)
| u v (application)
|  x. t (abstraction)
| efq t (exfalso)
|  u, v  (pair)
| proji t (projection)
| inji t (injection)
| case[t || y.u | y.v] (case)
| hop[x.t || y.u | y.v] (Harrop)
Evaluation contexts for IPC:
C ::= [·]
| C t | efqC | proji C
| case[C ||   |  ]
Evaluation contexts for KP:
E ::= [·]
| C[E]
| hop[x.E ||   |  ]











Our adaptation of Harrop’s rule in natural deduction has the form of an
elimination rule (it may be used to derive any formula  ), and instead of requiring
the hypothesis ¬         , we ask for a proof of       with the additional
assumption of ¬ . In this way, the rule looks much alike the usual  E : in fact,
we can see it as the elimination of a disjunction that may have an additional
negative hypothesis.
Now, clearly Harrop’s rule is derivable in KP:
[¬         ](2) [¬ ](1)
     
[¬     ](1)
(¬     )   (¬     )
[¬     ](1)
(¬     )   (¬     )
(1)
(¬     )   (¬     )
(2)
(¬         )  (¬     )   (¬     )
We assign proof terms to proofs in KP according to the Curry-Howard tra-
dition: the language of terms is shown in Figure 1 on the left. The proof term
annotations for the usual intuitionistic rules are standard (see for example [8]);
the annotation for the rule H is:
 , x : ¬    t :        , y : ¬        u1 :    , y : ¬        u2 :  
    hop[x.t || y.u1 | y.u2] :  
As expected, it is reminiscent of the case annotation, with the di erence
that it also binds the variable x in the first entry t. The other terms bind in
the usual way:  x. t binds x, case[t || y.u1 | y.u2] binds y in u1 and u2, and
hop[x.t || y.u1 | y.u2] binds x in t and y in u1, u2.
The reduction rules for the proof terms are given in Figure 2: once again
the first block contains the usual ones for IPC (with the slightly non-standard
Exfalso rule that pushes uses of  E to the outermost possible level), and the
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– Rules for IPC:
• Beta: ( x. t)u   t{u/x}
• Exfalso: C[efq t]   efq t
• Projection: proji  t1, t2    ti
• Case: case[inji t || y.u1 | y.u2]   ui{t/y}
– Additional rules for KP:
• Harrop-inj: hop[x.inji t || y.u1 | y.u2]   ui{ x. t/y}
• Harrop-efq: hop[x.efq t || y.u1 | y.u2]   ui{( x. efq t)/y}
Fig. 2. Reduction rules
second block contains reduction rules for the new hop[x.t || y.u1 | y.u2] con-
struct, depending on two shapes that t might have. Let us explain the intuition.
In the first case, the term is the injection inji t with possibly a free variable x of
type ¬ ; in that branch one has clearly chosen to prove one of the two disjuncts
  or  ; we may just reduce to the corresponding proof ui, in which we plug
the proof t but after binding the free variable x. In the second case, the term
is an exfalso, i.e. the proof uses a contradiction to prove the disjunction. We
may reduce to either one of the two branches ui, now using the contradiction to
derive either   or  , of course under the hypothesis ¬ .
Finally, let’s turn to reduction. Contexts are defined intuitively as proof terms
with a hole; the hole is denoted by [·], and E[t] means replacing the hole in the
context E with the term t. Reduction contexts are defined by the grammar in
Figure 1 on the right. Reduction is obtained as usual from reduction rules   as
the contextual closure under evaluation contexts: if t   u then E[t]  E[u]. We
chose carefully the evaluation contexts in order to simplify normal forms: instead
of full reduction, we use weak head reduction, i.e. reductions are performed only
in the head of terms, and not under abstractions.
3 Theorems
The calculus presented in the previous section introduced slight variations w.r.t.
the standard lambda calculus associated with IPC. In this section we show
that the calculus indeed preserves the usual properties of subject reduction (the
reductions preserve the type of a term) and normalization (all typable terms
reduce to a normal form). We recall that a term is in normal form (in short,
n.f.) when it cannot be reduced further. We are going to classify normal forms,
and finally show the disjuction property. As a side note, the calculus is not
confluent (because of the too permissive Exfalso rule and the non-determinism
of Harrop-efq): this is irrelevant for our results, but will be fixed in a future
version of the calculus.
First of all, two elementary results that we need below. The first one is
substitutivity, i.e. that substitution preserves types: if  , x :     t :   and    
u :  , then     t{u/x} :   (can be proved by induction on the structure of t). The
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second one is inversion, that allows to read typing deductions backwards, guided
by the syntax of terms (can be proved by induction on the type derivation).
Theorem 1 (Subject reduction). If     t :   and t  t , then     t  :  .
Proof. By the definition of reduction as the closure of   under evaluation con-
texts, we just prove the statement when t   t ; the general case t   t  follows
because substitution preserves types.
The cases of the usual intuitionistic reductions are standard (see for example
[8]); we just prove the cases of the reduction rules associated with hop.
For the case of the left injection hop[x.inj1 t || y.u1 | y.u2]   u1{ x. t/y},
by inversion we have  , y : ¬        u1 :   and  , x : ¬    inj1 t :       for
some  , , , . Again by inversion  , x : ¬    t :  , and by  I we obtain    
 x. t : ¬      By substitutivity we get the desired result     u1{ x. t/y} :  .
The case of the right injection is analogous.
Finally, if hop[x.efq t || y.u1 | y.u2]   u1{ x. efq t/y}, by inversion we
have  , y : ¬        u1 :   and  , x : ¬    efq t :       for some  , , , .
Again by inversion  , x : ¬    t :  , and by  E we obtain  , x : ¬    efq t :  .
By  I we obtain      x. efq t : ¬     , and by substitutivity we get the
desired result     u1{ x. efq t/y} :  .
Theorem 2 (Strong normalization). KP is strongly normalizing.
Proof. A proof of normalization is obviously too large for this short paper, but we
still want to give a sketch of the proof. One can use the reducibility method (see
for example [8]), among the most powerful techniques for proving normalization
up to higher-order logic. The usual proof for the simply typed lambda calculus
can be extended to product and sum types (i.e. conjunctions and disjunctions)
and the type of absurdity (i.e.  ). For KP, one just extends the definition
of inert terms to include Harrop terms. The additional reductions for hop are
similar to the reductions for case, and should not give particular problems. We
leave a precise proof of normalization for future work.
Before we turn to the disjunction property (Theorem 3), we first prove the
Classification lemma (Lemma 1) and inspect normal forms. While usually the
statement of the lemma talks about empty environments (  =  ), we use non-
empty ones, but only with negative assumption, i.e. contexts of the form  ¬ :=
{x1 : ¬ 1, . . . , xn : ¬ n}. Let us explain why: when reasoning on normal forms,
one needs to enter recursively the first arguments of Harrop terms, hence going
under binders. Therefore the inductive case needs to consider normal forms with
additional free variables of negative types, bound by Harrop terms in outer parts
of the current term.
Lemma 1 (Classification). Let  ¬   t :   for t in n.f. and t not an exfalso:
– Implication: if   =     , then t is an abstraction or a variable in  ¬;
– Disjunction: if   =      , then t is an injection;
– Conjunction: if   =      , then t is a pair;
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– Falsity: if   =  , then t = x v for some v and some x    ¬;
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of t:
– (ax) t is a variable in  ¬. By definition of  ¬, the type of t is an implication,
and we conclude.
– ( I) t is an abstraction, and we conclude.
– ( E) t = u v with  ¬   u :     . Because t is in normal form, u cannot be
an abstraction or an exfalso. By i.h., u is a variable in  ¬: hence the type of
t is  , and we conclude because t = x v.
– ( I) t is an injection, and we conclude.
– ( E) not possible. Assume t = case[u ||   |  ] with  ¬   u :      , and
derive a contradiction. By i.h. u is an injection or an exfalso. This contradicts
the hypothesis that t is a normal form.
– ( I) t is a pair, and we conclude.
– ( E) not possible. Assume t = proji u with  ¬   u :      , and derive a
contradiction. By i.h. u is a pair or an exfalso. This contradicts the hypothesis
that t is a normal form.
– ( E) not possible by the hypothesis that t is not an exfalso.
– (Harrop) not possible. Assume t = hop[x.u ||   |  ] with  ¬, x : ¬   
u :      , and derive a contradiction. By i.h. u is an injection or an exfalso.
This contradicts the hypothesis that t is a normal form.
Our weak head reduction produces weak head normal forms:
V ::=  x. t | inji t |  u, v 
V¬ ::= V | x | x t | efq (x t)
Normal forms in a negative environment  ¬ correspond to the entry V¬, while
values (i.e. closed normal forms) correspond to the entry V (it follows from
Lemma 1).
Another easy consequence of Lemma 1 is consistency:   t :   for any t. We
can finally prove:
Theorem 3 (Disjunction property). If   t :      , then   t :   or   t :  .
Proof. Assume   t :       with t in normal form. First note that t  = efqu,
because otherwise by inversion   u :  , contradicting consistency. By Lemma 1
(with  ¬ =  ) t is an injection. Conclude by inversion.
4 Conclusions and future work
We have added Harrop’s principle to intuitionistic logic and we have given a new
computational understanding of the resulting system. Thanks to Classification
(Lemma 1) we investigated the normal forms of proofs, and shown that proof
terms look exactly like usual intuitionistic terms at the outermost level: as ex-
pected, Harrop inferences over closed proofs can always be eliminated, making
Harrop’s rule admissible.
We believe that our presentation is well-suited to continue the study of ad-




Visser’s rules and other intermediate propositional logics Our next step
is generalizing to more complex instances of Visser’s rules. Visser’s rule have been
shown to be relevant not only for IPC, but also for other intermediate and modal
logics [4], and thus our system could be related to other such logics that have
been given a Curry-Howard correspondence.
First-order logic In intuitionistic first-order theories, the disjunctive and the
existential connectives behave likewise, and often reflect similar properties. The
most famous case is the existential property, clearly linked to the disjunction
property that we tackled above: if we can prove an existentially quantified for-
mula, then we can prove the same formula for a concrete witness. The first-order
principle corresponding to Harrop’s rule is the Independence of Premise:
(¬A   x.B(x))   x. (¬A  B(x))
As expected, it is an admissible but not derivable rule of intuitionistic logic,
and our framework can be easily extended to handle it as well.
Arithmetic Since its inception with Harrop [3], the motivation for studying ad-
missible rules of IPC was to understand arithmetical systems. A famous theorem
of de Jongh states that the propositional formulas whose arithmetical instances
are provable in intuitionistic arithmetic (HA) are exactly the theorems of IPC,
and many studies of the admissible rules of HA (like Visser [9], Iemho  and
Artemov [1]) originated from it.
The Independence of Premise has an important status in the theory of
arithmetic, and was given a constructive interpretation for example by Go¨del
[2]. Many other admissible rules of HA, such as Markov’s rule, have been stu-
died for a long time. Therefore, we believe that a substantial field of application
of our technique is the constructive study of admissible rules of HA.
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Abstract. This paper formalizes and simulates a social version of the No
Alternatives Argument (NAA). The Social NAA predicts that strength
of belief in the most strongly held hypothesis in a group of agents will in-
crease when the number of available hypotheses decreases. Social network
simulations using connected Bayesian networks show that this assump-
tion can be violated, but infrequently. Implications of the Social NAA
and when it holds in social networks are discussed.
Keywords: No Alternatives Argument · Bayesian Epistemology · Social
Networks.
1 Introduction
This paper o ers an initial investigation into how the number of choices perceived
as feasible by individual agents in a group setting may influence choice at the
group level.
This topic is worth considering for several reasons. First, most formal mod-
els of decision-making do not account for changes in the number of choices that
agents consider before making their decisions. However, theoretical frameworks
(e.g., [9]) and subsequent empirical studies (e.g., [11]) in psychology have shown
that the perceived number of viable choices does influence an individual agents
choice. Second, this influence has not been investigated in a social context, de-
spite cases where the number of perceived choices is relevant at the group level.
One pertinent example of where this might be important is voting behavior in
a political election. A candidate that a number of particular individuals would
normally consider untenable may over time be regarded as a viable option for a
variety of reasons. Such reasons may include the fact the candidate is determined
to be the best option in light of the other choices, new information makes the
candidate a more attractive choice, or the shared opinions of other individuals in
the agents’ social community convince the agents to change their minds about
the candidates. If enough individual agents begin to consider the candidate a vi-
able option, then that candidate is intuitively likely to gain votes come election
time.
The relation between the number of choices at the individual level and the




it is di cult to generalize a descriptive account because agents di er in their
decision-making processes, which also depend on the context and type of deci-
sion being made. On the other hand, it is not intuitively clear what a normative
account should capture - questions arise such as whether an agent should take
more caution when increasing the number of available options. As a preliminary
step in determining reliable relations between individually perceived hypotheses
and decision outcomes at the group level, this paper tests an assumption made
in a recent paper by [5] that supports an argument for the validity of the “no
alternatives argument (from here on, ‘NAA’) in the framework of Bayesian epis-
temology (e.g., [4]). Dawid et al. consider the case in which only one hypothesis
is regarded as a viable option according to a scientific community, and assert
that as the number of alternative hypotheses decreases to zero the strength of
belief in the most viable hypothesis increases. A new Bayesian network model
that explicitly includes sharing opinions between agents is developed to test this
assumption in a social setting through several simulations over various models.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes
Dawid et al.’s formal argument for the NAA in detail. Section 3 develops the
new Bayesian network model in light of criticisms of the formal version of the
NAA. Section 4 outlines the parameters, including the number and configura-
tions agents in a social network, and the results of several simulations over several
versions of the model. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results and
what they entail for future work on this topic.
2 Dawid et al.’s NAA
The NAA is the argument that, given a hypothesis H, in cases where there has
been considerable e ort to find an alternative to H and none can be found,
the one hypothesis that has been found is more likely to be correct and it is
rational for one to strengthen their belief in H. Dawid et al. develop a Bayesian
network to prove that an increase in degree of belief in the proposition T , that
H is an empirically adequate hypothesis, given the non-empirical evidence FA,
that a community has not found an adequate alternative to H, is greater than
T alone: P (T | FA) > P (T ). T and FA are both binary variables, meaning that
T represents whether H is believed to be empirically adequate or not, and FA
represents whether a scientific community has found more than one hypothesis
for a given phenomenon or set of data.
Since FA is unable to act as justification for T because it is not logically
or probabilistically within the domain of H, indirect factors that mediate the
influence of FA on T are necessary to consider. One factor is the number of al-
ternative hypotheses as determined by the community, which is expressed in the
variable Y , and directly influences both FA and T . In addition, the cumulative
factors that determine the di culty of developing alternative hypotheses, such
as the available evidence and the configuration and cleverness of the community,
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Fig. 1. Bayesian network representation of the NAA
The conditional distributions of the mediating factors Y and D are con-
structed to reflect the intuition that if there are a large number of alternative
hypotheses, then it is likely a community would have found at least some of them
as long as the complexities of the problem are not exorbitant. More precisely,
Y and D influence FA independently - for every fixed level of di culty of the
scientific problem at hand, an increase in the number of alternative hypotheses
does not decrease the likelihood that scientists have found an alternative hy-
pothesis, and for a fixed number of alternative hypotheses, the increase in the
di culty of the problem does not increase the likelihood of finding an alterna-
tive hypothesis. Y also influences T in that an increase in alternative hypotheses
does not make it more likely that scientists have found an empirically adequate
hypothesis. Figure ?? represents the resultant Bayesian network.
While Dawid et al.’s formal argument for the NAA has faced some criticism
([8]; [2]), the explicit inclusion of the perceived number of available hypotheses
in an epistemic model is a novel contribution. Despite this innovation, it is
unclear whether Y is meant to describe the beliefs regarding the number of
hypotheses of individuals within the scientific community, or the beliefs of the
scientific community as a whole. Furthermore, the development of hypotheses is
a community e ort and in large part relies on communication of information,
opinions and knowledge between individuals in a community.
The intuition behind this formalized version of the NAA, namely that the
degree of belief in H increases as the number of alternative hypotheses decreases,
is now tested in an explicitly social setting in order to account for some of the
social processes involved in hypothesis formation.
3 New Model: Agents in a Social Setting
In response to the previous criticisms, a Bayesian network is devised to describe
the influence of shared opinions on individual agents beliefs regarding the number
of feasible hypotheses. A community network is built through repetitions of
a Bayesian network structure that represents an individual agent, which are
connected in a way to represent opinion sharing between specified agents.
It is worth noting that numerous models have been developed to investi-
gate information and knowledge dynamics through communications of agents in
a community. Models using dynamic epistemic logic, for instance, are used to
model the phenomena of information cascades and pluralistic ignorance (e.g.,




group dynamics of consensus and polarization, among other social processes
based on opinion sharing between agents. Despite the success of these models,
the model developed here continues with the Bayesian framework employed by
Dawid et al. This is in part to test their assumption within their own framework,
and also because multiple hypotheses can easily be accommodated in Bayesian
networks. The extension of previously developed models to further investigate
the e ects of changes in the number of perceived hypotheses at the group level
is sanctioned for future work.
The model is described in non-technical language, and begins with defining
individual agents before scaling up to a community network.
3.1 Individual Agent Networks
The categorical variable H represents the set of hypotheses under consideration
by the agent. If three hypotheses are under consideration, for instance, then the
values of H are the set {H1, H2, H3}. The probabilities assigned to the values
constitute a distribution and therefore sum to 1.
Two types of priors determine the distribution in H, which are represented
by the E variables and the O variables. The E variables (with “E” standing
for “experience”) represent the credence a orded to each hypothesis according
an agents own experiences, experimentations, values and biases up to a specific
point in time. The O variables (with “O” standing for “others”) represent the
credence a orded to each hypothesis according to the collated opinions of other
agents in the network.
The number of E and O variables reflects the number of hypotheses under
consideration. Keeping with the example of three hypotheses in H, the network
would include three E variables and three O variables, which will be respectively
labeled E H1, E H2, and E H3 for the E variables, and O H1, O H2 and
O H3 for the O variables.
Each E and O variable is a categorical, binary variable. For each variable,
the value 0 (representing ¬E Hn and ¬O Hn for a particular E and O variable)
is interpreted to mean the hypothesis indicated by that variable is considered
an unfeasible option for whatever reason (e.g., it is not supported with su cient
evidence, it is not well known to the agent, there is believed to be a low chance
that this option will have an impact, etc.). The value 1 (representing E Hn or
O Hn for a particular E and O variable) is interpreted to mean the hypothesis
indicated is perceived to be a feasible option. For each variable, for a given
proposition E Hn (or O Hn) it will always be the case such that P (E Hn) +
P (¬E Hn) = 1 (or P (O Hn)+P (¬O Hn) = 1) in line with classical probability
theory, and subsequently Bayesian networks.
The E and O variables are priors that define the posterior probabilities in
H. The network structure, which is uniform for all agents, is shown in Figure 2.
This figure continues with the example of three hypotheses, and represents an
individuals belief states the influence the hypotheses in H.
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Fig. 2. A Bayesian network representing the belief states of one individual agent con-
sidering three hypotheses
3.2 Conditional Probability Assignments Weighting Self and Other
Beliefs
Agents take into account the opinions of others and bias their own preconceived
beliefs to various extents. Some agents, for instance, may readily take on board
the opinions of others in cases where they are believe themselves to be less
informed or consider others more expert, while other agents may consistently
disregard the opinions of others and stick to their own experiences to support
their beliefs. Such di erences between agents are represented through variances
in the conditional probabilities of the E and O variables on H.
The conditional probabilities of the E and O variables on H for each specified
agent can be assigned categorically or randomly. Categorical assignments refer
to three types of agents determined by the specified weights on the E and O
variables in H. In this paper, three types of agents are defined, respectively
labeled as balanced, mule, and sheep type agents. A balanced agent gives equal
credibility to its own preconceived opinions and the opinions of others, and
therefore each E variable is given a weight of 0.5 in H, and each O variable is
given a weight of 0.5 in H. A mule agent gives greater credibility to its own
preconceived opinions, and therefore gives each E variable a weight of 0.9 in H
and each O variable a weight of 0.1 inH. A mule type agent is consequently much
less likely to change its preferred hypothesis in light of its neighbor’s opinions.
Finally, a sheep agent is weighted in the converse way to the mule, with a weight
of 0.1 given to each E variable inH and a weight of 0.9 given to each O variable in
H. A sheep type agent is therefore more likely to change its preferred hypothesis
in light of the opinions of its neighbors.
Weights defining the E and O variables conditional on H can also be ran-
domly assigned, allowing for more fine-grained conceptions of the extent that an
agent may take others opinions on board. However, it is beneficial to define agent
types categorically in order to track changes in opinion dynamics according to




Fig. 3. A three-agent network, with each agent considering three hypotheses
3.3 Scaling up to a Social Network: Collating O Variable Values
from an Agents Social Influencing Neighbors
The probabilities of the O variables for agents in a community network are
determined by the values in H from specified neighbor agents. More precisely,
the hypothesis in H with the highest probability for each agent that is specified
to inform or influence a neighbor agent are collated to determine the values in
the influenced agents’ O variables.
A parent agent refers to an agent that influences another’s O variables, while
a child agent is influenced by a parent agent. Each O variable of an agent ag-
gregates the top H value of its parents, and uses that to set new values for its
own O variables. For example, if an agent has three parents and two of those
parents preferred H1 and one preferred H2, the child agent would set its O H1
variable’s distribution as 1 = 23 and 0 =
1
3 , and set its O H2 variable’s values
to 1 = 13 and 0 =
2
3 . All the other O Hn variables would have the distribution
1 = 0 and 0 = 1 (i.e. the other hypotheses have 0 probability according to the
agent’s parents).
Figure 3 depicts a three-agent network, in which the top agent is the parent
to the two lower child agents, influencing their belief through their O variables.
As the recursive loop from the children’s H to their parents shows that, the
child agents also inform the original parent agent’s O variables. However, since
Bayesian networks are by definition Direct Acyclic Graphs that forbid looping
configurations, the influence of the two lower agents on the top agent must be
done in a a subsequent belief update step, after they have been influenced by
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4 Simulations to test the Social NAA
A series of simulations are conducted over various configurations of social net-
works to test whether the NAA assumption holds in all cases on a social level.
What will be termed the Social NAA is the hypothesis that as the total number of
hypotheses available in the social network (i.e. the number of di erent hypothe-
ses outputted as a top hypotheses by the agents in their respective H posterior
distributions) decreases, the strength in belief in the hypothesis Hmax, the hy-
pothesis chosen by highest number of agents in the network increases should
stay the same or increase– i.e., the same number, or more agents should “vote”
for Hmax, whatever it may be, at each time step until convergence whenever a
hypothesis drops out of the possible options with no votes. Networks that vio-
late this outcome are counter-arguments against the social version of the NAA
assumption.
For the each simulation, the update procedure for each agent at each time
step is constituted by the posterior distribution for H being calculated as follows
in two steps:
1. CALCULATE :
A IF at time-step 0, use the prior distributions for O and E values to calcu-
late the posterior distribution over H using Hs conditional probability
table, and calculating the marginal probabilities in the standard way
[10].
ELSE If at time-step 1 or later, update the O variables by aggregating
the top hypotheses from the agent’s parent’s nodes, set these as the pri-
ors for O. If this distribution has changed from the previous time-step,
calculate the posterior over H.
B Add the agent’s top hypothesis after calculating the posterior to the
overall ‘vote’ distribution for that time-step, to be recorded for later
analysis.
2. UPDATE: Update the agents E variables to be equivalent to that of the
posteriors over H calculated at Step 1.
Convergence occurs when agents no longer update their hypothesis belief
distribution once computing the posterior H distribution and the distribution
from one time-step to the next is identical. In the development of the simulations,
it was found a maximum of 10 updates was su cient to ensure convergence for
the particular network configurations used.
All simulations were implemented in Python 2.7 and run using iPython note-
books.
4.1 Simulation 1: Randomized, Categorical Ten Agent Network
For the first simulation, a ten-agent network configuration was adapted from [3]
as exemplar of a core-periphery network - that is, several highly interconnected




periphery. It serves as an example of a network configuration ubiquitous across
a wide variety of communities in reality according to empirical social network
literature.
Agents were set to consider four hypotheses in {H1, H2, H3, H4}, though
various stages in the simulation some agents may not be aware of one or more
of them (i.e. being assigned a probability of 0).
In this simulation, agents were defined categorically (i.e., as balanced, mule,
or sheep agents – see 3.3), and each agent was assigned a category randomly
for each run. The E variable priors were also randomized with each run, set to
believe one of the four hypotheses and the initial O variable priors were set to
a normal distribution over the four hypotheses before being influenced by the
beliefs states of other agents. The simulation was run 1000 times with 10 update
steps per run.
Figure 4 depicts the configuration of the network, as well as changes in the
top hypothesis chosen by each agent at each time step in the run. The numbered
boxes refer to agents and their place in the network, and the lines with arrows
represent parent and child influences between agents. Each color corresponds to
a specific hypothesis, and the color of the agent box indicates the agents top
hypothesis (i.e. the hypothesis with the highest probability). This example de-
picts a successful run demonstrating the social NAA, because the top hypothesis
chosen by most of the agents (hypothesis H4 in green) increased in strength (i.e.
gained more “votes”) with each time step as the number of hypotheses considered
viable by each agent decreased.
From the 1000 runs, this simulation resulted showed 14 runs violating the
Social NAA assumption (i.e. when for some time-step, the strength in the top
hypothesis did not increase as the number of hypotheses considered viable by
each agent decreased). This supports that this assumption is too strong to de-
scribe a general relation between individual hypothesis preferences and outcomes
at the group level. Nevertheless, the number of violations was relatively small,
which suggests that the social NAA assumption may serve as a useful heuris-
tic on the social level than a rule. No significant di erence was found between
the distributions of the agent categories (the distribution of mule, sheep and
balanced agents) in the simulation runs that violated, and did not violate the
Social NAA. More thorough investigation with larger simulations using di erent
categories of agents will be carried out in future.
4.2 Simulation 2: Randomized Twenty Agent Network
In the second simulation, a twenty-agent network was created consisting of two
clusters of a core-periphery type networks connected by one agent forming the
best connected agent of the second cluster ‘bridging’ between the two clusters.
This again was run 1000 times with 10 simulations per run.
In this simulation, rather than using agent categories, agent types were de-
fined through randomized weights on the conditional probabilities whereby the
amount of weight given to an agent’s own beliefs (verses its parents) was ran-
domized between [0, 1] for each run. Agents were again set to consider four initial
116
118
Simulating the No Alternatives Argument in a Social Setting 9
Fig. 4. Example of One Run with Four Updates (First State t = 0). The network
converges at time-step 3.
hypotheses. The E variable priors were also randomized with each run, and the
initial O variable priors were set to a normal distribution before being influenced
by the beliefs states of other agents.
This simulation resulted in 22 violations of the social NAA assumption, which
was a similar result to the ten agent network simulation in that a relatively
low number of violations occurred. However, the network configurations that
violated the social NAA assumption tended to have core agents in the most well-
connected position (e.g., agent 1 in Figure 4) which took into account the rest of
the network’s opinions less than in the configurations which did not violate the
social NAA. The average weight of the O variables on H for the best-connected
agent in networks that violated the social NAA was 0.376, while the average
weight of the O variables on H for best-connected agent in networks that did
not violate the social NAA was 0.505. Well-connected agents that did not take
others opinions into account would stifle swings to new hypotheses across the
network. It was also hypothesized that the violation in this complex network
would also depend on the type of the connecting agent between the two clusters,




found that the strength of weight on other’s opinions in non-violating network
was higher than in the violating networks– 0.498 vs. 0.300.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper defined a social version of the No Alternatives Argument for belief
in hypotheses given the number of hypotheses available to agents in a social
network. Violations of the social NAA assumption in simulations support that
the assumption is too strong to be part of a valid reasoning process as argued
by Dawid et al. Nevertheless, the relatively low number of violations of this
assumption is a social context indicates that the social NAA assumption may
be a useful heuristic to guide understandings of how individual opinion sharing
may influence outcomes of decision-making at the group level.
It must be noted that there are significant shortcomings in this model. First,
only a limited number of simulations were conducted. The numerous variables
involved in creating the simulations, including configurations of networks, the
number of agents, type of agents, and number of hypotheses under consideration,
were not fully explored. It is therefore unclear whether the findings from these
simulations are just due to the network configurations chosen rather than other
variables such as influences based on agent types. While no strong conclusions
given the model can be made at this time, further exploration of these parame-
ters is open for future work. Second, the model is only capable of representing
uni-directional rather than bi-directional opinion sharing between agents. While
the network configurations attempted to account for the lack of bi-directional
influences by organizing agents in networks found in empirical social network
studies, the full extent of opinion sharing between agents was unable to be ex-
plored.
These shortcomings suggest potential for future work. The model in this
paper is descriptive in that it attempts to show processes of individual agents
decision-making and the outcomes at the group level, rather than argue as to
how agents should make decisions in light of group outcomes. One direction for
future work is to adapt previously developed models of opinion sharing dynamics
(such as those mentioned at the beginning of Section 3) to either account for
more realistic descriptions of these processes, or develop a normative account of
how agents should employ these processes.
Even more promising is the application of the model to real-world data,
as evidence about the actual processes individuals use could then be applied
to a normative account. A context that would be well suited for this model
is data pertaining to elections. The E variables, which in the current model are
under-specified to only provide an overview of preconceived beliefs about the hy-
potheses under considerations themselves, could be re-conceptualized to capture
relevant information about how an agents preconceived preferences are made.
One option is to apply the survey data from the American National Election
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Studies (ANES) new 2016 Time Series Study.1 The survey was given before and
after the 2016 U.S. General Election, and includes a variety of questions per-
taining to political and policy views, opinions about the candidates (such as a
“feeling thermometer” on a 0-100 scale, and emotional responses), and previous
voting behavior.
In sum, the purpose of this paper is to o er an initial investigation into
how the number of choices perceived as feasible by individual agents in a group
setting may influence choice at the group level. These findings pertaining to the
testing of one assumption about this relation show that this is an area worth
considering in future research.
References
1. Baltag, A., Christo , Z., Hansen, J.U., Smets, S.: Logical models of informational
cascades. Studies in Logic 47, 405–432 (2013)
2. van Basshuysen, P.: Dawid et al.s [2015] no alternatives argument: an empiricist
note. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29(1), 37–50 (2015)
3. Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G.: Models of core/periphery structures. Social networks
21(4), 375–395 (2000)
4. Bovens, L., Hartmann, S.: Bayesian epistemology. Oxford University Press on De-
mand (2003)
5. Dawid, R., Hartmann, S., Sprenger, J.: The no alternatives argument. The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66(1), 213–234 (2015)
6. DeGroot, M.H.: Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation 69(345), 118–121 (1974)
7. Douven, I., Riegler, A.: Extending the hegselmann–krause model i. Logic Journal
of IGPL 18(2), 323–335 (2009)
8. Herzberg, F.: A note on the no alternatives argument by richard dawid, stephan
hartmann and jan sprenger. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4(3),
375–384 (2014)
9. Potter, R.E., Beach, L.R.: Decision making when the acceptable options become
unavailable. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 57(3), 468–
483 (1994)
10. Russell, S.J., Norvig, P.: Artificial intelligence: a modern approach (4th Edition)
(2010)
11. Shah, A.M., Wolford, G.: Buying behavior as a function of parametric variation of





Explainability of Irrational Argument Labelings
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Abstract. In this paper we study the problem of providing a justifica-
tion for a seemingly irrational choice of arguments. The study is set in
a framework of value-based argumentation, in which the abstract argu-
mentation is extended with an assignment of values to arguments. These
are used to determine the relative strength of arguments. We use this
approach to provide methods of generating plausible explanations for
argument selection not satisfying certain rationality constraints.
1 Introduction
Abstract argumentation aims at providing explanation for the choice of accepted
pieces of information, taking into account conflicts between data available to a
decision-maker. Within this framework several constraints regarding the sets of
arguments which can be selected as an outcome of the deliberation process have
been provided.
However, it might be the case that an agent decides to make a seemingly
irrational decision about the selection of arguments. Imagine a situation in which
an agent says that she needs to have a cup of co ee at midnight, because she has
a paper due the following day. Her friend tells her, however, that she should not
drink co ee at night because it is unhealthy. Then, the agent decides to drink
co ee even though she agrees that it ruins her health.
In abstract argumentation, as defined by Dung (1995), the decision of whether
to accept or not a set of arguments depends only on the attack relationship be-
tween them. However, it might be the case that particular arguments have dif-
ferent strengths from di erent agents’ perspectives. If we would only take attack
relation between arguments into account while assessing their acceptability, the
previously described agent would not be rational. She refused to listen to friend’s
advice, even though she did not have any counterarguments for her claims. It
can be the case, however, that an agent discriminates between the strength of
available arguments. Then, an agent might be willing to disregard an attack on a
strong argument by a weaker one. In the described case, she could have decided
to treat an argument stating that she needs to drink the co ee as particularly
strong because academic success is the most important for her.
Following a recent trend in the literature on abstract argumentation (e.g. Fan
& Toni, 2015), this paper aims at capturing explainability of decisions about the
selection of arguments. In particular, we are concerned with the possibility of
explanation of seemingly irrational choices of selected arguments by providing
assumptions regarding their relative strength from the perspective of a particular
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agent. In this way we might detect agents’ perceived strength of arguments,
under the assumption that they act rationally.
One of the particular ways of determining the strength of arguments for
a particular assessor is the value-based argumentation. This approach, due to
Bench-Capon (2003), is based on the assumption that a persuasive power of
arguments relies in a substantial part on the values an agent assigns to them.
Further, an individual view on importance of values influences the agent’s view
on whether a particular counterargument is strong enough to defeat an argu-
ment it is in conflict with. Recently, this approach has been used to explain
the di erences between agents’ perceived conflicts between arguments (Airiau,
Bonzon, Endriss, Maudet, & Rossit, 2016).
In our setting it is studied under which circumstances is it possible to map
a set of values to an argumentation framework and a preference ordering over
them, under which the choice of accepted arguments is justified with respect to
a certain rationality constraint.
In Section 2 we provide an introduction of abstract argumentation and Value-
Based Argumentation Frameworks. We also define rationality constraints on ar-
gument acceptance. Further, in Section 3, we provide results about possibility
of successful explainability of argument acceptance with respect to these con-
straints. Section 4 includes conclusions and directions for further research.
Proofs are omitted, as they involve standard techniques only.
2 The Model
In the abstract argumentation approach, as introduced by Dung (1995), a delib-
erative process is captured as a set of arguments linked with a binary relation
representing the attacks between arguments. The relations between arguments
are further used to establish the rationality criteria for selection of accepted
arguments.
Definition 1 (Argumentation Framework). An argumentation framework
is a tuple AF =  A,  , where A is a non-empty set of arguments and    A2







Fig. 1. Example of an argumentation framework.
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One of the methods of representing the decisions about acceptance of argu-
ments involves a direct assignment of labels to arguments, denoting their degree
of acceptance. It di ers from the approach in which just a set of selected argu-
ments is specified. On the contrary, the labeling approach allows not only for
capturing a binary decision about argument selection, but also for expressing
that a decision-maker is undecided about the status of some argument.
Formally, an argumentation labeling is a function from the set of arguments
to the set of available labels. We are considering three labels, one denoting firm
acceptance (IN ), one firm rejection (OUT ) and one corresponding to the lack
of decision (UNDEC ).
Definition 2 (Argumentation Labeling). Let AF =  A,   be an argumen-
tation framework. A labeling over AF is a mapping
Lab : A  {IN,OUT,UNDEC}
Given L   {IN,OUT,UNDEC}, L(Lab) denotes the set of arguments {a  
A|Lab(a) = L}.







Fig. 2. Example of a labeled argumentation framework.
In order to capture the rationality constraints on the labeling of arguments,
it is useful to specify when an argument is labeled in a specific manner legally.
1. It is stipulated that an argument is labeled IN legally if all its attackers are
labeled OUT. In this way we can ensure that there is no plausible information
conflicting any accepted argument.
2. Further, an argument is labeled OUT legally, if there is some argument
labeled IN attacking it. This condition ensures that a decision about a firm
rejection of an argument is based on highly plausible grounds.
3. Finally, it is rightful to label an argument UNDEC if it has some attackers
who are not labeledOUT, but none of them is labeled IN. With this condition
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we express that an individual is only justified in leaving an argument as
undecided, if she has some evidence against it, but is not certain about its
status.
Formally, these are captured as follows:
Definition 3 (Legal Labelings). Let AF =  A,   be an argumentation frame-
work, a   A and Lab be a labeling over AF . We say that:
– Lab(a) = IN legally i  for all a    A such that a    a, Lab(a ) = OUT
– Lab(a) = OUT legally i  there is some a    A such that a    a and
Lab(a ) = IN
– Lab(a) = UNDEC legally i  for all a    A such that a    a, Lab(a )  = IN
and there is some a    A such that a    a and Lab(a )  = OUT.
We can distinguish the following types of labelings using the legality criteria
provided earlier:
Definition 4 (Labeling Semantics). Let AF  A,   be an argumentation frame-
work. We say that a labeling Lab over AF is:
– Conflict-free if there is no pair of arguments a, b   A such that a, b  
IN(Lab) and a  b.
– Admissible if for all a   A, if Lab(a) = IN, then Lab(a) = IN legally, and
if Lab(a) = OUT, then Lab(a) = OUT legally.
– Complete if Lab is admissible and for any a   A, if Lab(a) = UNDEC,
then Lab(a) = UNDEC legally.
If a labeling satisfies conditions of semantics  , we call it a  -labeling.
Let us now proceed to defining the value-based argumentation. It will allow
us for formalizing the notion of strength of arguments, induced by a hierarchy
of values that they refer to.
The basic concept of this approach is that of the value-based argumentation
framework. It is an extension of an argumentation framework. Further, a set of
values is considered. This set is subsequently mapped on the set of arguments.
Finally, we consider a preference ordering, representing di erent views on the
hierarchy of values.
Definition 5 (Value-Based Argumentation Framework). A value-based
argumentation framework (VAF) is a tuple  A, , V, val , where:
– A is a non-empty set of arguments.
–    A2 is an attack relation.
– V is a non-empty set of values.
– val : A  V is a function assigning values to arguments.
Given the definition of the VAF, we can express the relative strength of an
argument for a given audience. We associate audiences with particular views on
the hierarchy of values. This term does not presuppose that there are multiple
agents within an audience.
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Definition 6 (Audience). Take a VAF =  A, , V, val . Then, an audience
is a linear1 ordering over V . We denote that a value v1 is more important than
v2 for an audience P as v1  P v2.
We proceed by evaluation of attacks in the argumentation framework underlying
a considered VAF. We say that an argument a defeats an argument b for a certain
audience P if it attacks it and the value carried by b is not higher than the value
of the argument a from P ’s perspetive. In this way the preference orderings over
values are used to establish indirectly the relative strength of arguments.
Definition 7 (Defeat). Take a VAF =  A, , V, val  and an audience P .
Then, for a pair of arguments a, b   A, a defeats b for P (a P b) i  a  b an
val(b)   P val(a).
Using the notion of defeat for an audience we can convert any VAF into
the argumentation framework in which an attack relation is replaced with the
defeat relation for the audience. In such a graph the defeat relation is always a
subset of the initial attack relation. It is worthwhile to emphasize that in the
currently described framework the relative strength of arguments imposed by
the assignment of values and the preference ordering over them is only used to
induce the defeat graph. All acceptability conditions described earlier can then
be applied to the defeat graph of the VAF. Then, acceptability of arguments can
be assessed with the hierarchy of values to which they appeal taken into account.
Definition 8 (Defeat Graph). Given a value based argumentation framework
VAF =  A, , V, val  and an audience P , the defeat graph of VAF for P is an
argumentation framework AF =  A, P  .
With the employment of the notions introduced before, we can capture what
it means for a labeling to be rational. We say that this is the case if we can
find an assignment of values and an audience which would ensure that a labeling
satisfies a desired rationality constraint.
Then, a labeling of an argumentation framework is rational with respect to
some semantics   if we can find a VAF and an audience P such that it is a
 -labeling of the defeat graph of VAF based on P .
Definition 9 (Rationality of Argumentation Labelings). Let Lab be a
labeling of an argumentation framework AF =  A,   and   be a labeling se-
mantics. We say that Lab is rational i  there is a VAF =  A, , V, val  and an
audience P such that Lab is a  -labeling of the defeat graph of VAF based on P .
Let us illustrate the notion of rationality of labeling on an example.
Example 1. Take an argumentation framework labeled in the way shown in the
Figure 3.









Fig. 3. Example of a non conflict-free argumentation labeling.
Clearly, the conflict-freeness condition is violated in this case, as there are
arguments labeled IN which are in conflict. This is an indication that the agent
submitting this labeling is not rational. However, we can take into account that
she is assigning di erent strength to distinctive arguments. To account for that







Fig. 4. Example of a VAF justifying an irrational labeling.
To establish the relative strength of arguments in this instance, let us consider
an audience P :
v1   v2   v3   v4
Then, the induced defeat graph of the VAF based on P is of the form pre-









Fig. 5. Defeat graph of the example VAF.








Fig. 6. Labeling of the defeat graph.
So, the initial irrationality of the considered labeling has been explained by
the assignment of values and setting a preference ordering over them.
3 Results
In this paper we are concerned with establishing the structural properties of
argumentation labelings allowing for their rationality. It is worth noting that
di erent levels of demanded rationality, associated with chosen labeling seman-
tics, might require satisfaction of di erent requirements. We will investigate them
for conflict-freeness, admissibility and completeness conditions.
Let us commence with providing a condition under which a labeling is rational
if only conflict-freeness is required.
Proposition 1. A labeling Lab is rational with respect to conflict-free semantics
i  there are no arguments a, b   IN(Lab) s.t. there are paths a   · · ·   b and
b  · · ·   a in which all arguments are labeled IN.
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Let us now extend the previous result to account for admissible semantics.
Proposition 2. A labeling Lab is rational with respect to admissible seman-
tics i  Lab is rational with respect to conflict-free semantics and for any a  
OUT(Lab) there is some b   IN(Lab) s.t. b  a
Then, we can show a requirement for rationality with respect to complete
semantics.
Proposition 3. A labeling Lab over AF =  A,   is rational with respect to
complete semantics i  Lab is rational with respect to admissible semantics and
for any a   UNDEC(Lab) there is some b   UNDEC(Lab) s.t. b  a
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have have introduced an approach for explainability of seem-
ingly irrational decisions regarding acceptance of arguments, with employment of
value-based argumentation frameworks. We used labeling semantics as the crite-
ria of rationality. Further, we have studied properties of argumentation labelings
which allow for its rationality under conflict-free, admissible and complete se-
mantics.
4.1 Future Work
The results presented in this paper leave room for further research. It would
be beneficial to provide explanations of decisions irrational with respect to the
current approach with other plausible methods, such as involve adding argu-
ments to the initial framework. This could allow for rationalizing larger classes
of argumentation labelings.
Furthermore, it would be of interest to study how to rationalize argumen-
tation labelings under minimal assumptions with respect to agents preferences
over arguments. This involves the use of the minimal number of assigned values,
or choosing the assignment which allows for blocking as few attacks as necessary.
Finally, it would be interesting to study the computational complexity of
checking if a given labeling is rational.
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Abstract. This paper is about the role conservativeness plays in the de-
flationary metaontologies of Schi er and Thomasson. Deflationary meta-
ontologies lead to trivial answers to existence questions. However, to do
so, they rely on languages and their possible extensions. To rule out in-
consistent (or otherwise damaging) extensions, the common move is to
restrict extensions to conservative ones. I argue that it is this very move
that leads to trouble for both Schi er’s and Thomassons’s account.
Keywords: Conservativeness · Deflationary Metaontology · Easy On-
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1 Introduction
Ever since Field’s 1980 seminal Science Without Numbers, the idea of using
conservativeness in ontological debates has been present. Field’s strategy for
nominalism with respect to mathematical entities is to present an appropriate
base theory and to show that adding the mathematical framework leads to a
conservative extension of the base theory.
To get a better understanding of this, we need to know what ‘conservative’
means; we can (roughly) define it as follows: Let T and T   be theories. Let LT
be the language of T understood as a set of well-formed formulas. Then:
(CONS) T   is a conservative extension of T if, and only if, (i )
for every S   LT , if S follows from T  , then S follows from T .
For our purposes, it does not matter how exactly to understand ‘follows from’.
Note, however, that there are several possibilities and they come apart (see
Shapiro’s [14], and Field’s [6] and [8, pp. P-16 .]). As the definition implies, the
language LT   of T   is an extension of LT , i.e., LT   LT   . In particular, every
theory is a conservative extension of itself and every extension of an inconsistent
theory is conservative.
Field’s idea behind invoking conservativeness is to show that, in contrast to
“theoretical entities in physics” [8, p. 7], “mathematical entities are not theo-
retically indispensable” [8, p. 8]. If we have an appropriate theory that does not
invoke mathematical entities, we can see that we don’t need such entities. How-
ever, having mathematics at our disposal makes proving easier; it is dispensable,
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but still useful [8, p. 16]. In particular, Field is not arguing that we should not
invoke mathematics when doing physics (and other sciences); but if his program
is successful, we can see that mathematics does not need to be true to do its job
[8, p. 8]—it only needs to make things easier.
Conservativeness resurfaces in the neo-Fregean debate. Frege’s original at-
tempt to derive arithmetic from (second-order) logic and definitions failed be-
cause of his infamous Basic Law V. Russell showed that it implies a contradiction,
i.e., that on its basis what’s now known as Russell’s Paradox is derivable. Basic
Law V is a so-called abstraction principle which has the form of a biconditional
whose one side is an identity statement between singular terms which are intro-
duced via a term-building operation (the abstraction operator, hence the name
‘abstraction principle’) and whose other side involves an equivalence-relation:
@xFx = @yGy   F   G (AP)
where ‘@x’ is the abstraction operator and ‘ ’ is an equivalence relation (see
Cook [2] for a more general characterization of abstraction principles).
Neo-Fregeans try to do better than Frege. In particular, as the work of Wright
[17] and Boolos [1] show, Frege’s program is consistent if one invokes what is
known as Hume’s Principle instead of Basic Law V. Frege himself only uses the
latter to derive the former. Hume’s Principle is itself an abstraction principle and
the neo-Fregeans base their entire ontology on such principles. The idea behind
abstraction principles is that they do not create any new commitments, but only
‘re-carve’ what’s already there; in this manner, we just get new concepts [9, §64].
But, as it turns out, di erent abstraction principles can’t be true together [4,
p. 21]. This is the well-known bad company problem [10]. One thread of neo-
Fregean philosophy consists in distinguishing the good from the bad abstraction
principles; one suggestion to accomplish this is to only allow for abstraction
principles that are conservative [10, p. 325].
More recently, conservativeness has found a place in deflationary metaonto-
logies. Both Schi er [13] and Thomasson [16] invoke the concept. And it is their
use that is the focus of this paper.
In the following, I consider Schi er’s and Thomasson’s accounts. I first give
a brief overview of how they want to derive entities (Section 2) and give their
respective motivations for invoking conservativeness. Then, I criticize Schi er’s
and Thomasson’s accounts in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. I conclude this
paper (Section 3) by briefly considering whether my criticisms also a ect Field’s
program and the neo-Fregean account.
2 Deflationary Metaontology and Conservativeness
Deflationary metaontologies proceed by looking at how language lets us infer dis-
puted entities; these inferences are supposedly ‘easy’. Thomasson characterizes
any approach as ‘easy’ if it has “two features” [16, p. 128]:
(1) “all well-formed existence questions may be answered by conceptual and/or
empirical work” [16, p. 128], and
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(2) “at least some disputed existence questions may be answered by means of
trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises” [16, p. 128].
Thus, she characterizes both the neo-Fregean approach as well as Schi er’s as
‘easy’ [16, p. 127]; the former uses established truths to introduce new concepts
via abstraction, the latter invokes trivial inferences to derive ‘pleonastic entities’
which are “entities whose existence is secured by something-from-nothing trans-
formations” [13, p. 51]. Schi er also explains why he uses the term ‘pleonastic
entities’: “something-from-nothing transformations often take us to pleonastic
equivalents of the statements from which they are inferred” [13, p. 51]. The idea
is that the inferences just redundantly restate what the premises already contain.
Similarly, Thomasson relies on easy arguments to derive certain entities. For
example, she derives the existence of properties as follows:
From a sentence like ‘the table is brown’ we may also infer ‘the table has
the property of brownness’, and thus that there is a property[.] [16, pp.
102f.]
In similar fashion, Schi er explains:
Consider the property of being a dog. On my view, there isn’t a lot more
to this property than can be culled from the something-from-nothing
transformation that allows us to move back and forth between
(3) x is a dog
and its pleonastic equivalent
(4) x has the property of being a dog. [13, pp. 64f., numbering changed]
We can note two things here. Firstly, Schi er has to invoke “certain qualifica-
tions” [13, p. 72] to his approach to not run into Russell’s Paradox (see also [12,
pp. 164 .]). For, in similar fashion to the above something-from-nothing trans-
formations from (3) to (4) and vice versa, we can arrive at the equivalence of ‘the
property of being a dog is not self-instantiating’ (since the property is not a dog)
and ‘the property of being a dog has the property of not being self-instantiating’.
Therefore, we arrive at the property of not being self-instantiating—a property
that gives rise to the paradox.
Thomasson’s easy arguments are threatened by similar considerations. Nev-
ertheless, for the purposes of this paper, I waive this problem.
Secondly, easy arguments bring with them the threat of over-generating en-
tities, i.e., a bad company problem. Schi er gives the following example:
x is a wishdate =df x is a person whose existence supervenes on someone’s
wishing for a date, every such wish bringing into existence a person to
date. [13, p. 53, his emphasis]
This is something that we don’t want in our ontology. However, in some sense
this is harmless, viz., it does not lead to an outright contradiction. It is Eklund [5,
pp. 100 .] who introduces conditions for entities that would lead to contradiction
if they all existed. Thus, there is the threat of contradiction after all.
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Thomasson [16, ch. 8], too, discusses whether there is a ‘bad company’ prob-
lem for her approach. Both she and Schi er invoke conservativeness as a way to
rescue their approaches. Schi er draws a distinction between the good and the
bad cases by noting that the former are conservative whereas the latter are not:
There are numerous theories T such that when we add to T the concept
of a wishdate together with the claim that wishing for a date entails
the existence of a wishdate, the resulting theory is not a conservative
extension of T . [13, p. 54]
Thomasson, on the other hand, puts a conservativeness restriction on the intro-
duction of new terms to a given language L:
Introducing [a] term must not analytically entail anything statable in
unextended L that was not already analytically entailed by truths stated
in L. (This is a version of the familiar conservativeness requirement [. . . ]).
[16, pp. 263f.]
So, both Thomasson and Schi er put a restriction on what counts as a proper
extension to block the bad company problem; as the bad terms lead to extensions
that are not conservative, they are dismissed.
In the following, we take a closer look at how Schi er and Thomasson want
to use conservativeness. We start with Schi er’s account.
2.1 Schi er and Conservativeness
In introducing conservativeness, Schi er notes that there are di erent reasons
why certain extensions of a theory are not conservative [13, p. 55]. For example,
the extended theory “may entail that more than such-and-such many things
exist” [13, p. 55]; but such numerical claims are already statable in the base
theory, so that the extension is not conservative because it contradicts the count
of the base theory. Field, on the other hand, notes that adding some platonistic
theory to a nominalistic one can also lead to contradiction, namely in those cases
in which the nominalistic theory “may say things that rule out the existence of
abstract entities” [8, p. 10] (see also [13, p. 55]). Schi er [13, pp. 56f.] follows
Field’s strategy to circumvent this problem, viz., appropriately restricting the
quantifiers of the base theory:
For a theory or sentence T , T¬F is the theory or sentence that results
from restricting each quantifier in T to things that aren’t F . [13, p. 57]1
He puts this idea to use in the following way:
I now o er the following conservative-extension criterion for being a
pleonastic concept.
1 Note that I changed the notation: Schi er uses ‘  F ’ where I am using ‘¬F ’. Field’s
[8] notation for the restriction of a theory ‘T ’ is ‘T  ’.
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(CE) The concept of an F implies true something-from-nothing F -
entailment claims—and is therefore a pleonastic concept—i  (i) it
implies something-from-nothing F -entailment claims, and (ii) for any
theory T and sentence S expressible in T , if the theory obtained by
adding to T¬F the concept of an F , together with its something-
from-nothing F -entailment claims, logically entails S¬F , then T¬F
logically entails S¬F .
In other words, adding pleonastic entities to any theory conservatively
extends that theory, relative to the restriction on quantification. [13, p.
57, his emphasis]
Thus, having the restriction in place, the extension does not imply any contra-
dictions. The old part is appropriately characterized by the qualification of ‘¬F ’,
but we can still drop the restriction and talk about all the things in the extended
theory (which will be symbolized as ‘T F ’). To fully appreciate the definition,
we need also to know what ‘something-from-nothing F -entailment claims’ are:
Where ‘ ’ expresses metaphysical entailment, ‘S    xFx’ is a something-
from-nothing F -entailment claim i  (i) its antecedent is metaphysically
possible but doesn’t logically entail either its consequent or any state-
ment of the form ‘ x(x =  )’, where ‘ ’ refers to an F , and (ii) the con-
cept of an F is such that if there are F s, then S    xFx. (I’ll say that
the concept of an F ‘implies’ a something-from-nothing F -entailment
claim if it satisfies (ii).) [13, pp. 56f., his emphases]
Schi er explains the metaphysical entailment as follows: “A metaphysically en-
tails B just in case the material conditional A  B is metaphysically necessary”
[13, p. 56, n. 7, his emphasis]. So, the idea is that the introduction of the pleonas-
tic concept F guarantees the existence of F s and nothing else. As the existence
of an F is clearly not expressible in the base theory (it lacks the predicate ‘F ’),
(CE) is satisfied, i.e., the extension is conservative.
However, we can problematize this right away. As the quotation states, con-
dition (ii) is a conditional whose antecedent involves the existence of F s. Thus,
if there are no F s, then condition (ii) is vacuously satisfied. If condition (i) is
satisfied then, according to the definition, ‘S    xFx’ is a something-from-
nothing F -entailment. But, as there are no F s, the vacuous condition (ii) does
not guarantee the truth of ‘ xFx’. This means that we have no reason to as-
sume non-empty something-from-nothing F -entailment claims unless we have
independent reasons to believe that there are F s, i.e., that the antecedent of
condition (ii) is satisfied. Therefore, assuming ‘S    xFx’ to be a non-empty
something-from-nothing F -entailment claim begs the question as it presupposes
the existence of F s.
Note that, if there are no F s, the ‘S’ in ‘S    xFx’ is a sentence of LT
as otherwise there is the danger that condition (i) is not satisfied, i.e., that it
implies the existence of F s. Assuming T to decide the sentence, we can see that
it cannot be a consequence of T as it would be a consequence of T F so that it
follows from T F that  xFx—even if there are no F s.
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Further, as (CE) demands, a pleonastic concept F must entail something-
from-nothing F -entailment claims and give rise to a conservative extension of
T¬F . Then, if there are no F s, ‘S    xFx’ is an empty something-from-nothing
F -entailment. Further, as this ‘metaphysical entailment’ does not entail the ex-
istence of F s, the extension must be conservative as there is no logical con-
sequence that is not already one of T¬F ; among the new consequences would
be ‘ xFx’ which, by assumption, is not the case. So, if we want to actually
introduce F s, we have to assume the existence of F s; but such an assumption
is clearly question begging. In terms of the theories, this means that the base
theory already contains F s. But if this is the case, then there are cases in which
T¬F is inconsistent as the restriction of a sentence of the form ‘ x(. . . Fx . . .)’ is
‘ x(¬Fx  . . . Fx . . .)’, i.e., T¬F demands there to be F s that are not F s. Thus,
the strategy to make the conservativeness requirement work stands in the way
of successfully introducing F s to T .
Before getting to the next criticism, let me point out two things. Firstly, the
talk of ‘material conditional’ in the quotation above as well as the qualifications
Schi er invokes to not run into Russell’s Paradox [13, p. 72] seem to imply that
he is working with classical logic.2 His treatment of vagueness [13, ch. 5] puts
that into doubt, though. Thus, we need to consider both cases.
Secondly and because of the above, we need a better understanding of what
exactly is going on when a theory is extended. A theory T is a set of sentences in
the language LT that is closed under logical consequence ‘ L’ where the subscript
‘L’ indicates the logic, i.e., if AT is the base of T (e.g., an axiomatization of T ),
then T = {S   LT |AT  L S}. The restricted theory T¬F , however, does not put
a restriction on the logical theorems, i.e., on sentences S such that    L S since
we do not restrict the logic. That means that we can distinguish between the
logical laws and other sentences in T¬F via checking whether or not the sentence
involves a quantifier restricted to ‘¬F ’.
With this background, we can ask the crucial question what these newly
introduced/inferred entities are like, and, in particular, whether these entities
are, indeed, new. Schi er claims the following:
Thus, as with all pleonastic entities, properties have ‘no hidden and sub-
stantial nature for a theory to uncover.’ The essential truths about them
are directly or indirectly determined by the hypostatizing practices con-
stitutive of the concept of a property, together with those necessary a
priori truths applicable to things of any kind, such as that if x = y, then
whatever property x has, y has, and vice versa. As regards the principles
by which properties are individuated, it means that if a question of in-
dividuation is left unsettled by the practices constitutive of the concept
of a property, then that question has no determinate answer. [13, p. 63]
Apparently, all we need to know are ‘constitutive practices’ to arrive at the prop-
erties of these new things in our (now extended) theory. However, the point that
2 One way to circumvent the threat of, e.g., Russell’s Paradox is to weaken classical
logic; e.g., Field [7] opts for a non-classical logic to “save” the so-called Truth Schema.
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I want to problematize is the application of ‘necessary a priori truths applicable
to things of any kind’. Schi er relies on this when he says that “Leibniz’s law
gives us a means for establishing numerous non-identities” [13, p. 63]. The prob-
lem is simply this: (i) either Leibniz’s law (as well as all other necessary a priori
truths) is just another sentence of the base theory, or (ii) it is a logical theorem;
both options are problematic, though. Let us consider these options in turn.
Suppose that (i) is the case. Then Leibniz’s law, i.e. the sentence(-schema)
‘ x y(x = y   ( (x)    (y)))’ is part of the base theory T . The example
Schi er uses himself is the something-from-nothing transformation from ‘Jane
was born on a Tuesday’ to ‘Jane’s birth was on a Tuesday’ [13, p. 63]. The
question he asks is whether or not Jane’s birth is the same as her death. To
introduce the term ‘birth’ (‘B’) to T , we have to restrict the quantifiers in
T to ‘¬B’, i.e., we move to the theory T¬B . Thus, Leibniz’s law in T¬B is
‘ x y(¬B(x)   ¬B(y)   (x = y   ( (x)    (y))))’, i.e., it only applies to
entities that are not births; and this does not change when we add the ‘B’ to
T¬B . This, however, stands now in the way of comparing Jane’s death with her
birth. The latter is not in the range of the restricted quantifiers and, therefore,
Schi er’s argument for the distinctness of the two fails. The quantifiers (‘ x’,
‘ y’) still range over the whole domain and so range over births, but the law
itself is not applicable in answering identity questions regarding the new term.
Thus, to make Schi er’s application of, for example, Leibniz’s law work, we
have to opt for option (ii), i.e., we understand Leibniz’s law as well as all the
‘necessary a priori truths’ to be logical theorems.
As Schi er does not provide a list of the necessary a priori truths, we do not
know exactly what principles he counts as such. However, he says the following:
What generates the conflict in the first place is the status that [. . . ]
the law of excluded middle [. . . ] [has] in our conceptual repertoire. The
underived conceptual [role] of our [notion] of [. . . ] disjunction dispose[s]
us to accept instances of excluded middle[.] [13, p. 225]
This suggests that the following law of excluded middle (LEM) is a conceptual
truth:
    ¬ . (LEM)
Now, it is clear that Schi er cannot take (LEM) to be a necessary a priori truth.
For, as he claims, a question regarding ‘individuation’ that is “left unsettled by
the practice constitutive of the concept of a property [. . . ] has no determinate
answer” [13, p. 63, my emphasis]. But this would be simply false if (LEM) was
true; for, every answer would be determinate.
In his discussion of vagueness, Schi er [13, p. 227] explicitly rejects (LEM).
Thus, he rejects classical logic. Again, as he speaks in one of the quotations
above of ‘material conditional’, it is rather unclear how we are to understand
the ‘something-from-nothing F -entailment claims’ as well as (CE) then.
But let us waive this problem here, i.e., assume that Schi er is endorsing a
non-classical logic, and consider the application of Leibniz’s law again. He argued
that because “Jane’s birth occurred in 1850 and her death occurred in 1933” [13,
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p. 63], the birth and the death must be non-identical. But, as (LEM) does not
hold, just because Jane’s birth occurred in 1850 does not imply that Jane’s birth
did not occur at any other time; it might have occurred at several di erent times.
Similarly in the case of her death. Thus, we need additional information such as
‘Jane’s birth did only occur in 1850’ to apply Leibniz’s law. Thus, without this
additional information, it is not given that these entities are distinct. But if they
aren’t, we have not successfully introduces anything new ; the conservativeness
requirement stands in the way once more.3
2.2 Thomasson and Conservativeness
This brings us to Thomasson’s account. She does not discuss the above incon-
sistency issues related to extensions; let us assume that we do not run into such,
i.e., that the extensions are conservative. Still, she runs into similar problems as
Schi er above as will become clear in the following. Let me first give a rough
outline of her approach before criticizing it and explaining the problem.
The central idea for Thomasson’s easy approach is captured in the following
deflationary principle:
(E) “Ks exist i  the application conditions actually associated with ‘K’ are
fulfilled.” [16, p. 86]
For our purposes, the ‘actually associated’ bit is not important (see [16, pp. 85f.]
for the motivation). What is important are the application conditions. We do
not need to give a full account, but only note the underlying motivation.
Already in her [15], Thomasson introduces application conditions to circum-
vent what is known as the qua problem [3, pp. 79 .] for (purely) causal theories
of reference. In a nutshell, the problem is that unless we have “some very ba-
sic concept of what sort of thing” [15, p. 38] we are referring to, reference is
indeterminate. Her solution to this problem is that “nominative terms must be
associated with a sortal or, more generally, categorial concept” [15, p. 39]; she
calls this a ‘hybrid’ account [15, p. 48]. All this is confirmed in the more recent
[16, p. 95].
However, not every concept categorizes as categorial: terms such as ‘individ-
ual’, ‘object’, or ‘thing’ are not among them [15, p. 42]. This means that they
cannot be invoked in application conditions.
So, to guarantee successful reference using a term ‘K’, we have to have ap-
plication conditions associated with ‘K’ to ground the reference. If these are
fulfilled, (E) guarantees the existence of the corresponding entities.
We can raise the following problem here. To have grounded reference, we
already need successful reference grounding. For, any term that we want to
3 Note [13, pp. 233 .] where Schi er discusses arguments that attempt to show that
Leibniz’s law is violated. As his endorsement of a non-classical logic is motivated by
his treatment of vagueness, and he says that “almost every expression is to some
extent vague” [13, p. 178], his own discussion is highly relevant for his former appli-
cation of Leibniz’s law. The problem is that his own discussion stands in the way of
such a simple application.
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introduce is in need of application conditions to disambiguate the reference.
But the application condition must involve a categorial term to successfully
disambiguate. Now, how did we get this categorial term? Apparently, by means
of yet another categorial term, and so on.
Assuming that we don’t allow to go full circle (as Thomasson rejects with
her condition (4) in [16, p. 96]), we can only stop this regress by assuming that
we started with a set of referring4 categorial terms that have not been given to
us by application conditions.
Moreover, given the need to introduce new terms via associating appropriate
application conditions to them, we can also note that Thomasson cannot start
from a language not containing any predicates (i.e., terms). For, there is just
nothing in there to disambiguate the reference of a new term. Note, however,
that, trivially, adding terms to an empty language is conservative.
Now, this leads to a problem for Thomasson’s account of application condi-
tions. Principle (E) is supposed to apply across the board ; recall (1) from above.
We want to answer all well-formed existence questions. To be a well-formed ex-
istence question, the terms involved must have application conditions associated
with them [16, p. 219]. But this means that even the terms in the set of terms
with which we have to start before extending them with new terms must have
application conditions. Presumably, we can ask and answer existence questions
regarding them even in the unextended base language. Thus, their application
conditions must be statable in terms of one another; otherwise (1) is not sat-
isfied. Thomasson also makes this a condition for introducing new terms to an
“unextended language L” [16, p. 263]:
The term(s) must be introduced via a conditional that gives su cient
conditions for its(/their) application, stated using the extant terms of L
and/or other minimally introduced terms. [16, p. 263, my emphasis]
But this means that we must have terms ‘K’ and ‘K  ’ whose application con-
ditions involve one another.5 So, to answer the question whether there are Ks,
we have to check whether there are K  s; and to check whether there are K  s, we
have to see whether there are Ks.
Indeed, Thomasson distinguishes ‘basic’ from ‘derivative’ terms:
Once basic nouns are in place [. . . ] we can introduce new nouns on the
basis of others. [16, p. 99, my emphasis]
The above circularity problem concerns the basic terms. I waive this problem
for the moment.6 There is, however, another problem, viz., whether we can even
4 If they were non-referring, we could never establish reference. For, we use the cate-
gorial term to specify what something is, and then introduce further conditions to
be more specific. But, if the categorial term did not refer, neither would the more
specific one.
5 Strictly speaking, it means that for the basic terms ‘K0’, ‘K1’, . . . , ‘Kn’ we end up
in a similar situation. For simplicity, I chose and claimed this about two.
6 I discuss it in detail in [11].
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introduce all the other terms that correspond to entities that Thomasson wants
to infer. Thomasson characterizes the basic terms as those that “we tend to learn
early in our cognitive and linguistic development” [16, p. 104]; as examples,
Thomasson refers to “what Carnap called ‘the thing language’ [. . . ] such as
‘piece of paper’, ‘desk’, and the like” [16, p. 106]. Her examples do not include
any abstracta—which seems reasonable given her characterization of ‘basic’.
So, the question to be asked now is how Thomasson is able to infer the
existence of abstracta such as numbers. We can note that Thomasson does not
think of ‘number’ as a basic term [16, p. 217]. However, she does think that she
is inferring abstracta such as numbers and properties (for the latter, see [16, pp.
102f.] quoted above in Section 2).
To answer the existence question regarding numbers, we have to look at the
application conditions of ‘number’. Since we just saw that this is a derivative
term, it must have been introduced by means of other terms. We can also note
that numbers are abstract, so that either (i) a term that is involved in the
application conditions of ‘number’ is associated with an abstractum, or (ii) the
application conditions involve a phrase like ‘. . . and is abstract’ or ‘abstract . . . ’.
Let us look at the options in turn.7
Suppose first that (i) is the case. Then we can apply the same reasoning
again. Opting always for this option, we must bottom out in basic terms. Thus,
there must be a term among the basic terms that is associated with an ab-
stractum. This is so because of the conservativeness requirement together with
Thomasson’s requirement to have application conditions in place. However, this
is rather implausible given the characterization of ‘basic’.
Here we can see that Thomasson does not rely on having the concept ‘¬K’ to
introduce ‘K’. However, this is part of what creates the problem here. Thus, we
end up with the following dilemma: to even be in a place to have a conservative
extension, we need to invoke concepts from outside the theory we want to extend
(given the characterization of ‘basic’ terms that constitute the base theory and
the condition quoted above on using the vocabulary of the base theory), or we
are not in a place to extend the theory to all the concepts we want, as will
become clear in the following.
So let us take a look at (ii). Again, because of the conservativeness require-
ment, we cannot be sure whether or not the application conditions are fulfilled
now. Suppose, for example, that the application conditions of ‘number’ are ‘ab-
stract K’, where ‘K’ is a (combination of) basic term(s) (i.e., associated with
something non-abstract). How shall we check now whether or not these appli-
cation conditions are fulfilled?8 Just assuming them to be fulfilled is obviously
question-begging—as it already was in Schi er’s account.
7 Note that the requirement quoted above means that we introduce conditionals.
Nonetheless, I speak of application conditions to mean the antecedent of such.
8 Note, too, that using Hume’s principle as (part of) the application conditions for
‘number’ does not help here. Hume’s principle refers to relations, so that we can ask
the question about how we got the term ‘relation’, and the game repeats itself as we
are back in case (i).
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Summing up, the circularity issue puts Thomasson’s condition (1) into ques-
tion as her own approach is not applicable to all existence questions. She might
rebut, however, that the existence questions in question here are not well-formed.
The problem with this, though, is that this infects all other existence questions
that have to rely on terms that don’t have application conditions associated with
them but nonetheless correspond to entities (see [11] for details).
The abstractness problem, on the other hand, might conflict with (2). Thomas-
son says that “at least some” [16, p. 128] questions have to be answered in this
way, but as my above argument shows, none of these “disputed entities” [16, p.
128]—if abstract—can be derived if we don’t already start with abstracta. In
particular, by the conservativeness requirement that she invokes together with
her characterization of ‘basic’ terms, Easy Ontology as developed by her is not
capable of inferring any abstract entities. As concrete entities are usually not
disputed (or at least not in the same way), Easy Ontology does not fulfil (2).9
3 Conclusion
To sum up, both Schi er and Thomasson invoke conservativeness in their defla-
tionary metaontologies. However, both end up with problems that arise there-
from. Even if we successfully introduce new terms to our language, it is rather
unclear what properties the corresponding entities have. In particular, it is con-
sistent to assume them to have properties that are not normally ascribed to
them. The reason for this is simply that we have to restrict the quantifiers to
introduce something new; but it is then an open question what exactly has been
introduced. Just assuming that it has certain properties is question begging in
an ontological context.
Further, it is rather unclear whether we can infer the existence of certain
disputed entities. As the discussion of Thomasson’s work makes clear, to even
get to abstracta, we have to assume (appropriately many) abstracta to introduce
others. However, this is not the result that her easy approach promises.
We can also observe that Field’s approach is not in any way at risk to similar
worries. The reason is simply that his project does not try to introduce new
terms/entities, but he looks at the full picture and singles out a base that is
appropriate for the job at hand. We can describe this as top-down, and nothing
has been said that dismisses a successful top-down approach. The bottom-up
approach as exemplified by the discussed deflationary metaontologies faces the
di culties pointed out.
We can also note that the restriction to the negation of the concept that we
want to introduce is not a problem for the top-down approach; the concept was
already there to be invoked. However, the bottom-up approach seems to force
us to already have the very concept we want to introduce.
Lastly, the neo-Fregean approach understood as a ‘re-carving’ of what’s al-
ready there might also be una ected by the problems the deflationary meta-
9 In [11], I argue this point more fully to conclude that even empirical inquiry is
impossible by the Easy Ontologist’s own lights.
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ontologies of Schi er and Thomasson face. If we understand everything to be
already there, the new concepts are introduced via biconditionals that allow us
to understand the new concept by recourse to the old ones. And as abstracta
are already assumed, neo-Fregeans do not run into the problem of not being able
to introduce any abstract entities. The problem facing Schi er’s account is also
not a threat to them. The reason is again that we are not extending any theory
(and with that, any domain), and the logic is always classical.
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Interpreting Intensifiers for Relative Adjectives:
Comparing Models and Theories
Zhuoye Zhao
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Abstract. Adjectives such as tall or late which can enter comparative
constructions or be modified by intensifiers such as very are called grad-
able. They have received considerable attention in formal semantics and,
more recently, in Bayesian pragmatics. While comparative constructions
are well understood, less is known about the contribution of intensifiers.
In this paper, we compare several concrete models for the meaning of
very tall with data from a previous study.
1 Introduction
1.1 Degree Semantics
Degree Semantics (Kennedy & McNally, 2005; Kennedy, 2007, among others)
proposes that gradable adjectives such as tall and late map individuals to de-
grees on a scale. For example,  tall  =  x.height(x), which gives a map from
individuals to their degree of tallness. When used in positive forms as in Ronald
is tall, which is obtained by combining tall with a null morpheme pos, it means
the degree of tallness (i.e. height) exceeds a context-dependent threshold  (C).
(1)  pos tall  =  x.height(x)    (C)
The threshold  (C) is determined contextually in the sense that it has dif-
ferent values with respect to di erent comparison classes (encoded by the argu-
ment C). For instance, a tall tree and a tall man are definitely judged by di erent
standard. The Bayesian models we will introduce shortly will show ways in which
the threshold is selected according to C.
Di erent adjectives di er in the type of measure functions they denote and
the associated scale structure. Kennedy & McNally (2005) distinguish between
absolute adjectives like late or full, which map individuals onto a degree scale
that is lower- or upper-bound, and relative adjectives like tall which have an
open scale. Scale structure a ects  (C): absolute adjectives tend to pick the
scale endpoint as their threshold, which is known and does not depend much
on the comparison class. Open scales do not provide such a salient threshold, so
their  (C) is more context-dependent and less certain. As a consequence, relative
adjectives tend to be vague. For example, it is hard to decide whether a 5ft10in
tall man is tall. By contrast, adjectives like late or full show no such vagueness
– someone is late as long as they show up after the scheduled time.
1
142
Having introduced a comparison threshold  (C) into the semantics of grad-
able adjectives, the meaning of degree modifiers such as very follows naturally –
they shift the threshold  (C) to a higher value. Klein (1980) proposed a formal
semantic account for degree modifiers that captures the threshold shifting and
can be easily adapted into the notions of degree semantics. The basic idea is
that a sentence like Ronald is very tall is true if Ronald is tall compared to the
set of tall people. We can formally define it as follows:
(2)  very pos tall  =  x.height(x)    (C  ),
where C   = {x |  pos tall (x) = 1}
One of the goals of this paper is to test the prediction of this account using
probabilistic pragmatic models (see §1.2), and compare it with another purely
pragmatic account proposed by Bennett & Goodman (2015) (also see §1.2).
1.2 Probabilistic Pragmatic Models for Gradable Adjectives
In order to fully capture the meaning of gradable adjectives, a mechanism to
determine or infer the context-dependent threshold  (C) is necessary. Fortu-
nately, probabilistic pragmatic models (in the sense of Franke & Ja¨ger, 2016)
have been successful in making quantitative predictions for  (C), and in further
explaining the linguistic phenomena we’re interested in. The basic assumption
of such models is that language users are goal-oriented Bayesian agents that
are involved in social interactions where speaker and listener communicate and
recursively reason about each others’ goals/inferences. Each utterance u is at-
tributed probability P (u|w) to be chosen by a speaker with knowledge-state w
under the assumption that the speaker is trying to maximize some notion of util-
ity (the definition of which varies in di erent models). Listeners simply inverse
the probability using Bayes’ rule to obtain a probability distribution on possible
states of the world given what the speaker said: P (w|u).
Here we present two probabilistic pragmatic models for gradable adjectives,
the Rational Speech-Act Model (RSA) proposed by Lassiter & Goodman (2014),
and the Speaker-Oriented Model (SOM) by Qing & Franke (2014). Specifically,
the RSA model is a listener-oriented model, which predicts the threshold  (C) as
an inference of a (pragmatic) listener, whereas the SOM model, as indicated by
the name, derives  (C) at the speaker’s level based on his/her prior knowledge
about the world. We will now present the main features of these two models. In
the following we focus on the relative adjective tall and the utterance ‘Ronald is
tall ’, marked as u and the trivial empty utterance u0.
Rational Speech-Act model (RSA)
The essential idea behind (strongly) Bayesian models of pragmatics is that
the listener uses Bayes’ rule to recover a speaker’s knowledge state w in a context
C given the speaker’s utterance u.
(3) P (w|u,C)   P (u|w,C)  P (w)
2
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In our case, we are only interested in Ronald’s height h0, so w can be reduced to
the speaker’s knowledge of this height. We assume that the listener has a prior
knowledge of the distribution of possible heights,  (h). The only missing part
now is a model of how the speaker choose their utterance, i.e. P (u|w,C).
The idea behind the RSA is that the listener models a speaker who tries to
minimize the cost of their utterance, while maximizing informativity for a virtual
“literal listener” L0, who simply updates the prior by conditioning on u being
literally true. This is where the semantics come into play: Lassiter & Goodman
(2014) assume the standard Degree semantics, so the truth of u depends on a
threshold  . In their model, the listener has no prior knowledge of  , but assumes
that the speaker has exact knowledge of it.   is thus a free parameter that the
listener must infer together with h0, Ronald’s actual height.
Concretely, informativity is defined as negative surprisal value of L0’s belief
about h0 after hearing u, and the speaker’s utility function is as (4):
(4) Ursa(u,  , h0) = log( (h0|u,  ))  Cost(u)
The speaker tries to maximize utility, but is assumed to do it in a sub-optimal
fashion (using a soft-max with parameter   < ):
(5)  (u| , h0)   exp(  · Ursa(u,  , h0))
The listener then infers a joint distribution for   and h by applying Bayes’ rules.
Here we will only be interested in the posterior distribution of  , which is given
by the formula in (6).




 (h) · Pr( ) ·  (u|h,  )dh = Pr( ) ·
  
   (h)dh
1 + e crsa · (     (h)dh) 
Speaker-Oriented Model (SOM)
The SOM di ers from the RSA model in that instead of the literal listener
L0, it assumes a listener L sharing the prior knowledge  (h) with the speaker.
Moreover, instead of a fixed value of the threshold  (C), it provides a mecha-
nism to derive the probability of the speaker using a specific  , hence gives a
generalization over possible contexts.
Concretely, keeping the assumption that the speaker tries to maximize the
utility, the SOM replaces informativity with the notion of Expected Success
(given by the expected value of the probability of L successfully guessing the
actual height h0), and replaces the cost function with its marginalization over
all possible heights h >  .
(7) With the cost parameter c,













Again, the threshold   is chosen sub-optimally as in (5):
(8) Pr( )   exp(  · U( ))
Then according to Degree semantics, the probability of using the utterance u
can be given as the probability of     h0:
(9)  (u|h0) = P (    h0) =
  h0
   Pr( )d 
1.3 Bennett & Goodman’s model for intensifiers
Based on the RSA model, Bennett & Goodman (2015) proposed a purely prag-
matic account for degree modifiers. Though agreeing with Klein on that modi-
fied adjective phrases have the same semantics as unmodified ones except for a
threshold shift, they claimed that intensifiers such as very or extremely give rise
to the threshold shift in a non-compositional way, by simply changing the cost
function Cost(u). To be concrete, modified adjective phrases such as very tall
and extremely tall have the same semantics as the plain tall, except for di er-
ent context-dependent thresholds. Since extremely is more costly than very, the
threshold for extremely tall is higher than that of very tall. The cost parameters
crsa/csom may depend on the length of the intensifier (longer words cost more
than shorter ones) and the frequency (rarer words are harder to access, hence
also cost more), etc. This account can be easily implemented using the RSA
model, and Bennett & Goodman have already made predictions that match ex-
perimental data. In this paper, we want to further compare their account with
Klein, by implementing both of them in both SOM and RSA. We hope to get
insights into the two Bayesian models during the process.
1.4 Arguments for and against each Account
Before proceeding to the project, it seems necessary to discuss some theoreti-
cal arguments for or against each of the two accounts of degree modifiers. The
key debate, as indicated above, lies on whether the intensifiers contribute to the
threshold-shift compositionally, with non-vacuous lexical semantics. As Bennett
& Goodman pointed out, though it is intuitive to encode the strengths of inten-
sification into the lexical meanings of degree modifiers, it faces certain obstacles.
First and foremost, there is a large multitude of degree modifiers and great po-
tential for language production. For example, adverbs like ridiculously normally
do not indicate an intensifying reading, but when used in ridiculously tall, we
can easily construe it as an intensification of tall. In this sense, to provide lexical
semantics for each intensifier would greatly a ect theoretical parsimony.
On the other hand, Bennett & Goodman’s account also su ers certain defi-
ciencies. For one thing, it cannot exclude the possibility that the cost induced by
an intensifier has something to do with its lexical meaning. As is mentioned in
§1.2, the cost of an intensifier may depend on its length and frequency, but it is
reasonable to argue that the word is rarely used because of its relatively extreme
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meaning. Hence before we accept this account, we need to gain more evidence
regarding the causal direction. Moreover, since the account is purely pragmatic
and non-compositional, it faces direct objections with respect to compositional-
ity. Consider the following sentences.
(10) a. Ronald is not extremely tall.
b. Ronald is extremely tall and quite smart.
Intuitively, (10a) means Ronald’s height doesn’t exceed the average height saliently,
but may indicate that he can be relatively tall (or serves as a euphemism to
say he’s not tall). However, with Bennett & Goodman’s account, the intensi-
fier extremely doesn’t contribute to the semantic meaning at all. But since it
significantly strengthened the meaning of the adjectival phrase not tall (with a
high cost), we can derive the meaning that ‘Ronald is extremely not tall’, which
contradicts the general intuition that extremely is interpreted in the scope of
negation. Also, (10b) means that Ronald’s height saliently exceed the average,
and his intelligence is somewhat above average. However, if we construe the in-
tensification as purely pragmatic, we lose the binding between extremely and tall
as well as quite and smart, and fail to derive the correct reading.
This paper doesn’t have preference for either account. Rather, we hope to
provide empirical evidence for/against them, by implementing them respectively
with SOM and RSA, and compare their predictions with experimental data. The
project will be introduced in detail in §2, with further discussions and future
directions in section §2.4.
2 Project: Data and Results
2.1 Goal
The goal of this project is to test two di erent accounts proposed by K and
Bennett & Goodman, respectively, for the interpretation of degree modifiers,
embedded in both SOM and RSA. We expect it to provide empirical evidence
for/against either of the interpretations, and to provide insights for the com-
parison between the two Bayesian models. Specifically, we want to see how well
the quantitative predictions (from di erent models following di erent interpre-
tations) fit with empirical data (obtained from the experiment conducted by
Le el et al., 2018).
2.2 Model and Data
Le el et al. (2018) measured participants’ agreement with sentences such as
“Ronald is tall” given Ronald’s exact height. They tested both ‘tall’ and ‘very
tall’ (among other constructions), for 13 di erent heights from 5ft3in (160cm)
to 6ft10in (208cm). Participants adjusted a slider to express their agreement.
For our purpose, we interpret these judgments as reflecting the probability that
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a sentence is true, i.e. the probability that     h.1 For SOM, this translates
naturally as the cumulative distribution function of  ,
  h
   Pr( )d . For RSA,
we will translate this as the posterior cumulative distribution of  , as inferred
by the pragmatic listener:
  h
    ( |u1)d .
We tested all combinations of the two theoretical claims (Klein vs. Bennett
& Goodman) and two probabilistic models (SOM vs. RSA), against the median
judgment for each point of the scale and each construction. While in principle
the models make predictions about individual speakers rather than a population
(particularly the RSA), we chose to model the latter for simplicity and because
the individual data was rather noisy. The median was preferred to the mean,
as it is less sensitive to outliers and because the mean would not converge to
0% or 100% for extreme values. In each case, we started by adjusting the model
parameters (cost c for tall,  , prior on heights) to fit the data for tall, and then
evaluated the best possible fit for very tall. All results are presented in Fig. 1.
(i) Klein + SOM
To fit the data on tall, we chose a normal prior distribution for  (h) with
parameters µ = 68.5in,   = 3.7in, the degree of rationality was   = 1.2, and
the cost for tall was csom = 0.2.
According to Klein’s account for degree modifiers, intensified adjectives such
as very tall are interpreted as tall compared to the set of tall people. It can
be incorporated into SOM by using the posterior distribution on heights
after an utterance of tall as the prior distribution   (h) for the height of tall
people:





To simplify the further computation, we approximated this distribution with
a Gaussian in the next steps. Combining (7),(8),(9) and (11), we can derive
the distribution of the threshold    for very tall, which can then be integrated
to derive a model of participants’ judgments as P (   < h). The cost param-
eter for this second iteration of the algorithm was c som, and was meant to
reflect the cost of adding very to the sentence. With constraint c som   0, the
optimal choice ended up being 0.
(ii) Bennett & Goodman + SOM
According to Bennett & Goodman, intensifying degree adverbs shift the
threshold just because they increase the cost of utterances. Therefore, we
could translate this account into the language of SOM simply by increasing
the value of the cost parameter to csom + c som, where c som is the additional
cost caused by very. Here the optimal choice was c som = 1.8. Other param-
eters were identical to what we used to implement K’s account.
1 Le el et al. (2018) interpret their results as reflecting not just truth but also prag-
matic felicity (i.e. truth of the sentence together with its implicatures). However
the implicatures they discuss only surfaced for more complex sentences (involving




(iii) Klein + RSA
To fit the data on tall with the RSA, we chose a normal prior distribution
for  (h) with parameters µ = 69in,   = 3.7in, the degree of rationality was
  = 4.8, and the cost for tall was crsa = 0.85.
The RSA naturally provides the posterior distribution  (h|u1) for the heights
of tall people:




1+e crsa ·(     (h )dh )  d 
Then combining (12) with (4),(5),(6), we derive Klein’s predictions for very
tall within the RSA model. A cost c rsa = 1/3crsa = 0.28 gave close to optimal
results.
(iv) Bennett & Goodman + RSA
As in (ii), Bennett & Goodman’s account of very only requires increasing
the cost to crsa + c rsa. Setting all parameters as in (iii) gave good results.
2.3 Results
Fig. 1 shows the results of comparing empirical data with model predictions
described above. Fig. 1a indicates that even with a minimal cost c som = 0 for
the intensifier, the prediction of Klein’s account implemented within SOM shifts
the threshold of very tall far too right. All other three combinations gave good
approximations of the data, although Bennett & Goodman’s account within
SOM required a very high cost c som = 1.8 (in comparison to csom = 0.2 for the
full unmodified sentence). Both accounts of very could be implemented in RSA
with a reasonable cost for very.
2.4 Discussion
In Fig. (1a), we chose to present the radical case c som = 0 because any larger
value of c som shifts the curve further right; and since this radical case has already
yielded a result far to the right, it indicates that SOM + Klein cannot make cor-
rect predictions for very tall. Second, Fig. (1b), though exhibiting an accurate
prediction, requires an additional cost parameter c som = 1.8. If we follow the
assumption that cost is proportional to the length of expression as measured by
the number of words (see Lassiter & Goodman, 2014), then compared to the cost
csom = 0.2 set to fit the data of tall, which is induced by the sentence Ronald
is tall, c som is impractically large. In short, SOM’s low sensitivity to the cost
parameter (presented as an advantage of this model in Qing & Franke, 2014)
may hinder itself in correctly predicting the meaning of degree modifiers. On the
other hand, Fig. (1c) and (1d) show that RSA does give good predictions with
both accounts, and with relatively practical cost parameters crsa = 0.85 and
c rsa   13crsa. Note that our results o er an independent assessment of Bennett
& Goodman (2015), as they only tested their models against a point-wise esti-
mate of the posterior (but for multiple intensifiers), while we tested the model’s
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(a) Klein + SOM (b) Bennett & Goodman + SOM
(c) Klein + RSA (d) Bennett & Goodman + RSA
Fig. 1: Best fit for each model, compared to the median response in Le el et al.
(2018)
ability to fit the full posterior distribution (though only for very). Interestingly
however, the present results do not clearly advocate between Klein and Bennett
& Goodman.
3 Conclusion
We presented a four-way comparison between i) two theories of degree modifiers,
i.e. Klein (1980) and Bennett & Goodman (2015), and ii) two recent probabilis-
tic models for scalar adjectives, i.e. RSA (Lassiter & Goodman, 2014) and SOM
(Qing & Franke, 2014), in dealing with degree modifiers. The comparison was
conducted by testing the 2 2 combinations of theories and models on the exper-
imental data from Le el et al. (2018). The results showed us that SOM, due to
its low sensitivity to the cost parameter, does not make a good prediction for the
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meaning of intensifiers, whereas RSA presented us with relatively good results.
Meanwhile, the results did not show preference between Klein and Bennet &
Goodman. In particular, we could imagine implementing Bennett & Goodman’s
flexible account of various intensifiers by varying the cost in the second deriva-
tion involved in Klein’s account (so extremely tall would also mean “tall among
tall people”, but with a higher cost than very tall). In fact, this is virtually the
strategy we used trying to find the best fit for Klein’s account with both RSA
and SOM models.
In this paper, we only discussed the relative standard adjective tall. Turning
to minimum-standard adjectives, such as late would in principle help further
distinguish between the proposals of Klein and Bennett & Goodman. Crucially,
the correct account should explain for the fact that late is minimum-standard
while very late is relative. Nevertheless, neither the SOM nor the RSA was in
position to fit the data for late presented in Le el et al. (2018),2 forcing us to
leave this question for future research.
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Abstract. The meaning components of may/or and must/or sentences
have been discussed intensively by a number of theoretical accounts. The
debates are concerned with whether free choice inferences are logical
interpretations or scalar implicatures, and whether exhaustive inferences
and exclusive or inferences are derived for may/or versus must/or. In
this study, two experiments were conducted to evaluate the assumptions
of three representative accounts, namely, Fox (2007), Geurts (2005) and
Simons (2005). Each experiment separately examined the availability
and processing time-course of the three types of inferences associated
with may/or versus must/or sentences. The experimental results are
consistent with Simons (2005) to a large extent.
1 Introduction
This experimental study has two focuses. First, it presents a set of contrastive
data which illustrate how people interpret and process sentences with disjunc-
tion embedded under a deontic possibility modal as shown in (1a) versus a
deontic necessity modal as shown in (1b). Second, it discusses to what extent
di erent theoretical accounts explain the data by looking into their assumptions.
(1) a. Mary may eat an apple or a banana. may/or sentence
b. Mary must eat an apple or a banana. must/or sentence
The interpretation of may/or and must/or sentences is closely associated with
three types of inferences: free choice inferences as shown in (2a), exhaustive infer-
ences as shown in (2b), and exclusive or inferences as shown in (2c). Intuitively,
it is relatively certain that both types of sentences yield strong free choice infer-
ences; however, it is unclear whether there exists a di erence between them in
triggering exhaustive and exclusive or inferences.
(2) a. free choice inference (options indicated by each disjunct are permitted):
Mary is permitted to eat an apple, and she is also permitted to eat a banana.
b. exhaustive inference (options not indicated by disjuncts are not per-
mitted): Mary is not permitted to eat anything other than an apple or a banana.
c. exclusive or inference (only one option is permitted at a time): Mary
is not permitted to eat both an apple and a banana.
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Relevant theoretical discussions (see [1], [3], [4], [9], [10], [11], [15], [17], [19]) pri-
marily center on free choice inferences because free choice inferences are special
in the sense that the standard semantics (i.e., the combination of the Boolean
analysis of disjunction [2] and the standard modal logic for deontic modals [12])
completely fails to explain them, while the standard Neo-Gricean reasoning [15]
can only account for their derivation for must/or sentences. In order to univer-
sally explain free choice inferences, in general, two types of accounts are devel-
oped: scalar implicature accounts (e.g. [3], [9]), and semantic accounts (e.g. [10],
[15], [19]). It is impossible to tell which (types of) account is on the right track
based on previous experimental studies (e.g. [6], [7], [18]) because they limit their
investigations to free choice inferences drawn from may/or sentences, while ex-
haustive and exclusive or inferences, as well as the interpretation of must/or
sentences, are not investigated.
In this study, I create a lottery machine paradigm, which separately examines
the availability and derivation mechanism of the three types of inferences drawn
from may/or versus must/or sentences. Based on the novel data, I attempt to
evaluate di erent accounts. The study is structured as follows. In Section 2, I
discuss the assumptions of three representative accounts, namely, Fox (2007)
[9], Geurts (2005) [10] and Simons (2005) [15], and how they are experimentally
testable. Section 3 and 4 separately report the experimental investigations on
may/or and must/or sentences. In Section 5, I compare the data of may/or
sentences with those of must/or sentences and discuss how the data may shed
lights on theoretical accounts.
2 Background
Scalar Implicature Account Fox (2007) proposes that there exists a covert ex-
haustification operator (Exh) which can optionally be applied to may/or and
must/or sentences, so that free choice inferences are explained as being derived
by the same mechanism as that for scalar implicatures.
Exh needs to operate over a formally defined set of alternatives that is se-
mantically closed under disjunction. For example, the set of alternatives of (1a)
is closed as Mary may eat an apple or a banana, Mary may eat an apple, Mary
may eat a banana, Mary may eat an apple and a banana. Only propositions
that belong to the closed set of alternatives are relevant to the question under
discussion and can be updated to the context set, while all other propositions
are irrelevant and should be excluded (see Stalnaker (1978) [16]). As a result,
exhaustive inferences are derived because the type of worlds in which Mary eats
a thing other than an apple and a banana are excluded from the set of worlds
of evaluation of (1a). Due to the same reason, exhaustive inferences are also
assumed to be present for must/or sentences.
One primary role of Exh is to eliminate as many alternatives as possible.
When Exh is applied to a may/or sentence such as (1a) for the first time, the
stronger alternative containing and (e.g. Mary may eat an apple and a banana)
is negated, and an exclusive or inference is derived. After the first-step exhaus-
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tification, a new set of alternatives is generated, which includes Mary may eat
an apple but not a banana and Mary may eat a banana but not an apple. These
alternatives can simultaneously be negated if Exh is further applied to the sen-
tence. The recursive application of Exh eventually gives rise to a free choice
inference.
Di erent from may/or sentences, a must/or sentence such as (1b) only in-
volves a one-step exhaustification. Once Exh is applied, the simultaneous nega-
tion of the stronger alternatives containing individual disjuncts (e.g. Mary must
eat an apple and Mary must eat a banana) gives rise to a free choice inference,
while the negation of the stronger alternative containing and (e.g. Mary must
eat an apple and a banana) gives rise to an inference implying that it is not
obligatory for Mary to eat an apple and a banana. This inference is compati-
ble with the type of worlds in which Mary is permitted to eat an apple and a
banana, and she can also freely choose whether to eat them. Thus, exclusive or
inferences are not expected for must/or sentences.
Semantic Accounts Geurts (2005) and Simons (2005) solve the free choice
puzzle by proposing alternative semantics. Their accounts are crucially di erent
from each other in how they deal with the scope relation between disjunction
and deontic modals and how they formulate the semantics for disjunction. More
specifically, Geurts claims that if assuming that disjunction takes scope over de-
ontic modals, sentences with disjunction embedded under deontic modals can
be analyzed as conjunctions of modal propositions. In comparison, Simons pro-
poses that under the scope of deontic modals, disjunction can introduce sets of
alternative propositions.
Despite their di erences, they similarly argue that free choice inferences
are derived as the results of the computation of truth conditions, and they are
the preferred logical interpretations of both may/or and must/or sentences. In
addition, they also similarly suggest that there is some kind of exclusive or con-
straint 1 which can be applied to may/or and must/or sentences to restrict the
intersection between the sets of worlds denoted by individual disjuncts. They
further suggest that this constraint is a pragmatic constraint, and the exclusive
or inferences triggered by it is sort of conversational implicatures.
Although Geurts and Simons hold the same point of view that the exhaus-
tive e ect should always be a semantic e ect, they have noticeably di erent
assumptions concerning whether the e ect should be available for may/or ver-
sus must/or sentences. According to Geurts who proposes that disjunction takes
a wider scope, the existence of the exhaustive e ect is completely dependent on
whether disjunction should be closed. Following Zimmermann (2000) [19], he
claims that the conjunctive lists of modal propositions coordinated by disjunc-
tion should be closed by default unless they are explicitly marked by intonation
or other linguistic devices. Therefore, usually, exhaustive inferences are derived
semantically for both may/or and must/or sentences. Based on Simons who sug-
gests that deontic modals take a wider scope, the semantics of deontic modals
1 The exclusive or constraint is named as the disjointness constraint in Geurts (2005,
p. 395) and the no total overlap constraint in Simons (2005, p. 29).
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plays a central role in determining whether the exhaustive e ect is present. Ex-
haustive inferences are present for must/or sentences because must, as a deontic
necessity modal, prohibits the deontic accessibility to any type of worlds that
are not denoted by individual disjuncts. In comparison, exhaustive inferences
can be absent for may/or sentences because may, as a deontic possibility modal,
allows for the accessibility to an arbitrary type of worlds as long as the types of
worlds denoted by individual disjuncts are deontically accessible.
Psychological Implications Studies on language processing (e.g. [5], [8], [13])2
suggest that the computation of logical interpretations take place alongside with
the computation of logical forms in syntax, so it is automatic with low cogni-
tive costs involved. In comparison, scalar implicature derivation is cognitively
costly, because addressees may need spend cognitive resources in reasoning why
addressers utter a specific scalar expression instead of its stronger alternatives
or deciding whether a deep reasoning process should be applied. Since cognitive
resources in working memory are limited, it is fairly di cult for people to derive
scalar implicatures for every single occurrence of scalar expressions. As a result,
scalar implicatures are only optionally derived.
In psycholinguistic experiments, the degree of availability of an inference,
reflected by derivation rates, conveys information about whether this inference
is computed automatically or optionally; while the processing time conveys in-
formation about whether an inference is cognitively costly. Based on these, if an
inference is derived semantically, the derivation rate of it should be very high
(i.e., ideally close to 100%), and the processing time of it should be similar as
that of a logical interpretation. By contrast, if an inference is a scalar implica-
ture in nature, the derivation rate of it should be moderate (i.e., a value that
is neither close to 0% nor 100%), and the processing time of it should be much
longer than that of a logical interpretation. Thus, by experimentally examining
the derivation rate and processing time, we can tell whether an inference is avail-
able and whether it is a logical interpretation or a scalar implicature.
In short, once we obtain the derivation rate and processing time of each of
the three types of inferences associated with may/or and must/or sentences,
we can immediately know the meaning components of may/or versus must/or
sentences and the nature of these components. Based on these, we can further
judge the plausibility of di erent theoretical accounts.
3 Experiment for May/or Sentences
Purposes To examine derivation rates and processing time of free choice, exhaus-
tive and exclusive or inferences triggered by may/or sentences.
Participants 40 Dutch native speakers (aged 18 and above) were recruited
from the Dutch participant database of Utrecht University.
2 I only discuss the studies which adopt a method similar as the one I used, i.e.,
a picture-sentence binary judgment task, because in psycholinguistic experiments,
di erences in the types of tasks involved can cause crucial di erences in results.
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Method I designed a lottery game paradigm in Dutch in ZEP 3, which re-
quired participants to do an online picture-sentence binary judgment task based
on the cover story as shown in Figure 1. The cover story was only presented
once at the beginning of the task. Participants were asked to read the cover
story carefully without a time constraint, and their understandings about the
story were examined by 6 practice trials. Only when they successfully passed all
practice trials, they could start the test session.
Fig. 1. English Translation of the Cover Story for May/or Experiment
Fig. 2. Example of Target Trial in May/or Experiment
Figure 2 illustrates one target trial. For each trial, a picture depicting a lottery
machine would firstly be presented on computer screen for 500ms. After this,
3 Information about ZEP can be found at https://www.beexy.nl/
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a plus sign (+) would occur at the beginning of the sentence bar beneath the
picture. Participants were instructed that if they press the middle button on the
button box in front of them, the plus sign would be replaced by the first chunk
of the sentence. The sentence chunks could continuously show up by pressing the
same button. Participants could read the sentence at their own pace by control-
ling the speed of button press. All may/or sentences were cut into five chunks
as shown in Figure 2. Once the entire sentence was presented on the screen,
participants were required to judge whether the sentence is true or false based
on the cover story by pressing the corresponding left/right button on the button
box. True/false responses and the reaction time from the occurrence of the last
sentence chunk to the left/right button press were recorded.
The False response in Figure 2 indicates the existence of the free choice infer-
ence. To illustrate, based on the cover story, the picture indicates that the only
item the child is permitted to buy is a box of milk because it is both available
and a ordable. If participants derive the free choice inference for the sentence,
which implies that the child is permitted to buy a sandwich and he/she is also
permitted to buy a box of milk, they should judge the sentence as the incorrect
description of the picture. Thus, the percentage of false responses in trials like
the one in Figure 2 indicates the derivation rates of free choice inferences, while
the reaction time of these false responses reflects the processing time needed for
deriving free choice inferences. By adopting a very similar design of trials, the
data of exhaustive and exclusive or inferences can also be obtained.
Design and Materials A single factor within-subject design was used. The
independent variable was the type of conditions created for may/or sentences.
Each may/or sentence occurred in three target conditions (i.e., the free choice,
exhaustive and exclusive or conditions) and two control conditions in which
only logical interpretations were involved in making judgments (see Figure 3).
There were two dependent variables: the type of responses (i.e., true or false)
and the reaction time associated with the responses. 12 trials were created for
each target/control condition. 70 filler trials were added to conceal experimental
purposes. All trials were pseudo-randomized.
Predictions Fox (2007) predicts that exhaustive inferences are derived se-
mantically, while free choice and exclusive or inferences are derived as scalar
implicatures. Based on this, the percentage of false responses in the exhaustive
condition should be near 100%, and the corresponding reaction time should be
roughly the same as that in control conditions. The percentage of false responses
in the free choice and exclusive or condition should be neither close to 0% nor
100%, and the corresponding reaction time should be longer than that in control
conditions.
Geurts (2005) predicts that exhaustive and free choice inferences are derived
semantically, while exclusive or inferences are derived as conversational impli-
catures. Based on this, the percentage of false responses in the free choice and
exhaustive condition should be near 100%, and the corresponding reaction time
should be roughly the same as that in control conditions. The percentage of
false responses in the exclusive or condition should be neither close to 0% nor
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Fig. 3. Target and Control Conditions in May/or Experiment
100%, and the corresponding reaction time should be longer than that in control
conditions.
Simons (2004) predicts that free choice inferences are derived semantically
and exclusive or inferences are derived as conversational implicatures, while ex-
haustive inferences are absent. Based on this, the percentage of false responses
in the free choice condition should be near 100%, and the corresponding reaction
time should be roughly the same as that in control conditions. The percentage
of false responses in the exclusive or condition should be neither close to 0% nor
100%, and the corresponding reaction time should be longer than that in control
conditions. The percentage of false responses in the exhaustive condition should
be near 0%.
Results I excluded the data from 7 participants whose accuracy rates on
control items were low. I removed all reaction time data associated with wrong
responses in control conditions, and I further removed 5.78% reaction time data
which are outliers.4
The percentages of false responses, indicating the derivation rates of the
inferences under investigation, are given in Figure 4. The derivation rate of free
choice inferences is as high as 92.42%. The derivation rates of exhaustive and
exclusive or inferences were much lower, i.e., 15.15% and 28.54% respectively.
The percentage of false responses in the free choice condition was significantly
4 Outliers are more than 1.5 IQRs below the first quartile or above the third quartile.
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higher than that in the true control condition ( = 10.77, SE = 0.66, z = 16.19, p
< 0.001), and it was significantly lower than that in the false control condition (
= -2.36, SE = 0.57, z = -4.13, p < 0.001). The percentage of false responses in
the exhaustivity condition was significantly higher than that in the true control
condition ( = 3.49, SE = 0.53, z = 6.60, p < 0.001), and it was significantly
lower than that in the false control condition ( = -9.63, SE = 0.68, z = -14.16 ,
p < 0.001). The percentage of false responses in the exclusive or condition was
significantly higher than that in the true control condition ( = 5.23, SE = 0.56 ,
z = 9.35, p < 0.001), and it was significantly lower than that in the false control
condition ( = -7.90 , SE = 0.63, z = -12.50, p < 0.001). 5 The reaction time,
reflecting the processing time of the inferences under investigation, is illustrated
in Figure 5. The reaction time of free choice inferences (M   4724ms, SD  
2228ms) were not significantly di erent from that in the true and false control
condition. The reaction time associated with exhaustive inferences (M   6551ms,
SD   2367ms) was significantly longer than that in the false control condition (
= 9.60, SE = 2.04, t = 4.68, p < 0.001) and the true control condition ( = 11.8,
SE = 2.04, t = 5.78, p < 0.001). The reaction time associated with exclusive
or inferences (M   5968ms, SD   2680ms) was significantly longer than that
in the false control condition ( = 7.10, SE = 1.61, t = 4.42, p < 0.001) and the
true control condition ( = 9.30, SE = 1.60, t = 5.81, p < 0.001). 6
Discussion There are two important findings. First, free choice inferences
Fig. 4. False Responses (May/or) Fig. 5. Reaction Time (May/or)
were derived almost by default, and the derivation of them was not more time-
consuming than that of logical meanings. Second, both exhaustive and exclusive
5 The response data were submitted to a generalized linear mixed e ects model in R
(using the glmer function) with sentences, pictures and participants as randomized
e ects, and conditions as fixed e ects.
6 The reaction time data were submitted to a linear mixed-e ects model in R (using
the lmer function) with sentences, pictures and participants as randomized e ects,
and responses and conditions as fixed e ects.
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or inferences were only derived optionally, with the processing time significantly
longer than that of logical meanings. Given these, free choice inferences are
most likely to be the preferred logical interpretations of may/or sentences, while
exhaustive and exclusive or inferences are most likely to be some sort of conver-
sational implicatures if they indeed are not scalar implicatures.
Fox (2007) account has the poorest fit to the data because it completely fails
to predict the derivation pattern of free choice and exhaustive inferences. Geurts
(2005) faces a fatal problem in explaining the extremely low derivation rate of
exhaustive inferences. Loosely speaking, Simonss (2004) account has a consider-
ably good fit to the data. However, it is a bit surprising to find that exhaustive
inferences were very occasionally derived as a kind of conversational implicatures
for may/or sentences. As far as I am concerned, no theoretical study has ever
considered this as a possibility.
4 Experiment for Must/or Sentences
Purposes To examine derivation rates and processing time of free choice, exhaus-
tive and exclusive or inferences triggered by must/or sentences.
Participants 25 Dutch native speakers (aged 18 and above) were recruited
from the Dutch participant database of Utrecht University.
Methods, design and materials The paradigm, set-up, design and materials
of this experiment were exactly the same as those of the may/or experiment (see
Section 3) except for two aspects. First, one piece of information was added to
the cover story of this experiment, which stated that the child has to buy some-
thing from the lottery machine with the cash prize he/she has been awarded,
otherwise the machine will be unable to load the next lottery game. Second,
moeten (must) instead of mogen (may) was used in all target sentences.
Predictions Fox (2007) predicts that exhaustive inferences are derived se-
mantically and free choice inferences are derived as scalar implicatures, while
exclusive or inferences are not derived. Based on this, the percentage of false
responses in the exhaustive condition should be near 100%, and the correspond-
ing reaction time should be roughly the same as that in control conditions. The
percentage of false responses in the free choice condition should be should be
neither close to 0% nor 100%, and the corresponding reaction time should be
longer than that in control conditions. The percentage of false responses in the
exclusive or condition should be near 0%.
Geurts (2005) and Simons (2004) predict that exhaustive and free choice
inferences are derived semantically, while exclusive or inferences are derived as
conversational implicatures. Based on this, the percentage of false responses in
the free choice and exhaustive condition should be near 100%, and the corre-
sponding reaction time should be roughly the same as that in control conditions.
The percentage of false responses in the exclusive or condition should be neither
close to 0% nor 100%, and the corresponding reaction time should be longer than
that in control conditions. Please especially notice that Geurtss (2005) predic-
tions for may/or and must/or sentences are exactly the same.
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Results I included all participants response data. I removed all reaction time
data associated with wrong responses in control conditions, and I further re-
moved 5.47% reaction time data which are outliers.
According to Figure 6, the derivation rates of free choice, exhaustive and
Fig. 6. False Responses (Must/or) Fig. 7. Reaction Time (Must/or)
exclusive or inferences associated with must/or sentences were all very high,
i.e., 90%, 97.76% and 94% respectively. The percentages of false responses in
all three target conditions were only significantly di erent from that in the true
control condition, but they were not significantly di erent from that in the false
control condition. More specifically, the percentage of false responses in the false
control condition was not significantly higher than that in the free choice condi-
tion ( = 19.17, SE = 2284.02, z = 0.01, p   0.99), the exclusive or condition (
= 18.45, SE = 2284.02, z = 0.01, p   0.99), and the exhaustivity condition ((
= 17.15, SE = 2284.02, z = 0.01, p   0.99).
Figure 7 summarizes the reaction time data. The reaction time of free choice
inferences (M   4715ms, SD   2387ms), exhaustive inferences (M   4659ms,
SD   2326ms) and exclusive or inferences (M   5013ms, SD   2594ms) were
all not significantly di erent from that of the true and false control condition.
Discussion The main finding is that all three types of inferences were found
to be derived by default for must/or sentences, with the processing time not
significantly di erent from that of logical interpretations in control conditions.
It seems that all three types of inferences are parts of the preferred logical in-
terpretations of must/or sentences. Foxs (2007) account still only very poorly
fits the data. It only predicts the derivation pattern of exhaustive inferences.
Both Geurtss (2005) and Simonss (2004) accounts successfully explain the data
associated with free choice and exhaustive inferences; however, none of them
predicts the default and rapid derivation of exclusive or inferences.
Concerning the data associated with exclusive or inferences, I think there
are two possibilities. First, it is possible that due to the existence of the deontic
necessity modal, the permissions expressed by must/or sentences are actually
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much stronger than we thought. So the exclusive or constraint might not be a
pragmatic constraint but a construction-specific semantic constraint. However,
this possibility does not seem to be very plausible because the construction-
specific assumption violates the principle of least e ort. Second, it is possible
that this piece of data is not su ciently valid due to the potential problem
in the experimental paradigm. To illustrate, in the cover story, we added one
piece of information which stated that the child has to buy something from the
lottery machine. It could be possible that a large number of participants un-
derstood something as denoting exactly one instead of at least one undermined
thing. As a result, they might automatically ruled out the possibility that the
child is permitted to buy two things at once. More experiments need be done
to better understand the nature of exclusive or inferences triggered by must/or
sentences.
5 General Discussion
If comparing the data of may/or with those of must/or sentences, one similarity
and two di erences can be found. The similarity is that free choice inferences
are the preferred logical interpretations of both may/or and must/or sentences.
So generally, the semantic accounts, i.e., Geurts (2005) and Simons (2004), are
more plausible than the scalar implicature account, i.e., Fox (2007).
The crucial di erences are that while exhaustive and exclusive or inferences
were only very occasionally derived for may/or sentences as conversational im-
plicatures, they were derived by default for must/or sentences as parts of logical
interpretations. Lets temporarily not discuss the di erence in exclusive or in-
ferences (because no definite answer on the nature of exclusive or inferences of
must/or sentences can be given), and only look into the di erence in exhaustive
inferences triggered by the two types of sentences. Simons (2004) successfully
predicts this di erence because she assumes that the alternative semantics for
disjunction is activated under the scope of deontic modals. Due to this, even
if a closure operation is applied to disjunction, the semantics of the deontic
possibility modal still opens up the possibility for making may/or sentences
non-exhaustive. Geurts (2005) fails to do so because he claims that disjunction
takes scope over deontic modals, and in addition, it introduces a closed set of
propositions. Once disjunction is closed, may/or sentences can only be exhaus-
tive. Thus, Simonss (2004) account has the highest explanatory power.
To conclude, this study intends to convey three pieces of information: first,
free choice puzzles are better to be solved semantically; second, di erences in de-
ontic modals may lead to di erences in exhaustive and exclusive or inferences;





My thanks go to Yaron McNabb, Rick Nouwen and Henriette de Swart for
discussions and suggestions and Chris van Run for the ZEP script.
References
1. Aloni, M.: Free choice, modals, and imperatives. Natural Language Semantics, 15 (1),
65-94 (2006)
2. Aloni, M.: ”Disjunction”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2016 Edition), ¡https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/disjunction/¿
(2016)
3. Alonso-Ovalle, L.: Disjunction in alternative semantics. Doctoral dissertation, Uni-
versity of Massachusetts Amherst (2006)
4. Barker, C.: Free choice permission as resource-sensitive reasoning. Semantics and
Pragmatics, 3, 10-1 (2010)
5. Bott, L., Noveck, I. A.: Some utterances are underinformative: The onset and time
course of scalar inferences. Journal of memory and language, 51 (3), 437-457 (2004)
6. Chemla, E.: Universal implicatures and free choice e ects: Experimental data. Se-
mantics and Pragmatics, 2, 2-1 (2009)
7. Chemla, E., Bott, L.: Processing inferences at the semantics/pragmatics frontier:
disjunctions and free choice. Cognition, 130 (3), 380-396 (2014)
8. Chevallier, C., Noveck, I. A., Nazir, T., Bott, L., Lanzetti, V., Sperber, D.: Making
disjunctions exclusive. The quarterly journal of experimental psychology, 61 (11),
1741-1760 (2008)
9. Fox, D.: Free choice and the theory of scalar implicatures. In: Presupposition and
implicature in compositional semantics, pp. 71-120. Palgrave Macmillan UK (2007)
10. Geurts, B.: Entertaining alternatives: Disjunctions as modals. Natural language
semantics, 13 (4), 383-410 (2005)
11. Kaufmann, M.: Free choice is a form of dependence. Natural Language Semantics,
24 (3), 247-290 (2016)
12. Kratzer, A.: Modality. In: Semantics: An international handbook of contemporary
research, ed. by Arnim von Stechow and Dieter Wunderlich, 63950 (1991)
13. Marty, P. P., Chemla, E.: Scalar implicatures: working memory and a comparison
with only. Frontiers in psychology, 4 (2013)
14. Sauerland, U.: Scalar implicatures in complex sentences. Linguistics and philoso-
phy, 27 (3), 367-391 (2004)
15. Simons, M.: Dividing Things Up: The Semantics of Or and the Modal. (2004)
16. Stalnaker, R. C. Assertion. Blackwell Publishers Ltd, pp. 147-161 (1978)
17. Starr, W.: Expressing permission. In Semantics and Linguistic Theory, 26, pp.
325-349 (October 2016)
18. van Tiel, B.: Universal free choice. In Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, 16, pp.
627-638 (June 2012).
19. Zimmermann, T. E.: Free choice disjunction and epistemic possibility. Natural lan-
guage semantics, 8 (4), 255-290 (2000)
163
“First things first”: an Inquisitive
Plausibility-Urgency Model
Zhuoye Zhao and Paul Seip
ILLC, University of Amsterdam
Abstract. There is a fruitful line of work in incorporating questions
into epistemic logic (Van Benthem & Minica˘, 2009; Baltag et al., 2016,
among others). Based on the viewpoint that communication is a process
of raising and resolving issues, inquisitive semantics introduces a uniform
notion of meaning for statements and questions, thus can serve as a
suitable device for this purpose. For instance, Inquisitive Plausibility
Model (Ciardelli & Roelofsen, 2014) is able to combine questions with
the Epistemic Plausibility Model (IPM) (Baltag & Smets, 2006a,b) to
capture not only the belief and knowledge of agents, but also the issues
they entertain. Building on this, we develop an Inquisitive Plausibility-
Urgency Model (IPUM), which not only allows us to model knowledge,
belief and issues, but also the urgency of the issues, hence lead us to
towards formalizations of more dynamics of questions.
1 Introduction
Classical models of epistemic change/belief revision (Van Ditmarsch et al., 2007;
Van Benthem, 2007, among others) encode the knowledge/belief of an agent as
a set of (non-inquisitive) propositions, whose semantics are often modeled as a
set of possible worlds. One of the representatives is the Epistemic Plausibility
Model(Baltag & Smets, 2006a,b):
Definition 1. An Epistemic Plausibility Model M for a set of agents A is a
tuple:
M =  W, { a}a A, { a}a A,   ·   
where
- W is a set of possible worlds
-  a  W   W encodes the plausibility map for each agent, as a converse
well-founded total preorder between possible worlds
-  a is an epistemic map for each agent a   A: for every w  W ,  a(w) is the
epistemic state of a at w
-   ·   is the valuation function
The knowledge/belief modalities (including knowledge Ka, belief Ba, strong
belief Sba and conditional belief BQa ) can be semantically characterized as fol-
lows:
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- M, w   KaP     a(w)    P  
- M, w   BaP   Max a{w  W : w    a(w)}    P  
(Henceforth, we abbreviate Max a{w  W : w    a(w)} as bela(w))
- M, w   SbaP    s >a t for every s, t    a(w) where s    P  , t /   P  
- M, w   BQa P    bela(w)    Q     P  
Crucially, the plausibility relation  a is defined in a conditional manner,
namely, fixing any two worlds w1, w2   W , if the agent a thinks w2 is at least
as plausible as w1, then there is w1  a w2, and vice versa. Also note that the
notion of plausibility indicates a certain degree of epistemic indistinguishability
between di erent worlds, therefore it fully describes the epistemic state (all the
worlds the agent thinks possible). Formally, for any w    W , w     a(w) i 
w   a w or w  a w . However, we will keep the notion of epistemic state here
for convenience. Then for each agent a, her Knowledge at w is captured by
the epistemic state  a(w), meaning “all the possible worlds a knows for sure
(that’s possible) at w”, whereas the Belief is captured by best a(w), which
is determined by  a(w) and the plausibility relation  a, meaning “the most
plausible set of worlds in  a(w)”. Based on this model, the dynamics of the
agent’s epistemic/doxastic state, namely knowledge update or belief revision are
construed as model transformers that map the current plausibility model to a
new one.
However, in modeling the (dynamic) doxastic state of an agent, her questions,
or rather, the issues she entertains are also important. As pointed out by Scha er
(2005), All knowledge involves a question; To know is to know the answer. Fol-
lowing the spirit of the ‘Socratic epistemilogy’ initiated by Hintikka in the 1970’s
and later proposed in Hintikka (2007), there is a fruitful line of work in incorprat-
ing questions into epistemic/doxastic logic (Olsson & Westlund, 2006; Enqvist,
2010, among others). Providing a uniform notion for propositions and questions,
Inquisitive Semantics (Ciardelli, 2009; Groenendijk & Roelofsen, 2009; Ciardelli
et al., 2013) is thus able to enrich the classical models in this aspect. In this
paper, we will base our work on the inquisitive plausibility model (IPM) (Cia-
rdelli & Roelofsen, 2014), and further extend it with an urgency order defined
as a converse-well-founded total preorder between information states, which are
characterized as sets of possible worlds. In the rest of this section, we present
technical details of the background frameworks mentioned above. We will specify
our model in §2, and then show some applications in §3. We will conclude in §4.
1.1 Inquisitive Semantics (InqB) and Inquisitive Epistemic Logic
(IEL)
Inquisitive semantics (InqB) starts from the observation that the primary func-
tion of natural language is to exchange information, thus motivates a notion
of meaning that captures not only informative, but also inquisitive content. To
achieve this, inquisitive semantics generalizes the meaning of a sentence as the
issue it raises. An issue is a set of propositions, thus formalized as a set of “sets
of possible worlds”, namely information states. An issue can be represented as
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a set of information states that resolve it. Notice that if a certain proposition p
resolves an issue, then any stronger proposition q, that is q   p, also resolves the
issue. Therefore, we can formalize the notion of issue as a non-empty, downward
closed set of propositions. In possible world semantics, a proposition p is true in
a world w just in case w   p; in parallel, an issue P (represented as a set of sets
of possible worlds) is supported/resolved by a proposition p just in case p   P .
Here and henceforth, we will denote both the truth relation and the support
relation as ‘ ’.
The maximal elements of an issue P are referred to as its alternatives, written
as alt(P ). A sentence is inquisitive if it has more than one alternative, and is
non-inquisitive if it has only one alternative. The information content of an issue
P , denoted by |P | or info(P ), is defined as  P , the union of elements in P .
The language of InqB is very much like propositional logic, with atomic
formula p, q..., negation ¬, boolean connectives  , ,  of similar accounts, ex-
cept for two addtional projection operators, ! and ?, which are referred to as
non-inquisitive and non-informative operators, respectively. The non-inquisitive
operator ! maps an issue P to the power set of its informative content, i.e.
!P = P(|P |), while the non-informative operator ? maps P to the disjunction of
itself and its negation, i.e. ?P = P   S\|P |.
Based on InqB, Inquisitive Epistemic Logic (IEL) characterizes the basic
epistemic notions in the same fashion. In order to picture epistemic concepts,
IEL introduces two basic epistemic notions. The epistemic state of an agent a
at a world w, written as  a(w), consists of the worlds that a considers possible.
The inquisitive state, written as  a(w), can be read as the issue that the agent
a entertains. Therefore, for any information state s    a(w), s is a resolution
to the issue that concerns a. Moreover, the epistemic state of an agent is always
equivalent to the informative content of its inquisitive state, that is,  a(w) = 
 a(w). With these basic notions, we can then introduce two basic epistemic
modalities that we will operate on.
Definition 2. The knowledge modality Ka
w   Ka     a(w)    
That is, an agent knows a sentence   if and only if the agent’s epistemic state
resolves the issue raised by the sentence. Similarly, we can define a modality Ea
that pictures the issues that the agent entertains.
Definition 3. The Entertain modality Ea
w   Ea     s    a(w), s    
1.2 Inquisitive Plausibility Model (IPM)
Based on classical plausibility model, InqB and observations made in Olsson
& Westlund (2006); Enqvist (2010), Ciardelli & Roelofsen (2014) proposed a
semantic framework known as inquisitive plausibility model to capture not only
3
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the belief and knowledge of an agent, but also the issues an agent entertains,
which can be viewed as her “long-term epistemic goals”. Further, it can be used
to model the research agenda of an agent, which is captured as the issues the
agent entertains conditioning on her belief. The formalizations are as follows.
Definition 4. An inquisitive plausibility model for a set of agents A is a tuple
 W,V, { a}a A, { a}a A, { a}a A  that consists of:
– a set W of possible worlds.
– a valuation function V .
– an epistemic map  a for each agent.
– a plausibility map  a for each agent.
– an inquisitive map  a for each agent a   A: for every s   S,  a(s) is an
issue over  a(s).
The language and semantics of a corresponding inquisitive belief logic is then
naturally adapted from IEL and classical plausibility model. In addition to the
knowledge and belief modalities defined above, we further introduce the modal-
ities of entertaining Ea, conditional entertaining EQa , etc. Here we denote infor-
mation states by   and issues by µ :=?{ 1, . . . , n}. Also, we will always assume
that µ is in the minimal form, i.e.  1, ..., n are non-redundant alternatives, and
µ is the downward closure of them.
Resolution
M,w  ?{ 1, . . . , n}   for some  i, M,w    i for every w   s.
Truth Conditions
- M, w   Eaµ    t    a(w), t   µ
- M, w   EQa µ    t    Q  , t    a(w)  t   µ
- M, w   EBa µ    t   bela(w), t    a(w)  t   µ
Note that EBa is the entertain-over-belief modality, which is used to address
issues the agent is entertaining over her beliefs, i.e. the research agenda.
1.3 Inquisitive Contractions
Here we introduce an application of IPM. Classical belief revisions are captured
as model transformations between plausibility models. Using IPM, we can not
only preserve the classical operations, but also successfully model changes of
an agent’s research agenda. One of the typical phenomena as such is known as
inquisitive contractions (Olsson & Westlund, 2006). To keep it straightforward,
we will elaborate with the following single-agent scenario, and show how IPM
can be used to model this dynamic process.
Scenario: Alice believes there is a seminar this afternoon. She is wondering if
Bill is coming. Suddenly Charlie pops up and says to her that there won’t be
a seminar today. Alice doesn’t totally buy it, yet she also starts wondering
if there will be a seminar this afternoon.
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Analysis: The inquisitive state of Alice was the issue ?S ?Cb. However, since
she believed that there is a seminar (S), she was actually considering whether
Bill is coming at first, as shown in Fig.1(a). After being informed by Charlie,
her belief is weakened – she thinks it is quite possible that there won’t be a
seminar ([  S]), hence her belief state fully covers her epistemic state, and









Therefore, IPM can be used to model inquisitive contractions, and in general,
the dynamics of belief changes interacting with the agents’ research agenda.
However, there is more to be done to increase the descriptive power. First let us
consider two motivating scenarios.
1.4 Motivating Scenarios: First Things First!
Scenario 1 : Alice asked Bill and Charlie to have dinner in a restaurant. Alice
doesn’t know whether they will come, and she wants to know. Moreover,
Alice knows Bill likes Pasta, and Charlie likes rice. She knows that both
prices of rice and pasta are 7 or 8 euros, but she is not sure which is which,
and she wants to know. Then Bill called, telling her that he is coming, but
Charlie is not. Now Alice feels more urgent to know the price of pasta.
Scenario 2 : Alice believes that there is a seminar this afternoon, and she is
wondering whether Bill is coming. Now Charlie pops up again and says to
her that there won’t be a seminar today. Alice doesn’t totally buy it, yet
now she wants to know whether there is a seminar first.
Here and henceforth we will refer to Scenario 1 as the “dinner scenario”
and Scenario 2 as “seminar scenario”. As is shown in both cases, a formaliza-
tion of the notion of urgency of questions is in need to capture the change of
research agendas as described. In the next section, we will introduce the Inquis-
itive Plausibility-Urgency Model, which is a modest extention to IPM, and will
thus provide us with more dynamics for belief revision and questions.
5
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2 Inquisitive Plausibility-Urgency Model (IPUM)
2.1 The Urgency Relation
As mentioned in the final part of last section, our goal here is to (qualitatively)
model the degree of urgency of di erent questions. How can we achieve it? Recall
that in Epistemic Plausibility Model, the meaning of a proposition is character-
ized as the set of possible worlds on which the proposition is true, and we capture
the agents’ beliefs by defining a plausibility relation between possible worlds,
which is based on an agent’s attitudes toward di erent worlds. In inquisitive
semantics, the meaning of a question is modeled as the set of information states,
therefore, in accordance, we should be able to model an agent’s attitude towards
a question as a collective manifestation of her attitude towards its resolutions.
Moreover, in practice, one is more urgent to know the answer of a question means
he/she will feel more satisfied/relieved after hearing it. Therefore, just like the
plausibility relation, we can define an urgency relation  a between information
states in a conditional point of view, as follows. Fixing any two information
states s, t:
s  a t   a is at least as urgent/satisfied/relieved to know t as she is for s
By adding this urgency relation to IPM, we will get what we want – the
Inquisitive Plausibility-Urgency Model.
2.2 The Model
Definition 5. An inquisitive plausibility-urgency model M for a set of agents
A is a tuple
M = (W, { a}a A, { a}a A, { a}a A, { a}a A,   ·  )
where
- W is a set of possible worlds.
- an epistemic map  a for each agent.
- an inquisitive map  a for each agent.
- a plausibility map  a W  W for each agent.
- an urgency map  a  P(W )   P(W ) over  a(w) for each agent a at w,
which is a converse-well-founded total preorder on information states. Also,
for each s, t   P(W ) s.t. s  a t, if t    t, then s  a t .
- a valuation function   ·  .
Similar to Epistemic Plausibility Model as in Def.1, we can define modalities
of urgent-entertaining (UEa), strong urgent-entertaining (Suea) and conditional
urgent-entertaining UEQa . Given some issue µ :=?{ 1, ..., n}:
- M, w   UEaµ  Max a{t   P(W ) : t    a(w)}   µ
- M, w   Sueaµ   for any s, t   P(W ), if s /  µ and t   µ, then s  a t.
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- M, w   UEQa µ    for any t   Max a{t   P(W ) : t    a(w)} and
t    Q  , t   µ
- M, w   UEBa µ    for any t   Max a{t   P(W ) : t    a(w)} and
t   bela(w), t   µ
Also similar to EBa , UE
B
a is the urgent-entertaining-over-belief modality,
which is used to address issues the agent is urgently entertaining over the current
belief state.
There are a few notions worth mentioning. In constructing a model regarding
specific situations, we take complete resolutions to an issue that is urgently
entertained as equivalently satisfying, i.e. given µ =?{ 1, ..., n}    a(w) and
M, w   UEaµ, for any s, t   µ, there is s  a t and t  a s, or rather, s  a t,
where  a is the equivalence relation in terms of the urgency order. Also, as  a
in Epistemic Plausibility Model can fully describe the Epistemic map  a, the
urgency relation  a also determines the inquisitive state  a, in the sense that
the degree of urgency indicates certain inquiries. Formally, it can be achieved by
simply intersecting all the downward closures of the equivalent sets which don’t
support each other. Last but not least, potential changes of research agendas,
or in a sense the inquiry strategies are pre-encoded in the model. In particular,
di erences in urgency may be revealed at di erent level of information, which
result in a more fine-grained reaction of an agent towards di erent information
pieces. This feature can lead us to a solution to the dinner scenario, which
requires di erent reactions of Alice given di erent informations (whether Charlie
or Bill is coming). We will show how IPUM provides us with a relatively elegant
formalization of both scenarios mentioned in §1.4 in the next section. Before
that, we will first introduce a bonus e ect coming with IPUM.
3 Towards More Dynamics of Questions
In this section, we will go through some applications of IPUM, by resolving
the motivation scenarios introduced in §1.4. By resolving the dinner issue, we
demonstrate that the urgency order among di erent questions can be revealed
on partial resolutions to the total issue, therefore capture the reaction of an
agent toward certain pieces of information. The solution to the seminar scenario
will present a more fine-grained formalization of inquisitive contraction. Starting
from these applications, it is straightforward to extend to more dynamics of
questions interacting with knowledge/belief change using IPUM.
Scenario 1: Alice asked Bill and Charlie to have dinner in a restaurant. Alice
doesn’t know whether they will come, and she wants to know. Moreover,
Alice knows Bill likes Pasta, and Charlie likes rice. She knows that both
prices of rice and pasta are 7 or 8 euros, but she is not sure which is which,
and she wants to know. Then Bill called, telling her that he is coming, but
Charlie is not. Now Alice feels more urgent to know the price of pasta.
7
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Analysis 1: Initially, Alice was wondering whether Bill and Charlie was coming,
as well as the price of rice and pasta. She had neither belief nor urgency on
either of the two issues, therefore her research agenda is the total issue as
pictured in Fig.2(a). Since Alice knows that Bill likes Pasta and Charlie
likes rice, the urgency relation between resolutions to the price issues should
vary according to resolutions to the coming issue. For instance, under the
condition that Bill is coming but Charlie is not (Cb   ¬Cc), Alice should
be more eager to know the price of pasta. Therefore, we can construct a
strict urgency order between resolutions to the price issue among information
states that are already resolutions to the coming issue, as shown in Fig.3(a).
After Bill called, Alice came to believe that Bill was coming but not Charlie,
therefore Fig.3(a) pictures just the research agenda of Alice at that moment.
Based on this model, the following propositions are true:
- M, w   Ea(?Cb ?Cc   (P7   P8)   (R7  R8))
- M, w   UECb ¬Cca (P7   P8)
- M, w   SueCb ¬Cca (P7   P8)
That is, Alice has an inquisitive state consisting of both coming issues and
price issues; conditioning on the information that Bill is coming but Charlie is
not, Alice will urgently entertain the price of pasta; in fact, she will “strongly
urgently” entertain this issue.
Fig. 2. Dinner Scenario - before
Fig. 3. Dinner Scenario - after
Scenario 2: Alice believes that there is a seminar this afternoon, and she is
wondering whether Bill is coming. Now Charlie pops up again and says to
her that there won’t be a seminar today. Alice doesn’t totally buy it, yet
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now she wants to know whether there is a seminar first.
Analysis 2: Alice’s epistemic goal is to know whether there is a seminar today
and whether Bill is coming. Moreover, Alice thinks the former as the more
urgent issue. Therefore her inquisitive state along with the urgency order
can be shown as in Fig.4(a). However, initially Alice believed that there is
a seminar, which makes the latter the only issue she is entertaining (see
also Fig.1.3). After withdrawing this belief, the urgency order reveals itself.
Hence we have the following results:
- M, w   EBa (?Cb)
- M, w   [  S]UEa(?S)
That is, based on her belief, Alice is entertaining whether Bill is coming, but
when the belief is retracted, she begins to urgently entertain whether there
is a seminar.
Fig. 4. Seminar Scenario
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an extension of inquisitive plausibility model named
inquisitive plausibility-urgency model by introducing an urgency relation be-
tween information states. The relation is defined in a conditional manner analo-
gous to the plausibility relation. Using this model, we can capture more dynamics
of questions in belief change, such as the reaction of an agent towards (partial)
resolutions to the issue she’s entertaining, as well as a more fine-grained notion
of inquisitive contraction.
The description of IPUM in the paper is rather sketchy, and we hope to
further specify the details in a full paper. Meanwhile, based on this basic model,
some immediate future direction should be concerned. For one thing, a sound
and complete axiomatization (logic) is open for investigation. For another, here
we restrict our model in a single-agent setting; in order to extend it to a multi-
agent setting, we need to consider additional complications such as the attitudes
of an agent towards the issues raised or entertained by other agents, which will
hopefully lead us to a more complete picture of insecure communication. We
hope this paper can serve as a modest spur that induces revelations of inquisitive
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Abstract. Shan, a Southwestern Tai language spoken in Myanmar,
Thailand, and nearby countries, uses bare nouns to express both unique
and anaphoric definiteness, as identified by [11]. This novel data pattern
from the author’s fieldwork can be analyzed by adding an anaphoric
type shifter,  x, to the available type shifting operations defined by [2]
and [3]. It also demonstrates that the consistency test is not su cient to
determine what counts as a definite determiner for a language.
Keywords: definiteness · type-shifting · Tai language.
1 Introduction
[11] proposes that there are two types of definiteness expressed by German,
corresponding to the contracted (weak) and non-contracted (strong) preposition
+ definite article combinations—e.g., vom (‘by the’, weak) and von dem (‘by
the’, strong). In (1), the speaker and listener know that there is only one mayor
in the context. Since the mayor is unique in the context, the weak definite article
form, vom (‘by the’) is used and the strong form is infelicitous.



















‘The reception was opened by the mayor.’
[11] claims that the split between strong and weak definite forms fits well with
the types of definiteness described by [5], which grouped definiteness into four
categories: immediate situation (current non-linguistic context), larger situation
(broader non-linguistic context), anaphoric/familiar, and bridging (associative
anaphora). [11] says that when a noun is unique in an immediate situation or
larger situation context, German uses the weak form of the definite article, and
in anaphoric contexts it uses the strong form. For the bridging category, he
discusses two types: producer-product and part-whole bridging, which I will call
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‘product-producer’ and ‘whole-part’ bridging, respectively.1 The strong form is
used in product-producer situations and the weak form is used in whole-part
bridging. In addition to the categories discussed by [5], [11] adds that donkey
anaphora uses the strong form of the definite article. Table 1 gives examples of
these categories and the article form used for German. These will be discussed
more in the following section.
Table 1. Types of definiteness described by [11], citing [5]
Type of Definite Use Example German
Unique in immediate situation
the desk (uttered in a room with exactly one
desk)
weak
Unique in larger situation the prime minister (uttered in the UK) weak
Anaphoric








John was driving down the street. The
steering wheel was cold.
weak
Donkey anaphora
Every farmer who owns a donkey hits the
donkey
strong
2 Uniqueness and Anaphoricity
[11] claims that the weak definite article in German expresses uniqueness. This
can be uniqueness in an immediate situation, as in (2), or in a larger or global
context, described further below. In (2), there is only one glass cabinet in the
immediate context, so the weak definite must be used.























‘The book that you are looking for is in the glass-cabinet.’
The strong definite article expresses familiarity/anaphoricity. In (3), the first
sentence introduces a writer and a politician into the discourse context. In the
second sentence von dem Politiker (‘from the politician’) is used to refer back
to the politician. The strong definite form must be used in this context.
1 A review noted that what [11] calls ‘part-whole’ bridging would more correctly be
called ‘whole-part’ bridging, and agreeing with their assessment, I will use that and
‘product-producer’ instead of ‘producer-product’ for the same reasons.
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‘Hans interviewed a writer and a politician. He didn’t get any interesting
answers from the politician.’
Looking at Mandarin and Thai, [7] and [8] show that these languages use bare
nouns in the same places where German would use the weak definite article, and
noun phrases modified by a classifier and demonstrative where German would
use the strong definite article. Examples (4) and (5) show the use of the bare
noun in a unique situation in Mandarin and Thai, respectively.









‘The dog(s) want to cross the road.’







‘The dog is barking.’
In (6) and (7), are the Mandarin and Thai examples using demonstratives
to express familiarity/anaphoricity. In (6a), a boy and a girl are introduced into
the discourse context. (6b) and (6c) use na ge nasheng (‘the/that boy’), a noun
modified by a classifier and demonstrative, to refer back to the boy. In Mandarin
there is a contrast between the subject and object position. The classifier and
demonstrative are optional in subject position, but not in object position, as
shown in (6b) and (6c). [7] claims that this is because the Mandarin subject is
a topic, which negates the need for an antecedent index.



















































‘The boy looks twenty-years-old or so.’
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In the Thai example in (7), (7a) introduces a student into the discourse
context. In (7a), na´krian khon na´n (‘that boy’) is used to refer to the boy. (7b)
suggests that the demonstrative is required even in subject position for Thai.





































‘Student are very clever.’
2.1 Associative Anaphora (Bridging)
[11] shows that in German, there is a split between whole-part and product-
producer bridging in terms of definiteness marking: whole-part bridging uses the
weak definite and product-producer bridging uses the strong definite. [7] and
[8] show that Mandarin and Thai patterns with German, using the bare noun
in whole-part examples (weak definiteness) and the demonstrative in product-
producer examples (strong definiteness). In this section and the following one,
only the Thai data is shown to conserve space. In (8), tha´bian (‘sticker’) cannot
be modified by a demonstrative. This parallels the use of the weak definite for
whole-part bridging in German.































‘The car was stopped by police because there was no sticker on the li-
cense.’
In (9), the producer na´ktE`ENklOOn (‘poet’) must be modified by a demon-
strative. This parallels German’s use of the strong definite for product-producer
bridging.

































‘Paul thinks that poem is beautiful, though he doesn’t really like the
poet.’
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2.2 Donkey anaphora
In cases of donkey anaphora, [11] claims that German uses the strong article to
refer to nouns introduced in the first part of the construction. Similarly, in Thai
and Mandarin, a demonstrative is required in those positions ([7]; [8]). For the
Thai example in (10), using the bare noun to refer back to the bu alo gives the
sentence a generic meaning ‘Every farmer that has a bu alo hits bu alo’.

























‘Every farmer that has a bu alo hits it.’
Table 2 summarizes the patterns of definiteness expression in German, Thai,
and Mandarin. Examples of all the contexts described by [11] cannot be included
due to space limitations, but they can be found in the cited sources.
Table 2. Expressions of definiteness in German, Thai, and Mandarin
Type of Definite Use German ([11]) Thai ([8]) Mandarin ([7])
Immediate situation weak bare bare
Larger situation weak bare bare
Anaphoric strong dem. dem.
Bridging: Product-producer strong dem. dem.
Bridging: Whole-part weak bare bare
Donkey anaphora strong dem. dem.
3 Shan
Like Mandarin and Thai, Shan, a Southwestern Tai language spoken in Myan-
mar, uses the bare noun in unique situations, as shown in (11) and (12).2,3 In
(11), there is a single teacher in the context, so it must be referred to using a
bare noun. In (12), world knowledge tells us that there is only one sun, so a bare
noun is used to refer to the sun. The demonstrative is not felicitous in either
case.
2 Data for this paper comes from the author’s fieldwork in Chiang Mai, Thailand from
January 2018 to present, working with a speaker from Keng Tawng City in Shan
State, Myanmar, who has lived in Thailand for over 10 years. Data was collected
using a variety of elicitation methods: story translation, stories based on storyboards,
felicity judgments on grammatical sentences in specific contexts.
3 Glossing conventions: 1: first person, 3: third person, cl: classifier, comp: comple-
mentizer, impf: imperfect, neg: negation, sg: singular
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(11) Shan: Unique in immediate situation



















‘Ms. Lun cannot find the teacher.’













‘The sun is very bright.’
(Speaker comment on the demonstrative: there is more than one sun)
3.1 Anaphora
Unlike Mandarin and Thai, Shan can use the bare noun in anaphoric contexts
such as a narrative sequence. In (13), the first sentence introduces a man into
the discourse context. In following sentences, the man can be referred back to
either using a bare noun, phu-tsa´aj (‘man’), or using a bare noun modified by a
classifier and demonstrative, phu-tsa´aj kOˆ naˆn (‘that man’).4

















































‘A man went to a dog store to buy a puppy for his daughter... The/that
man replied,’
In (14), the first sentence introduces a notebook and cup of water into the
discourse context. The second sentence refers back to each of them using a bare
noun. Here the anaphoric nouns are in object position, but this position does
not require that a demonstrative be used. In this way, Shan is di erent from
Mandarin or Thai. The demonstrative is allowed, but it sounds awkward to use
a demonstrative for both the water cup and notebook in the second sentence.
4 A reviewer noted that the examples from Mandarin and Thai are not equivalent in
that the Mandarin one introduces two individuals apart from the speaker, and the
Thai one only introduces one other individual. For Shan, I have included both types
of examples. In (13) there is only one individual, and in (14) there are two.
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‘There is a notebook and a cup of water on the desk. I spilled the/that
cup of water onto the/that notebook.’
3.2 Bridging
Mandarin, Thai, and German use the weak/bare form of the nominal in whole-
part bridging and the strong/demonstrative form in product-producer bridging.
Shan, instead, does not use di erent nominal expressions in whole-part bridging
versus product-producer bridging. A bare noun can be used in both situations.
(15) shows that a bare noun is possible for whole-part bridging in Shan.

























‘The teacher approaches that building and knocked on the door to call
the owner.’
Whole-part bridging constructions in Shan often have the ‘whole’ as part of
the word for the ‘part’. It is not always clear whether it simply anaphoric with the
‘whole’ possessing the part or involves bridging to a real noun compound. (16)
shows an example of this where naas7 paˆplik (‘book cover’) contains the word
paˆplik (‘book’). While it is possible to modify the noun with a demonstrative,
the demonstrative is referring to the book rather than the cover. It does not
seem possible to modify the bridged noun with a demonstrative.















































‘The cat jumped onto the book that was on the table. The dog followed
again which made the book cover/cover of that book completely dirty.’
(17) shows that a demonstrative is not necessary for product-producer bridg-
ing either. The ‘producer’, ko´ntEmlik (‘author’) can be bare or modified by the
demonstrative, kOˆ naˆn. From the classifier we can tell that this demonstrative
modifies ‘author’ not ‘book’.
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‘Yesterday, the teacher read a Tai (Shan) history book. The teacher is
friends with the/that author.’
3.3 Donkey anaphora
German, Thai, and Mandarin use the strong/demonstrative form of the nom-
inal to refer anaphorically to a nominal in donkey anaphora. Unlike the other
languages, Shan does not use a demonstrative or strong definite article in this
situation. In (18), when ‘cat’ (mE´w) is referred to anaphorically, a bare noun is
used. It is not felicitous to modify it with a demonstrative because that forces a
singular reading, which sounds awkward in this sort of generic sentence.































‘Every dog, if it sees a cat will always chase the cat.’
If we wanted to use a demonstrative in this sort of example, a structure like
(19) would be possible, but, again, the classifier-demonstrative modification is
not necessary. The di erence between these two examples is that in (18) it is
dogs being quantified over, leaving ‘cat’ as unspecified for plurality and thus
awkward with a singular anaphor. In (19), toˇ laˇj (‘which one’) quantifies over
individual cats making it compatible with a singular anaphor.



























‘Dogs, whichever cat they see they will always chase the/that cat’
Table 3 summarizes the di erent expressions of definiteness found in Ger-
man, Thai, Mandarin, and Shan. This section has investigated the pattern of
definiteness found in Shan in specific contexts that have shown di erent pat-
terns of expression across languages. Shan allows for the bare noun to be used in
all of the contexts described by [11]. Even contexts like anaphora and product-
producer bridging allow for bare nouns where Thai and Mandarin do not. For
contexts were the noun is unique in a situation or with whole-part bridging, a
demonstrative cannot modify the noun, just like in Thai and Mandarin.
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Table 3. Expressions of definiteness in German, Thai, Mandarin, and Shan




Immediate situation weak bare bare bare (11)
Larger situation weak bare bare bare (12)
Anaphoric strong dem. dem. bare (13-14)
Bridging:
Product-producer
strong dem. dem. bare (17)
Bridging:
Whole-part
weak bare bare bare (16)
Donkey anaphora strong dem. dem. bare (18-19)
4 Analysis
Following [2] and [3], [4] summarizes the available interpretations of bare nouns
in languages without articles, claiming they can have a kind reading, a narrow
scope existential reading, and a definite reading. This appears to be consistent
with what is found in Shan. [2] claims that bare nouns in article-less languages
without number marking, like Shan, obligatorily have an e-type, kind denotation.
However, [4] allows for these mass nouns to undergo type shifting using   so
they can then type-shift using   to get a definite reading separate from the
kind reading. For now, I will assume this, following [4], but this topic should be
considered in future work. The type-shifting operators described by [2] and [3],
 ,  , and  , are defined below:
(20) Type shifting operators ([3]):  e, t    e/  e, t , t 
a.  :  P s x[Ps(x)]
b.  :  P  x[Ps(x)]
c.  :  P Q x[Ps(x)  Q(x)]
[3], revising [2], proposes that the type shifting operators follow a hierarchy,
where kind-forming   and entity forming   must be ruled out before   becomes
available, this is described in (21). The justification is that using   or   is a less
drastic change because it does not introduce quantificational force. [3] claims
that bare nouns are equally allowed to form kinds or entities, so they must be
ranked equally. [3] and [2] use the Blocking Principle, defined in (22), to identify
what type shifting is available in what language. If a language has an overt
determiner form of a type shifter—e.g., the in English is said to correspond to
 —then covert type shifting using that operator is unavailable.5
5 In a language where there are are no determiners, you would expect all type shift-
ing operations to be available, but according to [3],  -type shifting does not occur
in these languages because of the ranking described in Meaning Preservation be-
low. The existential interpretation comes form Derived Kind Predication. This is an
interesting subject for future investigation, but not addressed here.
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(21) Meaning Preservation: { ,  } >  
(22) Blocking Principle [3]: For any type shifting operation   and any X:
* (X) if there is a determiner D such that for any set X in its domain,
D(X) =  (X).
[7] follows [11] in claiming the existence of two types of definiteness. In trying
to account for the obligatory use of the demonstrative in some definite environ-
ments in Mandarin, [7] defines the unique and anaphoric definites as in (23),
where (23a) is the type shifting operation   and (23b) is the denotation of the
demonstrative in Mandarin.6 [8] claims that since English expresses both unique
and anaphoric definites using the, the is ambiguous for the unique and anaphoric
definite meaning.
(23) a. Unique definite article:    =  sr. P e, s,t  . :  !x[P (x)(sr)]. xP (x)(sr)
b. Anaphoric definite article:  x  x  =  sr. P e, s,t  . Q e,t . :  !x[P (x)(sr)  Q(x)]. xP (x)(sr)
It is clear from the data that the Shan demonstrative does not fill the roll of
anaphoric definite determiner since it is not obligatory in all anaphoric contexts
as in Thai. I propose, instead that Shan has a null anaphoric type shifter  x in
addition to the   type shifter.
This analysis raises the question: Why does the Shan demonstrative not
count as a determiner for the purposes of the Blocking Principle, but the Thai
and Mandarin ones do? We might expect the Shan demonstrative to pattern dif-
ferently from the Mandarin and Thai demonstratives in terms of the Consistency
test. [3] uses the Consistency test from [9] to distinguish between demonstratives
and true definites. For demonstratives, you can introduce two of the same NPs
modified by the demonstrative with contradictory predicates, and there is no
contradiction. For definite determiners, doing this would create a contradiction.
According to this test, Shan has a demonstrative, not a definite determiner, as
shown in (24). However, the Thai demonstrative also passes this test, as in (25).7
(24) Shan: Consistency test

























‘This cup is white. This cup is black.’
6 This definition di ers from [11] in that the index is defined as a property rather than
an individual, but I will not be concerned with this distinction for this analysis.
7 Mandarin passes the consistency test too, but the data is not included here to con-
serve space.
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‘That child is sleeping but that child is not sleeping.’ (cf. #the)
According to a native Thai speaker, (25) sounds contradictory out of the blue,
but fine with deixis. This test does not seem su cient to distinguish between
what counts as a definite for the Blocking principle. This is not that surprising
since the consistency test relies on deixis which is not something that comes into
play in anaphoric uses of demonstratives.
I would argue that the Shan bare noun/demonstrative contrast parallels the
English the/demonstrative contrast. The di erence comes from the fact that the
bare noun in Shan can denote a broader range of things, which might lead to
more disambiguation using the demonstrative. We would then expect the use of
the demonstrative in Shan to convey some special meaning beyond   in the same
way the English demonstrative can.
5 Conclusion
Shan can use a bare noun to express both unique and anaphoric definiteness. In
fact, the bare noun in Shan behaves much like the English article the. Though
languages like Thai and Mandarin are similar to Shan in lacking overt definite
articles and plural morphology, Shan does not pattern together with these two
languages in that its demonstrative does not function as the primary marking
of anaphoric definiteness. The pattern in Shan is likely to be found in other
languages without articles, like Japanese and Russian.
This paper has also shown that the Consistency test does not seem able to
distinguish what words count as determiners, so future work should address dis-
tinguishing between demonstratives and definite determiners. In Mandarin and
Thai, the demonstrative counts as the determiner denoting  x, so the demonstra-
tive is obligatory in expressing this meaning. I argue that in Shan the demon-
strative does not count as a determiner  x, so a bare noun can type shift using
 x. It seems, then, that the anaphoric definite,  x, could be included as one of
the available type shifting operations.
This work in conjunction with the work by [11], [8], and [7] brings up the con-
nection between form and meaning. In Mandarin, Thai, and German there seems
to be a connection between the obligatory use of a strong determiner/demonstrative
and the need for an anaphoric index in the meaning. In Shan, that connection is
unidirectional: if there is a demonstrative there must be an anaphoric index, but
the lack of a demonstrative does not mean there is no anaphora involved. We
might then wonder if we want to say there are two covert  ’s in this language.
The importance of separating them is apparent in contexts where their mean-
ings are di erent. In German, it is possible to see an overt contrast between the
unique and anaphoric reading, as in (26).
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‘When a foreign president visits Barack Obama in the White House, the
president gives a speech.’
The English translation is also ambiguous, as is the Shan version. This am-
biguity must come from di erences in the semantic denotations, which could
correspond to   and  x. Without some sort of distinction we cannot explain why
such examples are ambiguous. The goal of investigating data of this sort is to
identify which features to model in order to capture the range of expressions
of definiteness across languages. Using these di erent type shifters is one way
we can do this. It opens the question: how many type-shifters do we need to
account for definiteness? Future work would be to integrate this analysis into a
complete analysis of the interpretation of Shan nouns and further compare with
other languages.
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Compositionality in privative adjectives:
extending Dual Content semantics
Joshua Martin
Harvard University
Abstract. Privative adjectives such as fake have long posed problems
to theories of adjectives in a compositional semantics. In this paper, I
argue that a theory like Del Pinal’s recent Dual Content semantics, which
encodes lexical entries with both an extension-determining component,
and a conceptual component, is best equipped to account for privativity
while maintaining compositionality. I provide some novel evidence for
this system regarding recursive privativity, and some recent experimental
data, and introduce an extension to the system to account for pseudo-
privative behavior of predicative adjectives.
1 The puzzle of privativity
Kamp (in [1]) argues that all adjectives can be analyzed as functions from proper-
ties to properties. While some adjectives can operate as predicates, others do not,
and necessarily operate over the extension of the head noun they modify. Thus, to
achieve a uniform account, one theory treats them all as the more complex type.
As [2] acknowledges, with the advent of new, independently motivated semantic
compositional rules beyond function application (e.g. type-shifting or Predicate
Modification), this ‘generalize to the worst case’ approach is no longer necessary,
and the simpler adjectives might be assigned a simpler type, with their higher-
type behaviors accounted for with more complex compositional operations. The
most typical of the ‘worst case’ categories are privative non-subsective adjec-
tives, which entail the negation of the head noun, such that the intersection of
the modified NP and the bare noun is the empty set. The privative behavior
of adjectives like fake and stone in some contexts poses a notable challenge for
compositional theories of semantics to grapple with. Since no elements of the
bare noun set end up in the modified NP set, it is diﬃcult to evaluate what
contribution the bare noun makes to the compositional process, and what kind
of operation the privative adjective is performing over it. While the entailment
pattern suggests that the adjective is negating the denotation of the noun, it is
clearly insuﬃcient to say that a phrase like fake guns denotes ‘the set of things
which are not guns’, which would include not only what we understand fake guns
to be but also all other non-gun entities in the world.
Partee (see [3]) summarizes this problem, and suggests that what we have
heretofore considered privative nonsubsective adjectives are in fact neither of
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those things, and are actually a type of subsective adjectives. Their pseudo-
privative behavior arises from the fact that they ‘coerce’ the noun into an ex-
panded meaning to avoid vacuity, and then pick out a subset of that expanded
set. She argues that this is necessary to deal with data like (1):
(1) a. A fake gun is not a gun.
b. Is that gun real or fake?
Under most analyses, there is an obvious tension between the acceptability of
both of these sentences, such that (1a) can be true while fake can also predicated
of that gun in (1b). Partee argues that this is due to fake coercing gun into
an expanded meaning in (1b), while the unmodified instance of gun in (1a)
retains is original, limited denotation to the exclusion of fake guns. An expanded
denotation of gun that can include fake guns is also argued to be necessary for
felicitous use of real, which would otherwise be vacuous and redundant if all
members of the set denoted by gun were always real guns.
Her other arguments, based on Polish NP-splitting data, will not be reviewed
here, but it is notable that while she motivates coercion, she does not implement
it mechanically in any substantive way. How, precisely, is the denotation of a
noun coerced into a larger meaning, and perhaps more crucially, what is the
larger meaning that a noun like gun is coerced into by the presence of fake? If
it were merely expanded to include the presence of non-gun objects, this would
surely overgenerate to a class far larger than what we would naturally consider
fake guns. This is the problem that I think the following system addresses more
successfully.
2 Introducing Dual Content
Del Pinal’s Dual Content semantics (see [4]) preserves a system of composition
nearly identical to classical function application, with minimal modifications,
by adopting the assumption that the default lexical entries for nouns are no-
tably more complex than in prior systems. On this view, common nouns have a
binary semantic structure consisting of their extensional meaning (E-structure)
and their conceptual meaning (C-structure). E-structure is the atomic extension-
determining component, of the form  x.Stone(x). C-structure does not deter-
mine the extension of a noun, but instead consists of ‘representations of percep-
tual features, functional features and genealogical features related to [the noun]’
([4], p. 4). These take the form of a Pustejovsky-style (see [7]) qualia struc-
ture. While only E-structure determines the extension of the noun’s denotation,
C-structure, it is argued, is a necessary component of speaker’s linguistic com-
petence in their ability to correctly identify members of a kind and use the term
dynamically and productively in diﬀerent contexts; in a sense, it might be con-
sidered an instruction manual for correct and useful application of the linguistic







Telic:  x.Gen e[Shooting(e)   Instrument(e, x)]
Agentive:  x. e1[Making(e1)  Goal(e1,Gen e[Shooting(e) 
Instrument(e, x)])]
Not all of the precise semantics of the C-structure elements in (2) will come
into play here; what is necessary is that the C-structure of gun encodes that it
is composed of gun parts, has the perceptual form of a gun, is generally used in
shooting events, and was made with the goal to be used in shooting events. Now
that lexical entries are decomposed in this format, we also introduce operations
which are able to access specific components of a lexical entry’s meaning.
(3) Qualia functions: partial functions from the meaning of terms into their
respective C-structure denotations, namely, constitutive, formal, telic,
and agentive. The qualia functions are QC , QF , QT , QA. For example,
using the denotation for gun in (2): QC( gun ) =  x.Parts-Gun(x)
Adjectives can have a Dual Content structure as well. Intersective adjectives
could theoretically be represented in a simpler manner, perhaps with only E-
structure, such as  red  =  DC . x.DC(x)   Red(x), or even more simply as
type  e, t  and composing with nouns using Predicate Modification. Privative
adjectives, then, make use of these qualia functions, bringing through diﬀerent
elements of the noun’s C-structure (either preserved or negated). I will skip
over much of Del Pinal’s exposition and argument for how he arrives at this
eventual lexical entry for fake, and simply present the final version. Here, DC is
the domain of ‘ordered sets of the E-structure and C-structure of common Ns’
([4], p. 14).
(4)  fake  =




Formal:  DC .QF (DC)
Telic:  DC .¬QT (DC)
Agentive:  DC .[ x. e2[Making(e2)  Goal(e2, QF (DC)(x))]]
With this entry for fake, the resulting referent will have the constitutive and
formal qualia of the noun, will not have the telic or agentive qualia, and will
have a new agentive qualia suggesting that the referent was made with the goal
of having the same formal qualia as the noun (i.e. being a convincing fake).
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In this formalism, the negation of a qualia function indicates that the function
does not apply to that entity; perhaps a notation like QT (DC) = 0 would be
more natural, but I will preserve Del Pinal’s notation here to avoid confusion.
To compose this complex modifier with our complex noun in (2), we will need a
more complex notion of function application, which Del Pinal (p. 20) provides:
(5) Dual Content Function Application (FADC):
If   is a branching node, { ,  } is the set of  ’s daughters, and    E
is a function whose domain contains    , then    E(   ) and    C =
 QC(   )(   ), QF (   )(   ), QT (   )(   ), QA(   )(   ) .
Per (5), the E-structure of a modifier takes in the E-structure of the noun
as its argument, as does each C-structure take in its corresponding C-structure
argument. Then by FADC , the result of applying  fake  in (4) to  gun  in (2)
is:







Agentive:  x. e2[Making(e2)  Goal(e2, QF ( gun )(x))]
Thus, we get a class of entities which are not guns, do not have the origins of
guns, and were made to appear as if they were guns, but do not have the purpose
of guns (i.e. are generally not used in shooting events). In the next section, I will
provide some additional, previously unreported evidence for a Dual Content-style
system, and extend the system to account for additional privative types.
3 Defending and extending the system
3.1 Fake fake guns and recursive privativity
Any system which does not encode a non-extension-determining part of a lexical
entry, even if it invokes qualia structure, will struggle to account for recursive
applications of privative adjectives. If there is only one atomic component of the
lexical entry, a privative must negate it entirely. Thus, a secondary application,
as in fake fake gun, will negate that negation, and thus return functionally the
original entry for gun. Is this an adequate denotation for fake fake gun? That
is, should the two fakes cancel each other out in this way? It is certainly true
that a fake fake gun is probably, even necessarily, a gun. But it is certainly not
true that every gun is a fake fake gun. The latter likely involves some element of
deception, such as a criminal designing a real gun to appear like a toy in order
to sneak it by security. We would not naturally call most standard-issue military
or hunting weapons fake fake guns.
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Dual Content, by contrast, produces a diﬀerent meaning. Taking the denota-
tion of fake gun from (6) and feeding it into the function fake from (4) produces
the following output:
(7)  fake fake gun  =
E-structure:  x.¬QE(DC)( fake gun )   ¬QA( fake gun )(x) 
 e2[Making(e2)  Goal(e2, QF ( fake gun )(x))]
C-structure:
Constitutive: QC( fake gun )
Formal: QF ( fake gun )
Telic: ¬QT ( fake gun )
Agentive:  x. e2[Making(e2)  Goal(e2, QF ( fake gun )(x))]
Which, since the constitutive and formal qualia of fake gun are simply that
of gun, can be simplified further to:
(8)  fake fake gun  =
E-structure:  x.QE(DC)( gun )   QA( gun )(x)    e2[Making(e2)  





Agentive:  x. e2[Making(e2)  Goal(e2, QF ( fake gun )(x))]
I have avoided fully simplifying the denotation in (8), since replacing all the
denotation terms would simply make it more diﬃcult to read, but reading oﬀ
of this structure, we can see that a fake fake gun is an object which is in the
extension of gun, has the construction and form of a gun, has the same purpose
as a gun (i.e. shooting), and has the agentive quale of being made to look like
something which was made to look like a gun, while in fact still being made in
the way that guns are made. This last part, while a bit of a mouthful, seems to
much more accurately capture our intuitions than simply equating fake fake gun
with gun. This example demonstrates that DC handles complex and iterative
compositions in a more natural way than non-DC systems, and elucidates an
instance in which the simplicity of other systems lead them to fail to accurately
capture the meaning of a term which should be straightforwardly compositional.
3.2 Pseudo-privative predicates
Classical privative adjectives like fake are not the only instances of privativity
in our adjectival typology. Other adjectives, most commonly used in intersective
or predicative ways, sometimes behave privatively. Take the case of constitutive
material adjectives like stone. They are often simply intersective, as in stone
door, and can be predicated of individuals, as in That door is stone. But they
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also behave privatively, such as in stone lion, referring to a statue rather than a
real lion. In this section, I will argue for an extension of DC to cover constitutive
material adjectives, while retaining uniformity between their predicative and
privative uses. Del Pinal briefly discusses constitutive material adjectives, but
does not develop lexical entries nor show compositions for them. I propose that






This lexical entry is, most notably, recursive. The E-structure accesses el-
ements of the C-structure of the same term, such that the extension of stone
is determined the the C-structure of its members. This can be seen as a type
of coercion, such that the C-structure of another term may not be extension-
determining, but that adjectives that target a certain kind of qualia structure
(such as constitutive material adjectives) may take these qualia to be necessary to
satisfy their extension. We have already seen examples of promoting C-structure
elements to E-structure with Del Pinal’s denotation for typical. This denotation








Note that lion is unspecified for the telic quale. Straightforward Predicate
Modification with these denotations would lead to the following denotation for
stone lion:
(11)  stone lion  =
E-structure:  x.Lion(x)  QC( stone )(x)  QA( stone )(x)
C-structure:




But this is problematic. A stone lion should not be a lion, nor should it be
composed of biological lion parts, or the result of a lion birth, and these things
are explicitly contradictory with the constitutive and agentive qualia of stone
such that the resulting set is empty, a violation of Non-Vacuity. In fact, all that
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we want from lion is its formal quale, namely having the perceptual features or
shape of a lion. To achieve this eﬀect while preserving the predicative uses of
stone, we will have to slightly modify our notion of Predicate Modification. To
this end, I introduce the notion of E-Precedence. Its formal definition is given
in (12), but the basic intuition is as such: whenever, in Predicate Modification,
one element is specified for a part of qualia structure in its E-structure, and
the other element is either unspecified for that quale or specified for it only in
its C-structure, the element which has the quale in its E-structure will win out
and its value for the given quale will override the C-structural value for the
corresponding quale.
(12) Predicate Modification with E-Precedence (PMEP ):
If   is a branching node, { ,  } is the set of  ’s daughters,     and    
are both in D e,t , and    E =  x.QI(x) where I   {C,F, T,A}, then   E =  x.    E (x)  QJ(   )(x), where J   {C,F, T,A}   J   I =  .
In (12), I and J stand for subsets of the set of qualia. This will produce an
output where the E-structure of the composed phrase includes the E-structure
of   and any elements of the C-structure of   which are not specified in the
E-structure of  . Since the only element of C-structure that is specified in lion
and not in the E-structure of stone is the formal, applying PMEP to stone and
lion gives us the following result:
(13)  stone lion E =  x.  stone E (x)  QF ( lion )(x)
=  x.Stone(x)   (Excavated(x)  Carved(x))
  Perceptual-Lion(x)
This seems to be a good match for our intuitions: an object made of stone,
produced through some kind of stonework, and with the perceptual form of a
lion. This approach, then, builds in some of the basic insight of an Optimality
Theory-style system for adjective composition, such as Oliver’s Interpretation as
Optimization (see [5]) - namely, the notion that some features are more highly-
ranked than others, which will not necessarily always cause an override when
they are compatible, but can do so - into the existing functional composition
system. It also allows a uniform denotation for constitutive material adjectives
like stone to capture their simple predicative and complex privative behaviors.
While the introduction of this additional condition on the Predicate Modification
rule is undesirable by parsimony, it does not seem possible for any solution to the
problem of pseudo-privativity to be achieved without either allowing non-uniform
lexical entries or some kind of modification to FA or PM, and E-Precedence
seems a rather natural one following from Dual Content. This innovation will
not change the analysis for true privatives like fake, since they compose through
FA rather than PM regardless. For non-privative uses of intersective adjectives,
we will simply see no clash in C-structure and therefore no override, and PMEP
will behave identically to standard PM.
As a final note for this section, Del Pinal observes that the word literally
can instruct the listener to relax their commitment to Non-Vacuity and accept
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seemingly empty denotations in the case of constitutive material adjectives, but
not in the case of true privatives:
(14) a. Something unbelievable happened in a laboratory at Harvard. Scien-
tists discovered a way of making, literally, stone lions.
b. Something amazing happened in a laboratory at Harvard. Some en-
gineer managed to make, literally, a fake gun.
The observation is that we are willing to imagine a hypothetical living lion
composed of stone in the case of (14a), but that we cannot do any parallel
operation for (14b). In the current analysis, we could explain this by saying that
literally is a signal for the listener to ignore E-Precedence in their interpretation.
This would aﬀect the interpretation of constitutive material adjectives, which
are composed using PM, but not of true privatives, which use FA, matching the
observed pattern.
3.3 Patterns of entailment
Finally, Dual Content also shows promise in covering some recent experimental
data on the inference patterns of privative noun phrases. Pavlick & Callison-
Burch (see [6]) show that speakers do not treat all instances of privative ad-
jectives as entailing a negation of the head noun; specifically, speakers do still
infer entailments between the privative-modified NP and the bare noun in cer-
tain cases that would not be predicted by the traditional analysis of privativity,
which would predict that statements about the privative-modified NP should
in fact contradict, not entail, the same statement about the bare noun. Some
adjective-noun combinations ‘behave in the prototypically privative way’ ([6],
p. 117), e.g. counterfeit money contradicts rather than entails money. Others
behave contrary to this prediction, e.g. a fake ID is judged to still be an ID, a
mythical beast is judged to still be a beast, and a mock debate is judged to still
be a debate (or at least, statements that are true of the full NP are judged to
entail the same statements about the bare noun).
The account of this data in Dual Content could follow rather naturally from
the denotations for diﬀerent privatives. Specifically, since diﬀerent privatives
negate diﬀerent aspects of the C-structure, it is reasonable that you would oc-
casionally retain entailment in some contexts if what is negated is unvalued in
the noun for that particular quale. It does not seem incompatible with DC, ei-
ther, that speakers would assign diﬀerent relative pragmatic weights to diﬀerent
qualia in the C-structure, even if they aren’t entirely absent.
Mock debate was judged to entail debate at a much greater rate than mock
execution entailed execution. Debate probably is highly specified for its form
(i.e. that it involves exchanging arguments in an oral format, most likely) but
either unspecified or underspecified for its telos – perhaps to convey to the public
some range of arguments, but also perhaps for competitive glory, or to convince
voters to support you, but none of these seem crucial to the activity. Since mock,
analyzed similarly to fake, negates the telic quale but not the formal quale,
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entailment relations are likely to hold between the unmodified and modified NP
in the case of debate. Contrast with execution, which is likely underspecified
for its form (i.e. it may be a firing squad, gallows, guillotine, electric chair,
lethal injection, or any number of less typical methods) but highly specified
for its telos – it must involve ending someone’s life. If mock, then, negates the
telos but not the form, then a mock execution is very unlikely to hold the same
entailment relations as a regular execution, and in fact will be considered an
explicit contradiction with it.
This analysis also predicts the strangeness, possibly vacuousness, of certain
privative NPs, such as counterfeit light (referring not to an object like a lamp,
but to the light itself). Counterfeit is analyzed as similar but not identical to
fake, in that it negates the agentive quale of the noun and requires that the object
was made with the goal of looking and behaving like the noun ([4], p. 16). Thus,
since light probably lacks an agentive quale, being predominately an experiential
phenomenon and capable of being produced from a number of diﬀerent sources
and reactions, counterfeit light would be a strangely redundant utterance as
eﬀectively nothing is being negated. Partee’s Principle of Full Interpretation (see
[3]) might apply here, inducing pragmatic infelicity where counterfeit makes no
substantive contribution to the meaning.
3.4 Conclusion: returning to the puzzle
Partee ([3]) lays out two problems for privativity: can it be accounted for in
a compositional semantics, and can so-called privative nonsubsective adjectives
be given a subsective denotation that explains their patterning with respect to
NP splits in Polish? She argues with respect to the latter that privative ad-
jectives coerce the noun into an expanded meaning, but the implementation of
this coercion is left unspecified. I have argued that Del Pinal’s Dual Content
semantics oﬀers the least theoretically costly account of privativity (adhering
most closely to compositionality in the Fregean sense) while also showing the
most explanatory power. By expanding the lexical entries for nouns to include
an extension-determining and an associated non-extension-determining concep-
tual component, Dual Content allows a treatment of privative adjectives as, in
a sense, subsective, since they pick out referents with some of the conceptual
features of the bare noun while excluding others. This framework also allows for
productive and non-vacuous analyses of adjectives like typical, and handles cases
of iterated privativity like fake fake guns more successfully than its competitors,
while avoiding some classical philosophical objections that other kinds of simpler
lexical entries face.
I have also argued that introducing the notion of E-Precedence into Predicate
Modification, such that the extension-determining components of a modifier can
override the conceptual components of a noun when there is a clash, allows an ex-
tension of the Dual Content framework to account for the privative behaviors of
constitutive material adjectives while preserving a uniform lexical entry for those
adjectives when they are used predicatively and intersectively. This innovation
integrates some of the insight of the Interpretation as Optimization theory into a
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functional semantics, while avoiding its downfalls. Finally, I have suggested that
Dual Content might allow for a simple explanation for some puzzling behavior of
privative adjectives in recent experimental data, and that a uniform analysis of
each privative adjective can still account for their inconsistent application across
head nouns.
Many questions about the adjective typology still remain, including an ef-
fective way to implement non-privative non-subsective adjectives. These ques-
tions, I suspect, will be answered with tools that are perfectly compatible with,
though do not depend on, Dual Content, such as degree semantics for adjectives
involving time (e.g. former) and possible world semantics for adjectives involv-
ing possibility (e.g. potential). Open questions also remain about the extent of
Dual Content, namely which linguistic elements need this kind of split structure
and whether any other types of modification need to make reference to it. For
now, this paper has shown that a functional semantics can do an excellent job
of capturing our intuitions about multiple types of privativity, and even some
of its less obvious behaviors, and more fully specifies what expanded denotation
privative adjectives coerce their nouns into.
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Abstract. This paper presents novel empirical data that motivates an
analysis of plural predicates in which the predicates have a basic, ”double
cover” interpretation from which all other interpretations are derived. The
data presented in this paper are the results of a truth-value judgment task
designed to test whether intermediate cover readings of plural predicates
(i) can be made available or indexed in context as argued by Gillon [3] and
Schwarzschild [9], or (ii) are never available as argued by Lasersohn [7], [8].
The results show that neither intermediate cover readings, nor collective
and distributive readings are initially available in ambiguous contexts
that contain minimal negative evidence. To account for the empirical
data, this paper presents an analysis in which the basic reading of certain
transitive constructions with two plural NPs is a Landman [6] inspired
double cover reading that has been modified with a Schwarzschild [9]
style approach to indexing minimal cover readings.
Keywords: Plural Predicates · Minimal Covers · Collectivity · Distribu-
tivity · Cumulativity.
1 Introduction
The interpretation of plural predicates is a still unsettled topic that draws on
traditional semantic methods to motivate analyses. For example, Gillon [2] argues
that plurals are ambiguous rather than vague or indeterminate in respect to
readings that correspond to minimal covers of the plural noun phrase. (Gillon [2]
defines a minimal cover as a set that (i) is a subset of the power-set of a set being
covered, (ii) contains all of the same individuals as the set being covered, and
(iii) contains no set that is a subset of another.) Lasersohn [7], however, argues
that such an approach requires too many readings to be available in certain
cases, and that an approach in which plural predicates are ambiguous between
collective and distributive interpretations is more sound. Subsequent analyses
of plural predicates fall between these two approaches, arguing for somewhere
between two and (sometimes infinitely) many interpretations, e.g. [3], [4], [9], [5],
[6], [8]. While there is support for each position, none of these formal analyses
are informed by empirical data. In this paper, I introduce empirical data from a
truth-value judgment task to motivate a new analysis of plural predicates, namely
that plural predicates have a single interpretation rather than being ambiguous




This paper is focused on constructions like (1), in which there are two plural NPs
in a transitive construction that could be interpreted as collective or distributive.
(1) Alex, Billy, and Charlie wrote songs.
(1) can be interpreted as collective, in which case Alex, Billy, and Charlie all
co-wrote the same songs, and (1) can be interpreted as distributive in which case
Alex, Billy, and Charlie each wrote their own songs. It is often argued that plural
predicates like that in (1) are straightforwardly ambiguous between the collective
and distributive readings, e.g. [7], [8], [9].
The collective and distributive readings of (1) are not the only possible
interpretations, however. In addition to these interpretations, there are over 100
di erent combinations, or covers of Alex, Billy, and Charlie that could have
written songs. In respect to (1), a cover is any set of sets of Alex, Billy, and
Charlie, whose sum is equal to Alex, Billy, and Charlie. More formally, a cover is
a subset of the the closure under sum of a set, which is equal to the supremum
of the atoms of the subset.
(2) A covers B i  A   *(B)  AT( A) = B
For example, a cover could be as complex as one in which Alex and Billy
wrote songs together, while Charlie wrote songs both individually and with Alex
and Billy respectively (a   b, c, c   a, c   b). However, while such a reading is
theoretically possible, no one argues that this is part of the basic interpretation
of a sentence like (1). Instead, such a sentence is argued to have a more restricted
set of possible interpretations.
Gillon [2] argues that sentences like (1) are ambiguous in respect to their truth
conditions, which is a set of minimal covers—i.e. sets of subsets of pluralities, in
which none of the subsets overlap with the union of the others, and the union of
all subsets is equal to the plurality itself (3).
(3) A minimally covers B i  A covers B   ¬ X(X   A    (A-X) covers B)
In other words, (1) has eight possible interpretations which correspond to the
minimal covers of the subject NP. For example, The men wrote musicals is true
of Rogers, Hammerstein, and Hart because, though they did not individually or
collectively write musicals, the plural predicate is minimally covered by the fact
that Rogers and Hammerstein wrote musicals together as did Rogers and Hart.
Lasersohn [7] criticizes the analysis of Gillon [2], claiming that certain minimal
cover readings are non-existent, and that covers-based analyses are untenable
because they require sentences to have unfathomably large numbers of readings.
What seems to be the underlying issue for Lasersohn [7] is the distinction between
interpretation in the sense of on-line processing of language users versus the
sense of logically possible readings. For example, under Gillon’s [2] analysis, (4)
is predicted to be a true statement when John, Mary, and Bill are teaching
assistants (TAs) who each made exactly $7,000 last year.
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(4) The TAs were paid exactly $14,000 last year. [7, p. 131]
Lasersohn [7] argues that in the given context the predicted truth of this sentence
is untenable. Furthermore, he argues that NPs like the real numbers would require
infinite minimal covers and that it is unlikely that the grammar of a language
would assign an infinite number of readings or set an upper limit on the number
of possible readings. As an alternative to Gillon’s [2] analysis, Lasersohn [7],
points to analyses like Dowty [1], in which verbs are ambiguous between collective
and distributive readings.
Responding to Lasersohn, Gillon [4] agrees that at least collective and dis-
tributive readings are available, but he insists that context can make available
intermediate minimal cover readings—i.e. minimal cover readings other than
collective and distributive. Gillon [4] gives (5-a) as an example of a context that
makes intermediate cover interpretations available.
(5) a. A chemistry department has two teaching assistants for each of its
courses, one for the recitation section and one for the lab section.
The department has more than two teaching assistants and it has
set aside $14,000 for each course with teaching assistants. The total
amount of money disbursed for them, then is greater than $14,000.
At the same time, since the workload for teaching a course’s section
can vary from one section to another, the department permits each
team of assistants for a course to decide for itself how to divide the
$14,000 the team is to receive.
b. The T.A.’s were paid their $14,000 last year. [4, p. 483].
While (5-a) does not explicitly point to which minimal cover is true, it nevertheless
gives the context necessary to know that distributive or collective interpretations
of (5-b) are not su cient truth making conditions, and that a derivation of
minimal covers is necessary.
Schwarzschild [9] also argues for a context based analysis, analyzing plural
predicates as having a single meaning that can be indexed to any cover reading
in the appropriate context (which solves the problem of potentially infinite covers
[8]). According to Schwarzschild, [9], “whether or not a certain intermediate
reading is available seems to have to do with the context not with the semantics of
particular lexical items” (p. 66). He therefore proposes the following generalization
to account for cover readings:
(6) [SNPplural VP] is true in some context Q i  there is a cover C of the
plurality P denoted by NP which is salient in Q and VP is true for every
element in C.
This generalization for distributive readings is formalized in (7), where Part is
the one place distributivity operator and Cov is free variable over sets of sets
of the whole domain of quantification, the value of which is determined by the
linguistic and non-linguistic context.
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(7) x    Part(Cov)( ) if and only if  y[(y   Cov  y x)  y     ]
[9, p. 71]
Schwarzschild [9] specifies the translation rule in (8) which means that a plural
predicate is indexed to a particular cover reading.
(8) Plural VP rule:
If   is a singular VP with translation  ’, then for any index i, Part(Covi)( ’)
is a translation for the corresponding plural VP.
These rules allow any cover reading to be indexed given the right context. (9-a),
for example, therefore has the logical form in (9-b), where the two-place Part
operation distributes the predicate to the subsets of the indexed cover, Covi.
(9) a. The musicians wrote songs.
b. (Part(Covi)(wrote’))(songs’)(the-musicians’)
Schwarzschild [9] concludes that the absence or presence of a given cover
interpretation depends, to some extent, on the same sorts of things that other
pragmatic phenomena depend on, like salience. In an ambiguous context, collective
and distributive readings are made salient by the plural noun phrase.
Lasersohn [8] revisits these issues and further argues for the unavailability of
intermediate cover readings, motivating an analysis where plural predicates are
ambiguous between collective and distributive interpretations. While Lasersohn
[7] convincingly argues that certain intermediate cover readings are never salient,
it is nevertheless the case that they are logically possible interpretations.
Landman [6] takes an approach in which cover interpretations are neither one
of several basic interpretations nor are they indexable via context. For Landman
[6] cover interpretations are the result of a special contextual mechanism that
weakens the interpretations of verbs. In respect to a plural argument like the
musicians that denotes three individuals Alex, Billy, and Charlie or a b c, a
minimal cover like Alex and Charlie, and Billie and Charlie (a c,b c in (11)),
can be the agent of a plural predicate, e.g. (12)1, so long as one has a definition
of cover roles (13), a definition of covers (14), and a type shifting principle for
verbs that allows verbs with plural roles to be turned into cover roles (15).
{a   c, b   c}   *MUSICIAN the musicians  =  (*MUSICIAN) =  {a   c, b   c} = a   b   c (11)
 The musicians wrote songs  =
       
 e    WRITE :
a   b   c =  ( MUSICIAN)  
CAg(e) =   (a   b   c)  
 y    SONG   CTh(e) =   (y)
(12)
1 AT(d) is the set of atoms below d: if d   D then AT(d) = {a AT:a d}
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Let R be a thematic role
CR, the cover role based on R,
is the partial function from De to Dd defined by:
CR(e) = a i  a   ATOM    ({  (d)   SUM: d   AT(*R(e))}) =  (a)
undefined otherwise [6, p. 210]
(13)
group   is a subgroup of   i    ( )     ( ).
Let X be a set of subgroups in group  .
X covers   i    {  (x)   X} =  ( ) [6, p. 211]
(14)
 xn... x... x1.{e   *V:...*R(e)=x...} 
 xn... x... x1.{e   *V:...CR(e)=x...} [6, p. 211]
(15)
For Landman [6], cover readings are those in which there are plural agents of sums
of events. Such readings are made possible by cover roles, which are defined in
(13). If the plural role R has atoms d, and those atoms can be type-shifted down
with the operation  , and we can take the sum of those type-shifted individuals,
and that sum of type-shifted individuals is equal to the plural individual made
from the group a, then a is a cover role. More plainly, if the agent of an event is a
sum of groups, then that agent is a cover role. This is exactly what occurs when a
sentence like (16-a) is used to describe the event that is described in (16-b)—i.e.
an event in which a   c and b   c are the agents of separate song writing events.
(16) a. The musicians wrote songs.
b. Alex and Charlie wrote songs together, and Billie and Charlie wrote
songs together.
In order to derive the interpretation in (12) from that of (16-b), the following
must occur:   (a   c) and   (b   c) must be group atoms (made via the type
shifting operation  2) that are the agents of events e and f respectively (17).
(17)   (a   c) = Ag(e)
  (b   c) = Ag(f).
The plural agent of the sum of events e and f is equivalent to the sum of the
groups   (a   c) and   (b   c):
(18) *Ag(e f) =   (a   c)    (b   c) [6, p. 212]
The set of atoms below the plural agent in (18) is the set containing the two
groups   (a   c) and   (b   c):
2 one function of the type shifting operation   is to turn plural individuals into group
atoms; see [6] for details
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(19) AT(*Ag(e f)) = {  (a   c),   (b   c)} [6, p. 212]
Given the definition of cover roles, (13), it is possible to take the closure under
sum of the set of atoms below the plural agent, and therefore get the supremum
of the groups of agents ((20)), which upshifted, is equivalent to the plural agent
of events e and f ((21)).
(20)  { (d): d   AT(*Ag(e  f))} =  {a   c, b   c} = a   b   c
(21) *Ag(e  f) =   (a   b   c)
The type-shifting principle for verbs, (15), allows the basic meaning of the verb
write to be shifted cover interpretations:
(22) write    y x.{e  *WRITE:CAg(e)=x   C Th(e)=y}
This derivation provides a cover agent for the interpretation of (12) from the
interpretation of (16-b).
While Landman [6] provides this mechanism for building plural predicates
from covers, he argues that these are special cases that are not part of the
basic interpretation of the verb. Instead, he argues there are four scopeless
readings (double collective, collective-distributive, distributive-collective, and
double-distributive–i.e. cumulative) if plural noun phrases fill the roles of the
verb, and five other readings are available depending on how a particular scope
mechanism is invoked. The cumulative interpretation is relational–i.e. it is not a
statement about each individual denoted by the arguments of a transitive verb,
and it is not about a predicate and one argument: it is about the relation between
the predicate and its arguments. The cumulative reading (16-a) indicates that
(i) there is a set of musicians, (ii) there is a set of songs, (iii) every one of the
musicians wrote at least one of the songs, and (iv) every song was written by
one or more of the musicians. The cumulative interpretation can be type-shifted
to the “double cover interpretation”, from which minimal cover interpretations
can be derived, meaning that a relation between subgroups is expressed rather
than a relation between individuals.
Among all of the arguments for one analysis or another, it seems that no
empirical investigation into readings of plural predicates has been undertaken.
Given there is no consensus among theories, it is an open question whether (i)
cover readings might not be initially available but can be made available by
context [4], [9], [6] or (ii) certain cover readings are never available [7],[8].
3 Main Data
In addition to distributive and collective readings of plural predicates, lexical
modifiers like each have a distributive e ect, and modifiers like together have a
collectivizing e ect [3], [9], [10]. These lexical modifiers can therefore be used to
restrict the possible interpretations to distributive, (23-a), or collective, (23-b).
(23) a. Alex and Billie wrote songs individually.
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b. Alex and Billie wrote songs together.
If plural predicates like wrote songs have all minimal cover readings available
as argued by Gillon [2], then (1) should be equally ambiguous in respect to the
combinations of song-writers listed in (24).
(1) Alex, Billie, and Charlie wrote songs.
(24) a. a   b   c
b. a   c, b   c
c. a   b, b   c
d. a   b, a   c
e. c, a   b
f. b, a   c
g. a, b   c
h. a, b, c
If all minimal cover readings are equally available, then it should be possible
to refer to a subset of the minimal covers by adding lexical modifications. For
example, (25-a) is true of a set of minimal covers, and (25-b) is true of a subset
of those minimal covers.
(25) a. Alex, Billie, and Charlie went to the music studio. The musicians
wrote songs.
b. Alex and Billie didn’t write songs individually.
The set of minimal covers that could be true of both (25-a) and (25-b) are
all of those in which the predicate does not distribute to either Alex or Billie
individually. The only available interpretations would be those in which Alex and
Billie are part of a collective interpretation. The potentially true minimal covers
are listed in (26), along with the false minimal covers, which are crossed out.
(26) a. a   b   c
b. a   c, b   c
c. a   b, b   c
d. a   b, a   c
e. c, a   b
f. b, a   c
g. a, b   c
h. a, b, c
It is also possible to use modifiers to eliminate collective interpretations for
particular individuals. In (27) for example, the use of together in (27-b) negates
the scenarios in which Alex and Billie are predicated over collectively.
(27) a. Alex, Billie, and Charlie went to the music studio. The musicians
wrote songs.
b. Alex and Billie didn’t write songs together.
The set true and false minimal covers for (27-a) and (27-b) are listed in (28)3.




(28) a. a   b   c
b. a   c, b   c
c. a   b, b   c
d. a   b, a   c
e. c, a   b
f. b, a   c
g. a, b   c
h. a, b, c
Taking these modifications one step further, only a single minimal cover is
available as the truth-making condition when using both each and together in the
same sentence. For example, given (29-a) as a context, (29-b) negates all minimal
covers in which wrote songs gets a collective or distributive interpretation in
respect to Alex and Billie.
(29) a. Alex, Billie, and Charlie went to the music studio. The musicians
wrote songs.
b. Alex and Billie didn’t write songs individually or together.
Both (29-a) and (29-b) are true if Alex and Charlie wrote songs together and
Billie and Charlie also wrote songs together. The true and false minimal covers
of these two sentences are listed in (30).
(30) a. a   b   c
b. a   c, b   c
c. a   b, b   c
d. a   b, a   c
e. c, a   b
f. b, a   c
g. a, b   c
h. a, b, c
Given the interpretation of plural predicates is an open question, there are
five ways in which the pairs of sentences in (25), (27), and (29) are likely to be
interpreted. If all of these follow-up sentences are judged to be possibly true, then
it could be the case that the plural predicates are straightforwardly ambiguous
between all minimal cover interpretations as argued in Gillon’s [2], [3] earlier
work, or it could be the case that plural predicates are ambiguous between
collective and distributive interpretations, and that context makes the minimal
covers available as argued by Gillon [4] and Schwarzschild [9], and implied by
Landman [6]. Second, if (25) and (27) are judged to be possibly true, and (29) is
judged to be necessarily false, then it could be the case that plural predicates are
ambiguous between distributive and collective interpretations but intermediate
cover interpretations are not available, as argued by Lasersohn [8]. Third, if (25)
is judged to be possibly true while (27) and (29) are judged to be necessarily false,
then it would be the case that a collective interpretation is basic and all other
interpretations are derived. Fourth, if (27) is judged to be possibly true while
(25) and (29) are necessarily false, then the distributive interpretation is basic
and all other interpretations are derived. Lastly if all follow-up sentences are
judged to be false, then it is the case that there is a single general interpretation
that is basic, and all other interpretations are derived or indexed.
Experimental Design. An empirical study was designed to test determine
the interpretations of the pairs of sentences, like those in (25), (27), and (29).
A truth-value-judgment survey was conducted with 32 native English speakers
through Prolific.ac. The participants were presented with 45 test items containing
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a context like (29-a) and a follow-up like (29-b). Participants were told to judge
whether the follow-up sentence could be true or must be false in respect to the
context preceding it4. The 45 test items exemplified one of the three conditions in
(25), (27), and (29): 15 test follow-up items contained individually, 15 contained
together, and 15 contained both individually and together. Participants were also
asked to judged the truth value of 45 filler items that could be true or must be
false depending on their lexical modifiers. The total number of items expected to
be true or false was equal.
Results. The results of the study show that there is a significant di erence
in the way that the truth of sentences with both individually and together are
judged relative to sentences with only one of the two lexical modifiers. Using a
binary logistic regression model (lme4 package in R), and the conditions and
judgments as arguments, the judgments of test condition with both individually
and together were found to be significantly di erent (p<0.001) than judgments
of the condition in which sentences only contained together as a lexical modifier.
Sentences that only contained individually as a lexical modifier were found to be
judged no di erently (p=0.282) than those that only contained together. These
results show that despite the fact that each follow up sentence is true in respect
to its preceding context, speakers do not judge sentences in the test condition to
be true at the same rate at which they judge sentences in the other conditions to
be true.
The average percentage of true and false judgments for sentences in each
condition is presented in Figure 1. This graph shows that follow up sentences with
Fig. 1. Average percentage of true and false judgments by condition
only one of the two lexical modifiers are judged as necessarily false a majority
of the time, while follow up sentences with both lexical modifiers are judged
4 While these directions were written above every pair of sentences, the options the
participants clicked on were simply labeled True and False.
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as false an even larger majority of the time. In other words, negated follow up
sentences that restrict the set of true minimal covers with the lexical modifiers
individually or together are generally judged to be false. This is a surprising
result given the plural predicates are said to have both collective and distributive
readings, yet neither reading seems to be available when the subjects were asked
to interpret the possible truth of follow-up sentences. If the collective reading was
available, then the follow-up sentences negating the distributive reading should
all have been true. Furthermore, if the distributive reading was available, then
the follow-up sentences negating the collective reading should have been true.
Discussion. The fact that the follow-up sentences were judged to be false
means that the plural predicate they follow is not straightforwardly ambiguous
between all minimal covers as argued for by Gillon’s earlier work [2],[3]. It also
cannot be the case that they are ambiguous between collective and distributive
interpretations argued by Lasersohn [8], Schwarzschild [9] and Gillon’s later
work [4]. The results also suggest that the follow-up sentences in the study are
insu cient context to make the set of true cover readings available. Instead of
any of the aforementioned analyses, the empirical data seems to point toward
an analysis in which neither the distributive, collective, nor intermediate cover
readings are part of the basic meaning.
4 Analysis
Building on the idea of Schwarzschild [9] that a plural predicate has one meaning
that can index cover interpretations, and also the idea from Landman [6] that
cover readings are derived from a double cover interpretation, I motivate an
analysis in which plural predicates have a single, general interpretation from which
all cover interpretations are indexed. The double cover reading from Landman
[6] provides a weak, general meaning for the plural predicate, and by adding
indexing, specific interpretations can be salient. The required translation entails
the following rule.
(31) If   is a singular transitive verb phrase with translation A, then for any
index i,  e    A : CiAg(e) = x   CiTh(e) = (y) is the translation for the
corresponding plural transitive verb phrase.
If a particular cover is not indexed in the context–i.e. the index is left unspecified
as i–then the plural predicate is straightforwardly interpreted as a dual cover
reading. The reading indicates (i) that there is a sum of writing events, (ii) a
sum of groups of musicians (Alex, Billie, and Charlie in (25), (27), and (29)) as a
plural agent, (iii) there is a sum of groups of songs as a plural theme:
 The musicians wrote songs  =
       
 e    WRITE :
a   b   c =  ( MUSICIAN)  
CiAg(e) =   (a   b   c)  
 y    SONG   CiTh(e) =   (y)
(33)
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While this seems very similar to a distributive interpretation (and in Land-
man’s [6] framework, the double cover interpretation is a type-shifted double-
distributive (cumulative) interpretation), without indexing a particular cover,
it is impossible to tell exactly which (covers of) musicians wrote exactly which
(covers of) songs. It is therefore distinct from Landman’s [6] scoped distributive
readings where the set of musicians would necessarily distribute to either distinct
sets of songs, or the same set of songs.
The proposed analysis, provides a plausible explanation for why each condition
was judged to be necessarily false in the empirical study. The ambiguous context
in which the plural predicate was presented did not index any minimal cover
despite the fact that it informed the participants that every atomic part of the
song writing event had a group of musicians as the agent and a group of songs as
the theme. The ambiguous context did not index even the strictly collective or
distributive interpretation of the agent or the theme, so no specific interpretation
from the set of minimal covers was available. At the same time, the follow-up
sentences were interpreted as negated collective, distributive, and both collective
and distributive readings respectively, these readings being indexed by the use of
the lexical modifiers together and individually. Crucially, these indexed readings
in the follow-up sentences were for an agent that was subset of the agent in the
context sentences. Because no specific cover was indexed in the context sentences,
the intersection of the context sentence and the follow-up sentence was the empty
set. It seems that the participants in this study judged the follow-up sentences to
be necessarily false because the follow-up sentences did not contain information
that could straightforwardly index a particular cover reading of the the preceding
context. In other words, the sort of context that can index a particular cover
interpretation is positive evidence. The negative evidence in this study’s follow-up
sentences is not su cient for indexing cover interpretations of the preceding
contexts: Given Alex and Billy are part of the double cover interpretation of the
context, the follow up sentences were generally judged to be false.
The fact that follow-up sentences with both individually and together were
judged false significantly more frequently than those with only individually or
together, is a phenomenon that must be accounted for. It might suggest that
collective and distributive readings are more simple to derive than intermediate
cover readings, which corresponds to the claim supported by many that these
are basic readings—e.g. [3], [6], [7], [9]. However, given these readings cannot
be taken to be basic readings in light of the evidence found in this study, the
following question remains open: Why are collective and distributive readings
more simple to get than intermediate cover readings?
One possible explanation for the di erence in judgments is the respective
frequencies of overtly collective, distributive, and intermediate cover readings.
Both the number of lexical modifiers that specify collective or distributive readings
and their frequency of use lend to the intuition that these two minimal cover
readings are more salient than intermediate covers. After all, it seems there are no
lexical modifiers that index specific intermediate covers, and situations in which
intermediate covers are salient are likely to be less frequent than situations in
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which collective or distributive interpretations are salient. A corpus study looking
for the relative frequencies of these readings could validate this hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
While it is possible for plural predicates to have collective or distributive inter-
pretations, their basic interpretation is more general. The results of the empirical
study in this paper suggest that neither Gillon [3], Landman [6], Lasersohn [8],
nor Schwarzschild [9] is correct in concluding that the collective and distributive
interpretations are part of the basic interpretation of plural predicates. At the
same time, the study also suggests that Lasersohn [8] is correct in arguing that
certain intermediate cover readings are never available, that is if they are never
made contextually salient. I propose a basic reading, inspired by Landman’s
[6] double cover reading and Schwarzschild’s [9] indexing, that can index cover
readings when they are contextually salient. Given this contradicts the common
view, further empirical research is necessary to substantiate these claims.
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Representing Scalar Implicatures in
Distributional Semantics
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Abstract. I use compositional distributional models as a lens through
which to examine scalar implicatures. I will look at two opposing views
regarding the derivation of scalar implicatures, i.e. the localist and the
globalist views, and will illustrate how they would respectively be inte-
grated within these distributional models.
Keywords: scalar implicature, compositional distributional semantics, sentence
similarity
1 Introduction
Distributional approaches to modelling meaning in use take some contextual
clues into account while simultaneously lending themselves to computational
implementations [2]. In such approaches, the meaning of a word is represented
by a vector consisting of the relative occurrence of this word with respect to
other words within a certain distance of it. Distributional models were first de-
veloped to deal with words in isolation but they rapidly expanded so they could
represent not only words but whole sentences [2]. Compositional Distributional
Semantics (CDS) is interested in finding the best way to compose a sentence-
vector from the combination of word-vectors so that the resulting sentence-vector
will in fact represent the meaning of the sentence. In standard CDS models, a
sentence-vector represents the meaning of the composition of the words form-
ing the sentence but it does not take into account the information that could
be derived from this composition. The idea here is to discuss how implicated
meaning would be integrated within the sentence-vector and also what would be
the consequences for sentence similarity measures since the implicated meaning
have an important role to play for such applications as paraphrase detection and
short answer tasks [10].
One goal of this article is to bridge the gap between the distributional repre-
sentation of a sentence and its meaning that may be inferred from the context.
Scalar implicatures (SI) are one such type of inference that will be important
for advances in this area. After a brief review of the two most prominent theo-
ries of scalar implicature, namely the localist view [1] and the globalist view [6],
we will examine two compositional distributional models, Simple Multiplicative
Compositional Model [13] and Category Compositional Distributional Seman-
tics [3], and use them as a tool to represent sentence-vectors involving scalar
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2implicatures. We then compare the two views of SIs by looking at sentence sim-
ilarity computation involving di erent cases of implicated meaning. Our results
are then discussed in terms of what we would expect to achieve by integrating
the implicated meaning sentence-vector in CDS.
2 Scalar Implicatures
Scalar implicature (SI) is a special kind of quantity implicature involving a series
of alternatives that can be generated by substituting lexical items that are linked
via a conceptual scale [6]. Horn defined conventionalized scales as containing
di erent lexical items organised by informativity [8]. For example, from (1) we
can derive (3) using the scale in (2):
(1) John ate some candies.
(2) {some, all}
(3) John ate some and not all candies.
There are many di erent theoretical models of SI and its derivation. In this
paper, we will focus solely on the opposition between what we call globalist
models and localist models, looking only at the di erences most relevant to
their implementation in distributional models.
2.1 Globalist view
The globalist view states that SIs are always derived using pragmatic mecha-
nisms [6]. To understand the standard derivation procedure, suppose that Mike
utters (4).
(4) John ate some candies.
(5) John ate all the candies.
(6) John ate some and not all can-
dies.
(i) Mike utters (4) instead of (5)
(ii) He must not believe that (5) is true: ¬BM (5) (read: M does not believe (5))
(iii) Mike is likely to know whether (5) is true: BM (5)  BM¬(5).
(iv) Combining (ii) and (iii) we get that Mike must believe (5) is not true: ¬BM (5)   (BM (5)  BM¬(5))   BM¬(5) which gives rise to (6).
As shown, the hearer first derived the weaker implicature (¬BM (5)) based on
the fact that the speaker chose not to utter the stronger alternative in (5). The
transition from the weaker implicature to the stronger, i.e. BM¬(5), is made pos-
sible through the Competence Assumption wherein a competent speaker either
believes p or ¬p [6]. It is thus the combination of the Competence Assumption
and the choice made by Mike to utter the weaker alternative that leads to the
derivation of a SI.
This model is considered globalist because SIs are derived using global pro-
cesses like contextual information and the Competence Assumption rather than
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3local grammatical processes. This view also supports the idea that SIs are never
derived by default; rather, they are derived in particular contexts by post-
compositional global processes, which means that the derivation of SIs should
not play a role in the compositional process.1
2.2 Localist view
In contrast to the Globalist view, the localist view considers that SIs are derived
from specific lexical items. Additionally, and most importantly, SIs are derived
compositionally, which means they are derived semantically and not pragmat-
ically [1]. The basic assumption here is that the implicature arises from the
presence of an exhaustivity operator O that may be expressed in some cases
as a silent covert only.2 Going back to our example John ate some candies, the
steps to go from (4) to (6) in the localist view are as follows:
(i) The set of alternatives of (4) is based on the Horn scale ALT((4))={some,
all}
(ii) The logical form of (4) is then added to the negation of all stronger alterna-
tives of (4): OALT (4) = some   ¬all
(iii) The scalar implicature is thus derived gramatically from the presence of
the operator O, i.e. John ate O some candies that negates the stronger
alternatives and this gives (6).
The fact that this operator acts locally implies that it is possible to retrieve
di erent implicatures depending on the site where the operator is processed
[1]. After introducing the details of compositional distributional models in the
next section, we will see in section 4 that these di erent derivations of SIs will
also lead to di erent treatments by compositional models, and this, even for
non-embedded cases. In this paper, we will only consider cases where the scalar
implicatures are in fact derived and will not discuss cases where they are not.3
3 Compositional Distributional Semantics
The main idea of Compositional Distributional Semantics (CDS) is to start from
the word-vectors and combine them together to obtain a sentence-vector repre-
senting the meaning of the complete sentence. In this paper,we present two CDS
models: Simple Multiplicative Compositional Model (SMCM) [13] and Category
Compositional Distributional Semantics (CCDS) [3]. The former uses simple
operations between vectors in its composition and the latter is able to derive
sentence meaning while taking into account the structure of the composed sen-
tence.
1 Geurts [6] acknowledges the fact that some kind of local pragmatics must be invoked
when considering particular examples such as embedded implicatures, but those
structures are outside the scope of this article.
2 This view originates from the treatment of embedded implicatures, but also extends
to all scalar implicatures [5]. For more information about the motivations behind
the localist view see [1,5].
3 For a discussion about the optionality of scalar implicature see [6,5].
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43.1 Mitchell and Lapata
We present here only the multiplicative model of Mitchell and Lapata since
they arrived at the conclusion that “simple multiplication” is better suited for
sentence similarity tasks [13, p.1417] than all the other alternatives they tested.
(7) Multiplicative Model: pi = ui · vi · wi
The multiplicative function defines the ith component of the sentence-vector as
being composed from the simple multiplication of the ith components of the
word-vectors  u ,  v and  w . This function is commutative, which means that
the order the word are combined in does not change the result, meaning that
syntactic structure is not taken into account.
3.2 Coecke et al.
The idea behind this approach is that “syntax drives the compositional process”
[2, p.26]. Their compositional approach has 3 steps [3]. The first step is about
assessing the syntactic constraints, the second one is about linking grammatical
analysis with semantics, and the third step is about the composition itself.
(i) Assign a grammatical type pi to each word wi of a string of words then
apply the axioms and rules of pregroup grammar to reduce these types [11].
Following other categorial grammars, a sentence has the type s, nouns like
John and candies are assigned grammatical type n, determiners like some
are assigned nnl because they combine with a noun, and transitive verbs such
as ate are assigned the grammatical type nrsnl because they take n as input
for subject and object and output a type s of a sentence.4 To reduce the form
for the sentence we used the cancellation rules of pregroup grammar which
state that any type X will cancel if combined to the left of its right adjoint
Xr, and any type X will cancel if combined to the right of its left adjoint
X l, i.e. XXr   1 and X lX   1 where 1 is the Identity. Put together, it
would look like this:
(8)
John ate some candies
n nrsnl nnl n
1snl n1
s
(ii) Assign a vector space for every syntactic type present in the sentence.
(iii) Combining the vectors of the meaning for every word in the spaces built
above, we get the representation of the sentence-vector where   is the trans-
pose and   is the matrix multiplication:5
                 
John ate some candies =
     
John    ate  (     some         candies) (Eq. 3.1)
4 For simplicity reasons, all nouns are treated as grammatical type n [7]. See Lambek
[11] for a richer description of basic types.
5 The details of the calculations are presented in [3] and [7].
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54 Representing SI Using CDS
Now that we have introduced two CDS models we can go back to SIs and discuss
how these models could be used to represent the sentence-vector resulting from
the SI. For the localist view, the SI sentence vector would look like this, where
F represents a compositional function combining all the words together:
     
SILOC = F (John, ate,O, some, candies)
= F (John, ate, some, and not all, candies)
=
                          
John ate some and not all candies
(Eq. 4.2)
The fact that the exhaustification operator Only acts locally at the composi-
tional stage makes it straightforward to compute the SI sentence-vector for the
localist view since it only requires substituting some with some and not all in
the original sentence. In the localist case, the composition happens only once
because the negation of the stronger alternative is integrated within the sen-
tence before the sentence is composed. In turn, the SI sentence-vector is thus
equivalent to the vector for the composed sentence John ate some and not all
candies. To derive the representation for the meaning of the SI sentence-vector
we just have to choose which compositional function to use depending on the
CDS model.
The globalist view, on the other hand, considers that the implicated informa-
tion and not all is processed post-compositionally. This means that the original
sentence John ate some candies must be already composed before the new im-
plicated information is integrated within the meaning of the sentence. Following
the Gricean framework, the original sentence is equivalent to the meaning of
“What is said” while the implicated information corresponds to the meaning of
“What is implicated”.
(9) What is said
John ate some candies
What is implicated
John ate not all candies
One key di erence between the localist and the globalist views is that in the
globalist view the fact that “What is said” is already composed implies that
the implicated meaning could not possibly only be and not all because it is not
propositional by itself. Instead the implicated meaning should be a complete
proposition containing the same information, namely John ate not all candies.
In the globalist view, the complete interpretation of the sentence John ate some
candies must integrate both the “What is said” and the “What is implicated”
components. We thus have to first compose the original sentence (“What is
said”) and the SI sentence (“What is implicated”) separately. Once these two











John ate some candies,
                  
John ate not all candies)
= F3
 
F1(John, ate, some, candies), F2(John, ate, not, all, candies)
 
(Eq. 4.3)
In (Eq. 4.3) the indices of the compositional function F are only there to
explicitly show that there is three di erent compositions. This complete sentence-
vector derived using the globalist view is equivalent to the SI sentence-vector we
derived from the localist view. Equivalent in the sense that they both represent
the same conveyed meaning about the fact that John ate some candies but that
he did not ate all of them. With this in mind we can go back to the two CDS
models we presented and compute the resulting vectors.
4.1 SI and SMCM
Substituting the multiplicative function “·” for F we can derive the final vector





John ·  ate ·     O some ·     candies
=
   














John ·  ate ·  not · all ·      candies
 
(Eq. 4.5)
This suggests that even in commutative CDS models that do not involve syn-
tactic constraints, the resulting vector for the localist view and for the globalist
view are likely to be di erent. This result might be surprising but it stems from
the fact that globalist view is about composing two sentences together which
amounts for duplicates of certain words like John, ate or candies. It would make
no sense to treat the SI as only being the particle and not all because it is neither
a sentence nor propositional. The fact that SIs are derived post-compositionality
thus trigger this di erence between the localist and globalist views when using





spectively represents the sentence-vector for the SI for the localist view and the
combination of “What is said” and “What is implicated” for the globalist view.
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74.2 SI and CCDS
When considering the CCDS approach to composition, grammatical types and
word order matter. The compositional process of pregroup grammar works fine
if we simply substitute some with some and not all as long as the correct gram-
matical types are chosen for every word. The conjunction and has a type xrxxl
and here x = nnl.
(10)
John ate some and not all candies





From this we can compute the resulting vector, where   is a matrix multi-
plication and   is a point-wise product also known as Hadamard product:
                          
John ate some and not all candies =
     
John     ate 
      some  (  not  all)        candies  (Eq. 4.6)
To arrive at this result we used the simplification presented in [9]. Since a
conjunction always outputs the same type as its conjuncts and since it “enforces
equal contributions of the conjuncts in the final result” [9, p.33] it can be replaced
by point-wise product of its conjuncts.
Coming back to the globalist view, the basic idea remains the same but
now we must first compose “What is said” and “What is implicated” separately
before being able to compose them together. Once we have computed both com-
ponents of the complete meaning, the idea is to compose them together using
a coordination relation. The conjunction and is the simplest way to combine
two sentences together and here and has the grammatical type (srssl), i.e. s
instantiates x from xrxxl. To make sure the complete sentence will compose we
can verify the type of the whole sentence.
(11)
John ate some candies and John ate not all candies









8As described before, we can simplify the conjunction and by using a point-















We now have computed the sentence-vectors for both the localist and the
globalist views using two distinct CDS models and we arrived both times at
di erent results. In the next section we will quantify this di erence using sentence
similarity measures.
5 SI and Sentence Similarity
Vectorial approaches to meaning have the advantage of facilitating the compari-
son between meaning because it is mathematically easy to compare two vectors.
The most used measure for the distance between two vectors is the cosine simi-
larity measure. The cosine measure is the computation of the angle between the




i is the norm of the vector. The more
similar two vectors are, the smaller the angle will be, where an angle of 0 would
yield a perfect similarity of 1.
Sim( w 1, w 2) = Cosine( w 1, w 2) =
 w 1. w 2
  w 1   w 2  (Eq. 5.8)
The similarity measures when using SMCM and CCDS are presented in Table
1. For our calculations, we used pre-trained vectors from the Wikinews corpus
[12].6 We first computed the similarity between the original sentence John ate
some candies and the two complete sentence-vector we derived from the localist
and the globalist view. To make sure our results did not overtly depends on the
meaning of the subject John and the object Candies, we varied the subject and
the object and took the average value.7
Cosine scos
SMCM
Localist - Base sentence 0.9549 0.0016
Globalist - Base sentence 0.8863 0.0070
CCDS
Localist - Original sentence 0.9927 0.0001
Globalist - Original sentence 0.8709 0.0025
Table 1: Cosine similarity measures between complete and base sentence-vector
6 These vectors were trained using fastText, have 300 dimensions and are available for
download at https://fasttext.cc/docs/en/english-vectors.html




9The first thing we note from the results presented in table 1 is that the
standard deviation is very small which tends to show that the similarity measures
we obtained depend more on the structure of the derivation process for the SI
that on the individual values of the words that composed them. We can also see
that the localist sentence-vector is closer than the globalist sentence-vector to
the original sentence-vector by a significant margin. Under the CCDS model, the
localist sentence-vector is even closer to the original one. In fact it is so close we
could even say it is almost equivalent to the vector representation of the original
sentence John ate some candies.
5.1 Other Kinds of Quantity Implicatures
In this paper we have focussed on SIs of the form some and not all, but there are
a multitude of di erent kinds of quantity implicatures [6]. To see if our results
would also hold for other kinds of SI we also computed similarity measures for
cases when John ate 3 candies lead to the derivation of the following implicated
meaning: John ate no more than 3 candies. We also computed the similarity
values for a kind of quantity implicatures called free choice inference [5,6]: John
or Mary ate candies leading to the derivation John or Mary and not both ate
candies. Similarly to no more than, the results are much lower for the globalist




Localist - Original sentence 0.8571
Globalist - Original sentence 0.7398
CCDS
Localist - Original sentence 0.9178
Globalist - Original sentence 0.7421
and not both
SMCM
Localist - Original sentence 0.9491
Globalist - Original sentence 0.6554
CCDS
Localist - Original sentence 0.9861
Globalist - Original sentence 0.8017
Table 2: Similarity for no more than SIs and and not both free choice inferences
Our results are still in line with what we got for some and not all. In the
case of no more than, the relative scores for similarity measures remain the same
as before, i.e. the localist view is still the one closer to the original sentence,
but this time the globalist view sentence-vector is even more dissimilar than
before. We note there are no clear discrepancies in our results between the two
compositional models as respective trends of values is constant throughout the
results.
6 Discussion
The results presented here clearly point toward the localist view to be more
similar to the original sentence. The question now is whether these results say




6.1 Length of the sentence-vector
Even though it would be di cult to measure precisely the contribution from the
meaning of the words we can at least convinced ourselves that it is not completely
overruled by the di erence in word number by comparing the similarity measures
between di erent sentences having the same length. We thus computed similarity
measures by respectively varying 3 words and 6 words while keeping the same
first 4 words throughout as in our other examples for SI. Using SMCM and 4
di erent versions for the added words, we got that the ratio of similarity measures
between the 7-word sentence and the 10-word sentence varied by approximately
7.5%. These results tend to show that the meaning of the individual words are
in fact making a di erence for sentence similarity and that they are not just
drowned out by the di erence of length of the sentence-vectors.8
6.2 Contribution of the Implicated Meaning
The ‘SI meaning’ is responsible for the di erence in similarity between the com-
plete sentence and the original one. A lower similarity score thus means that
the SI part contributes more to the complete meaning sentence-vector whereas
a higher similarity score would imply the contrary.
We must first discuss the fact that the contribution of the implicated meaning
to the complete sentence-vector is generally so low for the localist view that it
could be a problem because we could question whether the SI-part was taken
into account at all while this issue would not be raised when using the globalist
view. In theory, if the goal of sentence similarity measures is to compute the
contribution from the SI part, then the localist view might not be the best
candidate because its SI contribution seems drowned out by the composition of
the sentence and this results in the minimization of its contribution.
6.3 Short Answer Tasks
Short answer scoring tasks are about determining if the answer provided by the
student is valid or not compared to the given target answer. According to [10]
paraphrase detection consisting of extracting similar sentences from corpora is a
method of choice for short answer scoring tasks. If the goal of sentence similarity
models is to measure the similarity between pairs of sentences as accurately
as possible, then it should be just natural to want to integrate this complete
similarity within sentence similarity measures.
(12) Question: Did John steal all the candies?
(13) Target A: No John did not steal all the candies, but he did steal some.
(14) Target B: No John did not steal all the candies.
(15) Student #1 answer : John stole some candies.
8 It is important to note this analysis is merely qualitative, but at this point we are





The Cosine value between (13) and the complete sentence-vector of (15) is
0.8148 for the localist view and it is 0.8845 for the globalist view under SMCM;
while the Cosine value between (14) and the complete sentence-vector of (15) is
0.9887 for the localist view and it is 0.9563 for the globalist view under SMCM.
The similarity values varies according with what we would expected but it
seems the localist view seems to be more selective overall. When using Target
B the localist view is only 3.3% higher than the globalist one, but it is 7.9%
lower than the globalist view when using Target A. To illustrate this let us chose
the threshold of acceptance, i.e. the similarity value below which the student’s
answer would be rejected, to be 0.85. Then the globalist view would accept the
student’s answer in both cases, while the localist view would only accept the
answer when compared with Target B because its form is much closer to the
localist complete sentence-vector.
6.4 Translation Studies and Sentence Similarity Measures
Although the integration of the implicated meaning within the complete sentence-
vector is not really discussed in DS right now, some other fields already empha-
sise the important di erence between original sentence meaning and implicated
meaning. To illustrate this di erence we borrow an example described in [4]
about the translation from English to Spanish of an expression like “Friday the
13th”.
(16) John stays home on Friday the 13th.
(17) John se queda en casa el viernes 13.
John stays home on Friday the 13th
(18) John se queda en casa el martes 13.
John stays home on Tuesday the 13th
The sentence (17) is the word for word translation of (16) and both the lexical
items and the syntax of the sentence are equivalent. Traditional sentence simi-
larity measures would thus give a value of 1. If we now consider both the original
sentence and the implicated meaning, we arrive at a di erent result. From (16),
we would naturally infer that the reason Luke stays home on this date is due to
superstition because it is common knowledge in the anglo-american culture that
this date is supposed to be unlucky. However, we could not derive this informa-
tion from (17) because in some spanish-speaking countries, the usual unlucky
day is Tuesday the 13th (as in (18)). In fact the cosine similarity value between
the complete sentence-vectors of (16) and (18) is 0.9997 using the globalist view
under SMCM while the similarity value between the complete sentences-vectors
of (16) and of (17) is only 0.8843. This example shows that complete similar-
ity, i.e. similarity of complete sentence-vectors, may play an important role in
translation. It is important to note that for this particular example, we can only
use the globalist view because it is not a scalar implicature and the localist view
is not yet able to take into account such implicatures. The post-compositional
structure of the globalist view allows for an easy integration of any kind of
implicatures as long as the two contributions (“What is said” and “What is





This paper was a first step in a new direction, bridging compositional distribu-
tional models and approaches to SI by looking at how implicated meaning could
be treated within these models. Our goal was to emphasise the importance of
the implicated meaning for complete sentence similarity measures and to ac-
knowledge the discrepancies between di erent applications of the integration of
SIs within CDS. We looked at two views regarding how the derivation of SIs
takes place and we showed those two views were not treated the same way by
two CDS models. This lead to the realisation that there are some di erences
in compositional treatments between the localist and the globalist view even
when considering non-embedded sentences such as John ate some candies. We
then derive the sentence-vectors and compute the di erence in sentence simi-
larity measures between the two views. We discussed the very low contribution
from the implicated part of the sentence in the localist view and the inherent
capacity for the globalist view to di erentiate between the relative contribution
of the explicit and the implicit meaning of a sentence and the fact that it can
encompass more kinds of implicated meaning compared to the localist view [6].
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Abstract. The paper discuses the status of the agent-relatedness of
German agent-oriented manner adverbials, based on a case study of the
adverbial sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’). We claim that their treatment as agent-
oriented is due to a mental-attitude-like component of their meaning, i.e.
they specify the content of the intention of an agent. The combination of
the mental-attitude and manner aspects in the meaning contribution of
the modifier is explained based on Goldman’s [7] theory of human action
as it provides a tool which can capture the meaning components of the
adverbial. The analysis is formalized in Frame Semantics as introduced
in Petersen [13] and Lo¨bner [10].
Keywords: lexical semantics · agent-relatedness · manner adverbials ·
frame semantics · actions.
1 Introduction
The investigation of adverbial modifiers sheds light on the semantics of events as
well as agentivity. Especially interesting with respect to these two issues are agen-
tive adverbials, such as agent-oriented and mental-attitude adverbials (cf. Ernst
[5] a.o.), which have been extensively explored in the literature. Nevertheless,
the exact nature of the agent-relatedness in connection to manner adverbials,
like the class of German agent-oriented manner adverbials, e.g. sorgfa¨ltig ‘ca-
refully’, vorsichtig ‘cautiously’, proposed in Scha¨fer [14], have been mostly left
aside as far as their agent-relatedness is concerned. These adverbials, however,
can provide us with new insights on the nature of manners of events as well
as the role of the agent. Hence, what we aim for in this paper is to clarify the
nature of the agent-relatedness of agent-oriented manner adverbials as well as
the impact of this relation on the manner of the modified event. We approach
this issue by analyzing the meaning contribution of such adverbials based on a
case study of the modifier sorgfa¨ltig (although sorgfa¨ltig is translated here as
carefully, the English adverbial has a broader meaning).
2 Proposal and Data
We propose that the modifier combines components characteristic of mental-
attitude as well as manner adverbials. Sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’) demands the par-
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ticipation of an intentional and controlling agent in the event and fixes the in-
terpretation of potentially intentional verbs or applies to ones which can only be
interpreted as intentional.1 Furthermore, the modifier imposes certain restricti-
ons on the agent of the modified action. We propose that these restrictions are
best captured by Goldman’s [7] ‘action-plans’ which are assumed to be at the
base of an analysis of intentional action.
2.1 Goldman’s treatment of (intentional) action
Goldman [7] o ers a multi-level view on human action (cf. also Lo¨bner [12]).
Although the author takes as a starting point the philosophical discussion on
act individuation, his theory is meant to be a cognitive one (cf. Goldman [8],
Lo¨bner [12]). Goldman [7], [8] assumes that the examples in (1) describe di erent
acts. More precisely, the author considers the examples as describing one doing
of an agent in the real world as a “combination of distinct act-tokens of distinct
act-types” (Lo¨bner [12]). The description is based on ways of categorizing acti-
ons, which are then seen as di erent levels in the conceptual representation (cf.
Lo¨bner [12]).
(1) (Example partly adopted from Goldman [7])
a. John flips the switch.
b. John turns on the light.
c. John wakes up Mary.
According to Lo¨bner’s [12] discussion of Goldman [7], there is one doing of John
out there in the real world, but this doing is conceptualized/categorized as a
complex relation between acts of di erent types (cf. Lo¨bner [12]). The acts are
ordered in levels and related by the so-called ‘level-generational’ relation. This
relation is a conceptual one: it applies at the ”level of conceptual representa-
tion, or categorization, of actions” (Lo¨bner [12]) and is based on the types of
the involved act-tokens. The relation is furthermore asymmetric, irreflexive and
transitive2 and can be expressed by the use of the locution ‘by’ (or ‘in’): John
turns on the light by flipping the switch (cf. Goldman [7]). The level-generational
relation captures that an act under suitable circumstances generates another act
of the same agent at the same time (cf. also Lo¨bner [12]).
The relation is actually quite intuitive: a waking up of Mary can be realized
in many di erent ways. The verb itself does not specify a single method but
depending on the circumstances of the action it could be realized by an act out
of a set of possible methods (turning on the TV, touching her, calling her, and
so on). Under some given circumstances, John uses the method of turning on
the light to realize the waking up of Mary. If the circumstances of his action do
not support the method, i.e. there is no bulb in the lamp, the act of flipping the
1 A similar assumption is made for mental-attitude adverbials by Buscher [2].
2 The generational relations, proposed by Goldman, capture di erent circumstantial
connections between acts of di erent types (cf. Lo¨bner [12]). Due to limitation of
space, we refer the interested reader to Goldman [7].
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switch do not have to enable the realization of the turning on of the light, i.e.
it does not generate the higher act. Likewise, John’s flipping the switch, under
circumstances, generates (is a method of) turning on the light.
That the single acts in (1) are not identical is indicated by the causal relations
between them (cf. Goldman [7] for a discussion of identity). The act of flipping
the switch can cause the light to go on, but the act of turning on the light does
not cause the flipping of the switch. Hence, the two acts do not have the same
properties, which they should if considered identical according to Goldman [7].
Goldman ([7]: 57) further proposes that an agent is acting intentionally only
if he has an action-plan which matches the realization of her action. This action-
plan consists of an action-want, i.e. the want to realize a certain act, and the
level-generational beliefs of the agent. The latter are understood as hypothetical
acts of an agent related by level-generation.
For an intuitive illustration of action-plans consider an example by Goldman:
John turns on the light by flipping the switch. If John is to turn on the light
intentionally, then he has to have the want to turn it on. This want is part of
his action-plan which causes his actual action (see Goldman [7]). Now, John can
further have di erent options for turning the light on, but as he decides to use
the switch, he believes that this method is going to realize the act he desires.
Hence, in order to act intentionally, John must have an action-plan consisting of
his want and a set of beliefs concerning the methods of realization of the target
of that want.
We propose, based on Goldman, that the content of the intention of the agent
is the target of her action-want. This intention then predetermines, according to
the level-generational beliefs of the agent, how it could be realized.3
2.2 Analyzing sorgfa¨ltig
According to our proposal, the modifier sorgfa¨ltig needs an intentional and con-
trolling agent to participate in the event. This means that an agent with an
action-plan has to be involved. Furthermore, the modifier imposes restrictions
on the manner of the event which we see as related to the content of the agent’s
intention.
The agent The assumption that an agent has to be present is already indicated
by the name of the class. However, it has never been discussed in detail whet-
her the involved participant is really to be seen as an agent. Similarly, mental-
attitude adverbials are assumed to require an agent too, but as shown by Buscher
[2], this is not always the case. Following her analysis, the subgroup of assimila-
tive adverbials, like widerwillig (‘reluctantly’), demand a controlling participant,
whereas intentional adverbials, like absichtlich (‘intentionally’), a participant ini-
tiating the event, but none of them demands a fully specified agent.4 Thus, it
3 The assumption also allows us to treat mental-attitude adverbials, as absichtlich
(‘intentionally’), as stating that an agent is acting with respect to her action-plan.
A detailed analysis of absichtlich is going to be presented in Gabrovska et al. [6].
4 See Buscher [2] for a discussion and supporting data.
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has to be clarified first whether an agent (an intentional, volitional, and sentient






















The examples in (2a) and (2b) show that sorgfa¨ltig cannot modify verbs denying
control as well as unaccusative verbs (they do not assign an agent role (cf.
Buscher [2]: 103  among others)), respectively. Example (2) speaks in favor of
the assumption that verbs modified by sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’) have to allow for an
intentional interpretation (or have only an intentional interpretation, considering






























‘The child cut the picture carefully.’
Example (3a) shows that zerschneiden (‘to cut’) can be done intentionally or
unintentionally. However, when the verb is modified by sorgfa¨ltig, (3b), only an
intentional interpretation is possible. Even if we have a context where a child
holds two pictures, one of his mother and one of his father, but is not aware that
she holds them both as the picture of the mother is on top of the picture of the
father hiding it completely. Now, if the child cuts sorgfa¨ltig the picture of her
mother, it cannot be said to cut sorgfa¨ltig the picture of her father too.
Altogether, the data presented so far supports the assumption that an agent
has to be present whenever the modifier sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’) is used. The exam-
ple in (3) indicate that when combined with verbs which can be either intentional
or unintentional, the modifier fixes the interpretation to the intentional variant.7
Hence, the involved agent is acting intentionally. We use Goldman’s action-plans
to capture and handle intentional action. Hence, whenever an agent is acting in-
tentionally, she is going to have an action-plan. This means that the agent has
5 We follow Van Valin and Wilkins [16] as far as the notions volition and sentience
are concerned.
6 The # signals oddness due to meaning, whereas the * symbol means ungrammati-
cality.
7 Buscher [2] states that mental-attitude adverbials, like absichtlich (‘intentionally’),
also fix the interpretation of verbs. We assume that this common feature between
the two classes is to be explained by the use of the same mechanisms.
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an action-want and chooses with respect to her beliefs the appropriate way of
achieving, i.e. generating, the desired act.
The result The agent, if supposed to act sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’), has to meet
some further requirements concerning her intention and the way her beliefs would
realize that intention.
The notion of ‘result’ as used here refers to the target of the action-want of
the agent, i.e. the desired act, not a produced object or a resulting event. Hence,










































‘We worked carefully, because we wanted to achieve bad results.’
Both examples verbalize the agent’s desire: achieving good/bad results. The
di erence in acceptability between (4a) and (4b) is due to the quality of the
result. Under normal circumstances a sorgfa¨ltig (‘careful’) action is unlikely to
be performed if the quality of the result is intended to be low. Assuming a
context where the agent actually desires to achieve bad results for some reason,







































‘We worked carefully, therefore our results are bad.’
Comparing (5a) and (5b) we see that it is the quality of the achieved results
which indicates the oddness of the latter. Data like this shows that a sorgfa¨ltig
action is more probable to lead to a “good” result.8 Although the example in
8 It has to be noted that gute Ergebnisse (‘good results’) or having good results is
not an act as required by Goldman ([7]: 52f). In accordance with the author, the
corresponding desired act is to achieve/gain good results.
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(5b), as (4b), is not completely uninterpretable, additional context is necessary
to make the sentence acceptable, whereas (5a), like (4a), is fine on its own.
This specification of the result as one with a high quality is, however, a

























‘John cleaned his room carefully but nevertheless spider webs hung from
the ceiling.’
Although the cleaning is said to be sorgfa¨ltig, the achieved result is not seen
as “good” enough. Such data indicates that the target of the agent’s want does
not have to be realized. Nevertheless, the cleaning itself is still intentional and
its method of implementation still suitable for the achieving of at least part of
the relevant aspects of the intended result. Furthermore, native speakers, when
confronted with such data, tend to assume reasons outside of the control of the
agent as an excuse. Hence, in the example above, the agent is assumed to be
unable to clean the spider web due to the height of the ceiling, for example. This
leads to the assumption that the quality of the result is measured with respect
to the abilities and control possibilities of the agent.
The method The inference of a “good” result evoked by sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’)
also depends on the manner in which the action is realized.
We call this manner component the method of realization of the desired
act and propose that abstract actions have more than one possible method of
realization. This assumption is in line with Lo¨bner’s [12] view on the lexical
meaning of action verbs, where Goldman’s perspective is adopted for concepts
constituting the lexical meanings of the latter.
Considering again Goldman’s [7] theory, the relation between acts is phrased
by the use of ‘by’ (translated as indem in German9). Hence, in the example John
turns on the light by flipping the switch by moving his hand, ‘by’ states that the
act of flipping the switch is the method of realizing the act of turning on the
light. This means that the act of flipping the switch is suitable for generating
the act of turning on the light under the given circumstances. Similarly, all more





































9 Not every use of indem (‘by’) signals a level-generational relation. Mere instruments
can also be introduced by the connector. For an analysis of indem see cf. Bu¨cking
[3].
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‘The turnips are cleaned carefully, by leaving them in water for several
minutes and then washing and brushing them down.’
Example (7) supplies the method suitable of realizing a sorgfa¨ltig cleaning.
The method is complex and consists of the sequential realization of three acts:
putting in water, washing, and brushing down. If one of these acts is left out, the
cleaning is no longer sorgfa¨ltig. Hence, not all methods implementing a cleaning
are available when an action is said to be sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’). This is not
unexpected, considering that the result of the action should have a rather high
quality. It is only natural that if a “good” result is expected, not every method
can guarantee high quality. Nevertheless, the number of possible methods is
usually not reduced to exactly one by the adverbial. Rather, the set of methods
implementing a certain action is specified more concretely and therefore reduced
in the number of elements compared to the set containing all possible methods.
Here again, the method and its suitability depend on the context in which the
action is performed. Existing (social) conventions and rules also have an impact
on the suitability.
3 The analysis
Bringing all the parts together we can state that sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’) demands
the participation of a controlling agent with the intention for a result with a high
quality. The modifier further relates this intention to the method suitable for the
realization. As the agent is acting intentionally, she is the one choosing which
method is suitable for the realization of her want with respect to her abilities as
well as the circumstances and conventions/standards holding at the moment of
realization and her knowledge of these.
3.1 The formalization
The proposal, as presented so far, is formalized in the framework of Du¨sseldorf
Frame Semantics, which adopts and develops Barsalou’s [1] proposal on the re-
presentation of knowledge in human cognition. The theory is based on the Frame
Hypothesis, which states that frames are the general format of representation in
human cognition (Lo¨bner [9]).
In this framework, frames are defined as recursive attribute-value structures,




0ahUKEwjo-KPH5o7ZAhXD1qQKHd3ACwQQ6AEIJzAA, last accessed 27.06.18,
11:52.
11 Sorts are seen as maximal types in a hierarchy of types (Lo¨bner [10]). Lo¨bner [10]
considers sorts an a priori part of his frame ontology, whereas types are derived from
sorts and attributes, e.g. ‘color’ is a sort, whereas ‘blue’ is a type.
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[13], Lo¨bner [9], [10], [11]). They can be represented as diagrams, attribute-
value matrices or in predicate logic. The manner of representation adopted here
are diagrams. Hence, a frame consists of nodes connected by arcs. The nodes
represent values, whereas arcs stand for attributes. As a frame is seen as a
description of an individual, there is a central node marked with a double line
standing for this individual. Furthermore, values of nodes are seen as belonging





























Fig. 1. Partial frame for ‘pencil’ based on Lo¨bner ([11]:4, Figure 1)
The frame in fig. 1 represents the standard kind of pencil with a wooden shaft
and a graphite mine. Thus, the central node of the frame is of type pencil.12
The pencil consists of a shaft and a mine, represented by the attributes shaft
and mine. The mine and the shaft nodes are connected with each other by the
two place attribute spatial relation. As frames are recursive structures, the
latter two nodes themselves can be represented as frames and have attributes as
material and form.
Goldman’s [7] considerations on human action are captured in frames by the
notion of cascades. Values of the nodes in a cascade are not individuals but
first-order frames describing acts (i.e. events) of di erent types; cascades are
second-order frame structures. The act-frames are related via a ‘c-constitution’
relation which is based on Goldman’s ‘level-generation’.13 The c-constitution
relation captures the fact that under circumstances an act can generate another
act of a di erent type.
The cascade in fig. 2 represents that under given circumstances (e.g. Mary
is sensitive to light, John knows that and there is a bulb in the lamp a.o.), the
act of flipping the switch by John constitutes the act of turning on the light by
the same agent. Likewise, the latter act constitutes the act of waking up Mary.
12 Node types are marked by bold font, whereas attributes by small caps.
13 See Lo¨bner [12] for a definition of ‘c-constitution’ as well as for a discussion of ‘level-
generation’.
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3.2 A model for sorgfa¨ltig
A frame representation capable of capturing the meaning contribution of sorgfa¨ltig
(‘carefully’) has to o er access to the intention of the agent as well as to the
action realizing that intention. Hence, both a plan and an action-realization
representation have to be available.
For this purpose we treat actions as involving a plan and a realization re-
presentation. This kind of representation is inspired by the analysis of causation
events in Kallmeyer & Osswald [15], where the standard template-based event
structure for causative verbs14, e.g. break, is represented in frames. Hence, the
frame in fig. 3 has as a central node an action with the attributes plan and exe-
cution which assign an action-plan, more precisely a level-generational beliefs
construction including the target of the agent’s want, and a physical realiza-
tion of an action respectively. As already discussed an action-plan as well as an
action are represented themselves as cascades. Thus, the values of the plan and
the execution nodes are cascades.
Following Goldman [7], an action is intentional if realized as conceived in the
agent’s action-plan. Hence, the plan and the action have to match. This means
that values of the action cascade nodes have to match the respective values of
the action-plan cascade. This is achieved by the use of a comparator15, which
checks whether the acts at a certain level have the same type or not. If they do
then the values match, otherwise not.
14 While Kallmeyer & Osswald [15] concentrate on the primitive CAUSE, we attend
to Dowty’s [4] DO. The di erence here is that we do not assume the agent to be
an argument of DO, but rather the agent’s action-plan (more details concerning the
formalization are going to be presented in Gabrovska et al. [6]).
15 Comparators are defined in Lo¨bner [10] as two-place attributes with arguments of
the same sort which return comparison values, for example ‘=’, ‘>’, and ‘<’ (not to
be confused with the relations these symbols as taken to denote). These attributes




The matching, however, does not have to occur for all levels of the cascade.
The result does not have to be actually achieved, but only desired. If the method
intended to implement the result is suitable and realized as conceived in the plan,
the agent’s action can be categorized as sorgfa¨ltig. It is, nevertheless, necessary
that the agent desires a result with a certain quality.
Sorgfa¨ltig further postulates restrictions on the target of the agent’s want
and the method of realization of that target. These restrictions are captured by
value constraints.16 The values of the highest node of the action-plan cascade are
constrained to high quality results. Such results cannot be intentionally achieved
by doing just anything, hence the restriction of result values leads to restrictions
on the method values, the lower nodes in the action-plan cascade. Constraints,










































Fig. 3. Connecting action and action-plan
Fig. 3 shows an example representation of a sorgfa¨ltig action. The agent is
acting intentionally, which is represented by the fact that Method on the right
hand side is congruent with the plan on the left. The restrictions the modifier
makes on the target of the agent’s want and the method of implementation
are constraints between the values of the two nodes connected by the c-const
relation in the action-plan cascade. As the methods of result implementation
match the realization, the restrictions imposed by the modifier are realized.
This means that the method is such that it can generate a sorgfa¨ltig sein (‘being
careful’) level in the execution track of the frame. The sorgfa¨ltig sein node is
16 Constraints are, following Barsalou [1], a means capturing the interactions of values
of attributes.
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a further categorization of the agent’s act (cf. Dowty [4]:114f on the agentive
reading of careful). The result component, if realized, is also generated by the
method and matches the intended result. The possibility that the result might
not be achieved is marked in the frame by the use of dashed lines.




























‘I cleaned my room carefully by vacuuming and removing all spider webs.’
Assume that John is the agent, who is cleaning sorgfa¨ltig according to his own
criteria and knowledge of the relevant conventions and rules. The method of
realization is complex and consists of saugen (‘to vacuum’) and Spinnweben
entfernen (‘to remove spider webs’). John’s desired act (the result to be achieved)
is to achieve that his room is well cleaned (clean+) and according to his beliefs
the chosen method can generate this act. The lowest level in fig. 3 stands for
the vacuuming and removing spider webs; the intermediate level represents the
cleaning, which is implemented by the vacuuming and removing spider webs;
on top, generated by the cleaning is the result achieve having well cleaned room
(as the result is achieved in this case the dashed lines should be normal lines).
The cleaning is further categorized as sorgfa¨ltig sein. As in this case plan and
execution match the comparator returns the value ‘=’ for each level.
4 Summary and Outlook
So far we have assumed that intentional agents have action-plans as proposed
by Goldman (1970) and that sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’) relates the desire and the
belief components of the action-plan in a specific way, stating that the method
chosen for the realization of the desire has to be suitable with respect to the
intended quality of the result. Hence, as a mental-attitude adverbial, sorgfa¨ltig
attributes an intention to the agent and at the same time, as a manner adverbial,
specifies how the action should be realized with respect to this intention. The
formalization of the proposal is realized in the framework of frame semantics as in
Petersen [13] and Lo¨bner [10] [12] and is capable of capturing agent-relatedness
as well as its impact on the manner components of events.
The tentative analysis presented here still leaves a number of open questions
for future work. But is has the potential of explaining the meaning contribution
of not only sorgfa¨ltig (‘carefully’). We assume that agent-oriented manner adver-
bials assign an intention to the participating agent and relate this intention to
the method of realization. The di erence between modifiers of this class is then
the content of the intention and its impact on the method of realization. Furt-
hermore, the meaning contribution of mental-attitude adverbials, like absichtlich
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Abstract. I argue that pronominal anaphora across mixed parafic-
tional/metafictional discourse (e.g. In The Lord of the Rings, Frodoi
goes through an immense mental struggle. Hei is an intriguing fictional
character! ) poses a problem for a workspace account. I evaluate di er-
ent possible solutions based on a descriptivist approach, Zalta’s logic of
abstract objects and Recanati’s dot-object theory.
Keywords: Metafictional statement · Workspace account · Anaphora ·
descriptivist approach · Abstract objects · Dot-objects.
Semanticists of fiction typically distinguish between (at least) three di erent
kinds of statements that contain fictional names (e.g. ‘Frodo’): In Recanati’s
[17] terminology, ‘fictional’, ‘parafictional’ and ‘metafictional’ statements. Fic-
tional statements are statements taken directly from some fictional work (e.g.
(1) from The Lord of the Rings). Parafictional statements are statements about
the content of a fictional work (e.g. (2) or (3) as found in a discussion on The
Lord of the Rings) that can be either ‘explicit’ (2) or ‘implicit’ (3), depending
on whether the ‘In fiction x,’-prefix is overt or covert. Metafictional statements
are statements about fictional entities as fictional entities (e.g. (4)):
(1) Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon.
(2) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo is a hobbit living in the Shire.
(3) Frodo is a hobbit living in the Shire.
(4) Frodo is an intriguing fictional character.
‘The workspace account’1 is a Stalnakerian approach to modelling fictional and
parafictional statements. In this paper I briefly introduce the workspace ac-
count (Section 1) and argue that pronominal anaphora across mixed parafic-
tional/metafictional discourse (henceforth ‘metafictional anaphora’) poses a
challenge for the workspace account (Section 2). I explore and evaluate three
di erent possible solutions based respectively on a descriptivist analysis of pro-
nouns (Section 3.1), Zalta’s abstract object theory [22, 23] (Section 3.2) and
Recanati’s dot-object theory [17] (Section 3.3).
1 For details, see Semeijn [18].
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1 Introducing the workspace account
In Stalnaker’s [19] widely adopted pragmatic framework, assertions are modelled
as proposals to update the ‘common ground’ (i.e. the set of mutually presup-
posed propositions between speaker and addressee). Previous attempts to extend
the Stalnakerian framework to fiction (Stokke [20] and Eckardt [3]) are compat-
ible with the consensus view of fiction interpretation (e.g. Currie [2] or Walton
[21]) that links fiction to the cognitive attitude of imagination (i.e. regular asser-
tions are mandates to believe and fictional statements are mandates to imagine).
Likewise, fictional statements are modelled as proposals to update an ‘uno cial’
common ground that is separate from the ‘o cial’ common ground.
The workspace account is compatible with Matravers’ [15] theory of fiction.
He argues against the consensus view that there is no special cognitive atti-
tude involved in our engagement with fiction. In fact, our primary engagement
with narratives – whether fictional or non-fictional – involves the same cognitive
processes. Likewise, in the workspace account, fictional statements and regu-
lar assertions are modelled as proposals to update the same temporal common
ground: the workspace. What di erentiates non-fiction from fiction is whether,
at the end of the possibly multi-sentence discourse, ‘assertive’ or ‘fictive closure’
is performed; Whether the content of the updated workspace is added to the
(o cial) common ground as belief (for non-fiction) or as parafictional belief (for
fiction) under the relevant fiction-operator. I present a simplified representation
of assertive closure of the assertion Trump is the president of the U.S. and of
fictive closure of (1). To represent the workspace and common ground, I use the
box notation of DRT (Discourse Representation Theory) developed by Kamp [9]


















Whether I am reading a fictional narrative (e.g. The Lord of the Rings) or a
non-fictional narrative (e.g. some article in The Times), I update the workspace
with the content of the narrative. As soon as I stop entertaining the proposi-
tions of a non-fictional narrative I perform assertive closure: I stop updating the
workspace (with e.g. Trump is the president of the U.S.), and instead update
the common ground with this information (i.e. I adopt it as belief). As soon
as I stop entertaining the propositions of a fictional narrative I perform fictive
closure: I stop updating the workspace with fictional statements (e.g. Frodo had
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a very trying time on a particular afternoon) and instead update the common
ground with parafictional statements based on the content of the workspace (e.g.
In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo had a very trying time on a particular after-
noon). Hence, after engaging with The Lord of the Rings all that I am left with
are parafictional beliefs about its content.
Parafictional statements such as (2) are modelled as regular assertions about
the content of a particular novel. Hence after engaging in parafictional discourse
we perform assertive closure; The content of the workspace is added directly to












Thus, you end up with parafictional beliefs both after engaging reading The Lord
of the Rings and after engaging in a conversation about its content. What di ers
in these two cases is the content of the workspace (i.e. whether you entertained
propositions about hobbits or about the content of a particular novel).
2 The challenge of metafictional anaphora
Metafictional statements are not modelled in the workspace account and
pose a problem. More specifically, pronominal anaphora across mixed parafic-
tional/metafictional discourse pose a problem. Consider the following felicitous
discourse:
(5) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodoi goes through an immense mental strug-
gle to save hisi friends. Ah yes, hei is an intriguing fictional character!2
The last sentence in (5) is a metafictional statement because it is about Frodo
as a fictional entity. As Lewis [12] argued, metafictional statements are not
covertly embedded under fiction-operators. For instance, the metafictional
statement in (5) does not express that in The Lord of the Rings, Frodo is an
intriguing fictional character. Instead, it is a proposal to directly update the
common ground (in bold) or, in other words, to perform assertive closure:










The metafictional statement in (5) contains a pronoun ‘he’ that is anaphoric
on the name ‘Frodo’ introduced in the preceding parafictional statement. Stan-
dardly, we take this to mean that the two terms co-refer because of the so-called
‘Anaphora-Coreference Principle’ (i.e. if a pronoun is anaphoric on a antecedent
name, the two terms co-refer). We represent this by equating their discourse ref-
erents (i.e. adding x = y to the common ground). However, following standard
DRT-rules, x is not accessible outside of the LOTR fiction-operator. Hence, it
is unclear how we can interpret metafictional statements such as the one in (5).
3 Comparison of di erent solutions
There are di erent strategies available to meet the described challenge. In this
section I discuss and evaluate a descriptivist approach (Section 3.1), an abstract
object account (Section 3.2) and Recanati’s dot-object account (Section 3.3).
3.1 A descriptivist approach: A description of Frodo
A possible solution to the described challenge in a traditional semantics frame-
work is a descriptivist approach to anaphora (e.g. Evans [5], Elbourne [4] or
Heim [8]). This analysis was originally proposed to account for donkey anaphora
without relying on a dynamic semantic approach. Consider the following donkey
sentence (6):
(6) If Sarah owns a donkey, she beats it.
Intuitively, the pronoun ‘it’ does not refer to a particular individual donkey but is
bounded by ‘a donkey’. However, it is outside of the syntactic scope of ‘a donkey’.
On a descriptivist analysis, the anaphoric pronoun ‘it’ functions like, or ‘goes
proxy for’, the definite description ‘the donkey’ retrieved from the preceding
clause. In Elbourne’s D-type account, this is because NPs at the level of syntax
undergo phonetic deletion (are not pronounced at the surface level) when in the
environment of an identical NP (e.g. My shirt is the same as his). Similarly, (6)
is in fact equivalent to (7):
(7) If Sarah owns a donkey, she beats the donkey.




When we apply this strategy to (5), the pronoun ‘he’ is also analysed as going
proxy for a definite description retrieved from the previous clause. However, (5)
cannot be the result of simple phonetic deletion of an identical NP. If it were,
(5) would be equivalent to something like (8):
(8) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo goes through an immense mental struggle
to save his friends. Ah yes, the person named Frodo in The Lord of the
Rings that goes through an immense mental struggle to save his friends,
is an intriguing fictional character!
This gives us an incorrect analysis of (5): A flesh and blood person cannot be
a fictional character. Rather, the required definite description is a metafictional
description such as ‘the character named Frodo in The Lord of the Rings ’ so
that (5) becomes equivalent to:
(9) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo goes through an immense mental struggle
to save his friends. Ah yes, the character named Frodo in The Lord of
the Rings is an intriguing fictional character!
Although, (9) gives an acceptable analysis of what is expressed by (5) it is unclear
how to obtain such a meta-description of Frodo from the preceding clause. More-
over, even if we assume that we can accommodate such a definite description for
metafictional anaphora, this solution does not extend to other types of mixed
discourse such as pronominal anaphora across mixed metafictional/parafictional
discourse (e.g. Frodoi is an intriguing fictional character. Ah yes, in The Lord
of the Rings hei goes through an immense mental struggle to save his friends! )
which would require accommodation of yet another type of definite description.
Hence, a descriptivist approach does not (as yet) adequately account for metafic-
tional anaphora; Simple phonetic deletion does not provide appropriate definite
descriptions and hence we need an account of how to accommodate these.
3.2 Abstract object theory: Frodo the abstract object
An alternative strategy is to claim that fictional names in parafictional and
metafictional statements refer to an object that is accessible in the main box.
For example, in applying his logic of abstract objects [22, 23] to fiction, Zalta
claims that parafictional and metafictional statements are about abstract objects
(i.e. Frodo the fictional character) that really exist.
Zalta distinguishes two types of objects: x is an ‘ordinary object’ (‘O!(x)’) if
it is, or could have been, concrete (e.g. a chair). x is an ‘abstract object’ (‘A!(x)’)
just in case it could not be concrete (e.g. the empty set). There are two distinct
kinds of predication: An ordinary object like a chair can ‘exemplify’ being red,
i.e. it has the property of redness. Zalta denotes this using standard predicate
logic notation: ‘red(c)’. An abstract object can also ‘encode’ properties which
means it has this property as one of its constitutive characteristics. For instance,
the empty set encodes the property of having no members. This is denoted with
the argument to the left of the predicate: ‘( )memberless’. Ordinary objects
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do not encode properties but abstract objects do exemplify properties (e.g. the
empty set exemplifies being well-discussed: ‘well-disc( )’).
A ‘story’ (e.g. The Lord of the Rings) is an abstract object that encodes the
content of a narrative; It encodes ‘vacuous properties’ or propositional properties
of the form ‘being such that P is true’, where P is a proposition that is true in
the story. A ‘fictional character’ is an abstract object that is native to a story
(e.g. Frodo or the One Ring, but not Napoleon).
Contrary to common practice, Zalta draws a strong distinction between ex-
plicit and implicit parafictional statements (e.g. respectively (2) and (3)). This
is because Zalta is a realist about fictional characters (i.e. they exist as abstract
objects) and hence we can talk about them as we do about ordinary objects (i.e.
without an ‘In fiction x’-operator or some type of pretense). A statement such as
(3) is thus actually not ‘implicit’ in the sense that is has a covert fiction operator.
Rather, it is a plain statement about what properties a certain abstract object
encodes: ‘(f)hobbit   (f)lives-in-Shire’. Explicit parafictional statements (e.g.
(2)) on the other hand do contain an ‘In fiction x’-operator. They are state-
ments about specific encoding and exemplifying relations between stories and
characters. For instance (2) expresses that The Lord of the Rings encodes the
property of being such that Frodo exemplifies being a hobbit that lives in the
Shire: ‘ LOTRhobbit(f)’. Metafictional statements are statements about what
properties fictional characters exemplify. For instance, the metafictional state-
ment in (5) expresses that Frodo exemplifies the property of being an intriguing
fictional character: ‘intr-fict-char(f)’.
Incorporating these ideas into the workspace account suggests a modification
of the fictive closure operation. Because of the strong distinction drawn between
the analysis of implicit and explicit parafictional statements, fictive closure can
in theory involve two di erent kinds of updates of the common ground. I present
a (simplified) representation of fictive closure* of (1) that includes updates of












As soon as I stop reading The Lord of the Rings, I update the common ground
with discourse referents for the newly introduced abstract objects (e.g. the
fictional character Frodo) and with (explicit and implicit) parafictional be-
liefs based on the content of the workspace (e.g. ‘ LOTRtrying-time(f)’ and
3 Zalta adds a theorem to his theory (‘(x)(s)(Native(x, s)   (F )(xF    sFx))’)
according to which, if some character x is native to some story s, implicit and
explicit parafictional statements about x necessarily follow from one another.
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‘(f)trying-time’). Importantly, not all propositional content of the workspace
is updated as parafictional belief simpliciter; Proper name conditions (e.g.
‘Frodo(x)’) are separated from the other conditions in the workspace and placed
in the main box.4 This represents the fact that the abstract object Frodo is also
named ‘Frodo’ outside of The Lord of the Rings.
In other words, I add an abstract object to the shared ontology for any
fictional entity that is introduced and is native to the relevant story. This means
that I incorporate Zalta’s metaphysical assumptions that entail the existence of
abstract objects in the actual world. It also means that after reading The Lord
of the Rings the discourse referent for (the abstract object) ‘Frodo’ is accessible
outside of the fiction-operator. This solves the challenge posed by metafictional
anaphora. To see how we have to first recognize that because Zalta draws a
strong distinction between implicit and explicit parafictional statements, the
challenge splits up in two sub-challenges: One of pronominal anaphora across
mixed explicit parafictional/metafictional discourse and one of pronominal
anaphora across mixed implicit parafictional/metafictional discourse. Our
central example up to this point (5) is an example of pronominal anaphora
across mixed explicit parafictional/metafictional discourse. I represent the
common ground based on the parafictional statement in (5) and the proposed








Next, we can rewrite (5) so that it is an example of pronominal anaphora across
mixed implicit parafictional/metafictional discourse:
(10) Frodoi goes through an immense mental struggle to save hisi friends. Ah
yes, hei is an intriguing fictional character!
I represent the common ground based on the parafictional statement in (10)
and the proposed metafictional update (in bold) as follows:
4 Alternatively, we can model this as a doubling of the proper name condition so that










As the formalisms show, in both cases the discourse referent x for ‘Frodo’ is
accessible outside of the LOTR fiction-operator. Hence we can equate the dis-
course referents for ‘Frodo’ and ‘he’ and interpret the metafictional statements
in (5) and (10).
Although this analysis seems to straightforwardly solve the problem of
metafictional anaphora, on closer inspection Zalta’s analysis of explicit parafic-
tional statements is problematic. Remember that (2) expresses that the abstract
object The Lord of the Rings encodes the vacuous property of being such that P
(where P is the proposition that Frodo exemplifies being a hobbit that lives in
the Shire). P is supposedly true according to The Lord of the Rings. However, the
name ‘Frodo’ refers to an abstract object and hence it is true according to The
Lord of the Rings that the abstract object Frodo exemplifies being a hobbit that
lives in the Shire. This seems problematic; First, how can an abstract object ex-
emplify being a hobbit or living in the Shire? These are the kind of properties that
abstract objects encode. Moreover, intuitively The Lord of the Rings is a story
about flesh and blood hobbits, not a story about what properties certain abstract
objects exemplify or encode.5 Hence, any analysis according to which fictional
names that occur under a fiction-operator refer to abstract objects, seems prob-
lematic. Therefore, although an abstract object account solves the sub-challenge
of pronominal anaphora across mixed implicit parafictional/metafictional dis-
course, it runs into di culties with the sub-challenge of pronominal anaphora
across mixed explicit parafictional/metafictional discourse. The only way to solve
this problem seems to be to allow for some kind of ambiguity in the name ‘Frodo’
so that it refers to a flesh and blood individual when it occurs in the fiction op-
erator and to an abstract object when it occurs outside of the fiction operator.
This strategy is explored in the next section.
3.3 Dot-object theory: The di erent facets of Frodo
A di erent available strategy to solve the problem of metafictional anaphora is to
claim that parafictional and metafictional statements are about di erent kinds
of objects (e.g. Currie [2] or Kripke [11]), i.e. we do not add y = x to the common
ground when interpreting (5) and hence there is no accessibility problem.
Prima facie, the admissability of pronominal anaphora across mixed parafic-
tional/metafictional discourse forms a problem for such an account because of
the Anaphora-Coreference Principle. However, Recanati ([17]) argues there are
apparent counterexamples to this principle. Take the following sentence:
5 A similar concern has been voiced by Klauk [10].
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(11) Lunchi was delicious, but iti took forever (adapted from Asher [1, p.11])
The pronoun ‘it’ is anaphoric on the noun ‘lunch’ of the preceding clause. How-
ever, ‘lunch’ and ‘it’ do not co-refer; ‘lunch’ refers to food (which was delicious)
and ‘it’ refers to a social event (which took forever). Following Recanati, we
can save the Anaphora-Coreference Principle by appealing to the notion of a
so-called ‘dot-object’ (See e.g. Pustejovsky [16], Luo [13] or Asher [1]), i.e. “a
complex entity involving several ‘facets’ ” [17, p.15]. The noun ‘lunch’ is polyse-
mous (i.e. it can refer to food or a social event) and hence denotes a dot-object
(represented as food • social event) involving several facets (i.e. a food facet
and a social event facet). Thus, in (11) ‘lunch’ and ‘it’ do actually co-refer (i.e
to the dot-object lunch), but the predicates ‘being delicious’ and ‘taking forever’
apply to di erent facets of the object (i.e. respectively to the food facet and to
the social event facet).
According to Recanati, fictional names are also polysemous (i.e. they can
refer to flesh and blood individuals or to abstract objects) and denote dot-objects
(e.g. the name ‘Frodo’ denotes the dot-object flesh and blood individual •
abstract object). In metafictional statements the name ‘Frodo’ refers to the
dot-object Frodo through its abstract object facet. In parafictional statements
(both explicit and implicit) the name ‘Frodo’ refers to the dot-object Frodo
through its flesh and blood individual facet.
Importantly, our concept6 of the abstract object facet of Frodo “contains
both nuclear information (the properties encoded by the fictional character) and
extranuclear information (the properties exemplified by the fictional character)”
[17, p.23]. What nuclear properties it contains is determined by our concept of
the flesh and blood individual facet of Frodo (i.e. the concept of the abstract
object facet contains a ‘pointer’ to the concept of the flesh and blood individual
facet). In other words, Recanati includes Zalta’s distinction between encoding
and exemplifying properties (relevant for the abstract object facet of Frodo)
and agrees that what properties are encoded is determined by our parafictional
knowledge. But, whereas for Zalta Frodo the abstract object encodes just those
properties that according to The Lord of the Rings Frodo the abstract object
exemplifies; for Recanati, the abstract object facet of Frodo encodes just those
properties that according to The Lord of the Rings the flesh and blood individual
facet of Frodo exemplifies.
Applying Recanati’s analysis to the workspace account suggests an adjust-
ment of the fictive closure operation: At fictive closure we update the common
ground with discourse referents for dot-objects for any newly introduced fictional
character. These can be referred to as dot-objects (x), through their flesh and
blood facet (x1) or through their abstract object facet (x2):
6 In order to avoid metaphysical assumptions about the existence of multifaceted dot-
objects, Recanati suggests that the correct objects of study are in fact dot-concepts
(i.e. concepts of dot-objects) rather than dot-objects. In the DRS’s below, a discourse












Hence, x1 as it appears in the parafictional statement, refers to the dot-object
Frodo but through its flesh and blood individual facet.
A dot-object analysis of fictional characters solves the challenge posed by
metafictional anaphora. Consider again our central example (5). I represent the
common ground resulting from the parafictional update in (5) and the proposed







As the formalism shows the discourse referent x (predicated over through its
abstract object facet in z = x2) for ‘Frodo’ is accessible outside of the LOTR
fiction-operator. Hence we can equate the discourse referents for ‘Frodo’ and
‘he’ and interpret the metafictional statements in (5). Although the solution is
formally very similar to the solution o ered by an abstract account it avoids the
problem identified with it because the name ‘Frodo’ in the explicit parafictional
statement refers to the dot-object Frodo through its flesh and blood facet rather
than to an abstract object.
Although a dot-object account of metafictional anaphora seems promising,
some of the details still need to be worked out. First, as Recanati himself also
notes ([17, p. 17, n.11]), the metaphysical status of dot-objects is unclear; Should
we think of a dot-object simply as a pair consisting of two facets, i.e. x =  x1, x2 ?
Must all facets of a dot-object exist in order for the dot-object to exist? These
questions are especially pressing in the case of fiction where one of the facets of
the dot-object (i.e. the flesh and blood individual facet) does not exist. Second,
it is not obvious how the crucial di erence with an abstract object account (i.e.
referring to a dot-object through di erent facets versus referring to an abstract
object using di erent kinds of predicates), should be formalized. Whereas using
the same argument (x) in the formalisation of metafictional and parafictional
statements fails to show the di erence, using di erent arguments (x1 and x2 as in
the DRS above) suggests that fictional names in parafictional and metafictional




I have argued that a workspace account of fictional and parafictional statements
runs into di culties with metafictional anaphora because the discourse referent
for the fictional name introduced in the parafictional statement is not accessi-
ble outside of the fiction-operator. I have evaluated three di erent accounts of
metafictional anaphora: A descriptivist approach (that requires an additional
account of how to accommodate appropriate definite descriptions), an abstract
object account (that o ers a solution to the problem of metafictional anaphora
but wrongly analyses explicit parafictional statements as being about abstract
objects) and a dot-object account (that solves the aforementioned problem but
remains unclear on some crucial parts).
In this paper I have primarily focussed on pronominal anaphora across mixed
parafictional/metafictional discourse. In fact, pronominal anaphora could oc-
cur across all possible types of mixed discourse with fictional, parafictional and
metafictional statements (though some possibilities seem unlikely to actually
appear such as pronominal anaphora across metafictional/fictional discourse).
Eventually, an adequate account of fictional names will have to give the right
predictions for anaphora across all acceptable types of mixed discourse (rather
than only being able to account for statements in isolation).
More specifically, it would be interesting to extend the described accounts of
metafictional anaphora to certain problematic cases. For instance, suppose that
apart from The Lord of the Rings Tolkien also wrote an alternative story (The
Lord of the Schmings) in which the character Gimli (a dwarf in The Lord of the
Rings) is an elf. I could then felicitously say:
(12) In The Lord of the Rings, Gimlii is a dwarf but in The Lord of the
Schmings, hei is an elf.
This is an example of pronominal anaphora across parafictional statements about
di erent narratives. Intuitively, although the pronoun ‘he’ is anaphoric on the
name ‘Gimli’, the terms do not refer to the same Gimli since he is ascribed
inconsistent (individual-level) predicates in the two di erent narratives. This is
reminiscent of both the phenomenon of counterfictional imagination (See e.g.
Friend [6]) and Geach’s Hob-Nob puzzle:
(13) Hob thinks a witchi blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob thinks shei killed
Cob’s sow. (adapted from Geach [7])
Here the pronominal anaphora occur across two di erent propositional attitude
reports and although the pronoun ‘she’ is anaphoric on ‘a witch’, there need
not be one particular witch that is the object of thought of both Hob and Nob.
Future research will have to determine how to account for (12) and determine its
relation to other puzzles. A possible strategy, in Recanati’s dot-object account,
would be to claim that ‘he’ and ‘Gimli’ in (12) refer to a dot-object with three
or four di erent facets: two for the flesh and blood facets for Gimli the dwarf
and Gimli the elf and one or two abstract object facets (depending on whether
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Perspective blending in graphic media
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Abstract. This paper discusses the representation of perceptual events
in comics. I present “blended” pictures in which the experiencing charac-
ter and her non-veridical perception are both represented from an exter-
nal perspective in a single image. Inspired by Abusch & Rooth’s (2017)
analysis of free perception sequences and their modelling of veridical and
non-veridical perception, I develop some proposals to model interpreta-
tion of non-veridical perception in blended pictures. I also discuss to what
extent blended-perspective pictures are parallel to free indirect discourse
in literature.
Keywords: picture semantics · pictorial narrative · perception · mental
states · perspective shifting
1 Introduction
Is it possible for someone to have full access to another individual’s perceptual
experience? This may sound as fiction in real life, but in fiction, it is a common
phenomenon. The pictures below, taken from Grant Morrison’s comic book Joe
the Barbarian and the cartoon BoJack Horseman illustrate this:
Fig. 1. (a) Image from graphic novel Joe the Barbarian, by Grant Morrison. (b) Snap-
shot from Bojack Horseman animated series, season 1 episode 11 Downer Ending.
In figure (1a), we see a character surrounded by his own hallucinations: here,
Joe’s toys have come to life. But the character is also depicted, which implicates
that a narrator can ‘see’ both the character and his hallucinations from some
external position. Similarly, in (1b), the protagonist, Bojack, depicted on the left
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of the picture, is under the influence of drugs and sees himself in the mirror as
a real horse. We can simultaneously see Bojack and the image of himself in the
mirror as he perceives it. I will call such instances “blended-perspective” or sim-
ply “blended” pictures, as they allude to the narrator’s geometrical perspective
from which the scene is projected, but also to the character’s internal reality or
epistemic perspective.1
In this paper, I present some proposals to deal with blended pictures in visual
narratives by using tools from semantic theories applied to language. In section
2, I give an overview of previous work on semantics of pictures; in section 3, I
discuss three ways to analyse blended pictures; finally, in section 4, I conclude
and point out some issues for further research.
2 Background
Pictures convey their own content. This has led to the development of semantic
analyses of pictures in recent work (see Greenberg 2011, Abusch 2012, 2015,
Abusch & Rooth 2017). These approaches extend the possible worlds semantic
framework to pictures, based on the idea that, like sentences in language, pic-
tures express propositions, i.e. sets of worlds. Greenberg (2011) suggests that
the content of a picture is the set of scenes (i.e. worlds at a time and a location)
the picture accurately depicts. Accordingly, a picture is an accurate depiction
of a scene if it can be derived from the scene by specific rules of geometrical
projection.
In general, geometric projection is defined as  {w, v, l,M} = p, meaning
that a world w (at time t)2 is projected to picture p from viewpoint v given a
marking rule M and a line projection rule l.3 The main idea is that the content
of a picture p is a set of worlds relative to a geometrical viewpoint. In other
words, the content of a picture p is a set of pairs consisting of a world and a
viewpoint:
 p M,l = { w, v | (w, v, l,M) = p} (1)
Before moving to their analysis of looking events, I will say a few words about
how discourse referents are identified in pictures. I follow Abusch’s (2012) analy-
sis of co-reference across panels. Abusch uses a Discourse Representation Theory
framework to model co-reference of individuals in picture sequences. The reader
1 Note that the term “blending” as used here is di erent from the notion of “blending”
as used in cognitive semantics literature.
2 The time parameter t is neglected in the formalisations, but “world” will refer to a
“world at a time”.
3 M and l are parameters of geometrical projection. More specifically, l determines the
projection lines from a viewpoint v towards a scene and M determines how points
in the picture plane are to be marked with respect to the projection lines and the
scene. For more details, see Greenberg (2011), Abusch (2015). Except for formula
(1), I will not include these parameters in the following formalisations in order to
keep things simple.
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distinguishes certain areas in the picture that correspond to the story charac-
ters. Discourse referents are made out of these areas. Identity relations between
discourse referents across pictures are then formalised as identity predications
between these areas. Abusch suggests that co-reference is done at a post-semantic
level, that is, identity between areas in pictures is determined pragmatically and
is not part of the literal content of a picture.
Within a geometrical projection framework, Abusch & Rooth (2017) analyse
free perception picture sequences. Their analysis is directly relevant for the data
presented here. A free perception sequence (p, q) is a sequence in which one
picture (p) depicts a character looking at a scene and the other one (q) - the
free perception panel - depicts the scene looked at, as if directly through the
character’s eyes. Figure (2) is an illustration of a free perception sequence:
Fig. 2. A free perception sequence. (taken from Big Nate, by Lincoln Peirce)
A crucial distinction is that between veridical and non-veridical looking
events. In the case of veridical looking events, the free perception panel has
an extensional interpretation: it shows what the “base world” looks like from
the character’s geometric perspective, as in the picture above.4 On the other
hand, in the case of non-veridical perceptual events, the free perception panel
depicts what the character sees but that may not correspond to how the base
worlds looks like. This happens in cases of misperception, for example, when
the protagonist hallucinates. This is shown in figure (3). Bart is looking at a jar
which is actually empty, but what he sees instead is a dead fairy.
The authors propose covert syntactic embedding for free perception panels,
inspired by natural language embedding structures.5 More specifically, they pro-
4 I assume that the “base world” corresponds to the objective representation of the
fictional world by the reliable narrator. In pictorial narratives, as opposed to lan-
guage, there is not always a verbal narrator. In the absence of a verbal narrator, I
assume an impersonal narrator or a camera eye. How the notion of the narrator in
visual media should be construed is a matter of debate in narratological studies. I
will not take a stance on this debate here, but no matter how a narrator is construed,
I take the default visual observer to be a reliable one. Therefore, the base world is
the representation of the fictional world according to that reliable observer.
5 They also suggest that extensional free perception panels can be analysed as top-level
conjuncts but this option will not be discussed here.
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Fig. 3. A non-veridical free perception sequence. (taken from Bart Simpson’s Treehouse
of Horror, by Kyle Baker)
pose syntactic embedding of the free perception panel under a covert operator
P , a see-predicate. This is illustrated in figure (4). The authors propose the
following logical form for embedding cases (here simplified):
w, v,O |= p d [1[P q]] (2)
Fig. 4. An embedding structure for a free perception sequence (p, q).
Abusch & Rooth use a dynamic semantics framework. The above formula
expresses a satisfaction clause where the tuple on the left of the turnstile satisfies
the sequence (p, q) on the right. w is a world, viewpoint v is the viewpoint for
the last picture of the sequence and O is a sequence of individuals onto which
the discourse referents are mapped. On the right side of the turnstile, p and q are
the two pictures and d is a discourse referent with index 1 introduced in picture
p. According to the intensional LF (2), q is syntactically embedded under the
covert operator P that takes the index introduced by the discourse referent as
its subject. This means that w looks like q from agent d1’s perspective, but the
base world may or may not look like q.
Note that this LF also allows for an extensional interpretation, as is the
case in natural language embedding structures with verbs like see or believe. To
capture ambiguity, the authors distinguish between veridical and non-veridical
looking events: l(x, q) and m(x, q) respectively, that both translate into “x looks
at a scene that projects to picture q from x’s perspective”, but the di erence
between them is that m has a precondition that the base world does not actually
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look like q, only x sees it as q. Roughly, the idea is that an embedding structure
entails that the agent has looked and that w looks like q from his perspective,
but the base world might either look like q (therefore the world ends up with
a veridical looking event l) or it may not look like q (hence the world ends up
with a non-veridical looking event m).
Overall, the authors o er a neat proposal in order to allow for both exten-
sional and intensional interpretations in free perception sequences. In the follow-
ing section, I will use the main idea of their proposal to account for blended-
perspective pictures.
3 Perspective blending: exploring solutions
3.1 First proposal: Splitting & viewpoint-shifting
Although Abusch & Rooth’s (2017) analysis can account for free perception
sequences, it is not clear how it could work for pictures like (1a): these seem
like free perception sequences that are merged or blended into a single image.
In this section I explore the idea of “unblending” such pictures by turning them
into free perception sequences, and following a similar embedding as proposed
in Abusch & Rooth (2017).
When seeing pictures like (1a), and of course based on the previous narrative,
we infer that the scene surrounding the figure of the protagonist, call him j,
reflects not the ‘objective’ world of the fiction, but the subjective world of the
protagonist, that is, the world as perceived by the protagonist. In that case, I
assume that the reader re-analyses the picture as something similar to a free
perception sequence in the following way. First, a picture p is covertly split in
two parts resulting in a sequence of two pictures: the first picture, call it p1,
contains the figure of the character, and the second picture, p2, includes the
whole scene. I postulate a splitting function f whose definition is given below
and results in the sequence shown in figure (5).
Definition 1. A splitting function f applied to picture p yields a sequence of
two pictures p1 and p2: f(p) = (p1, p2), where p1 includes the figure of a salient
discourse referent and p2 includes the whole scene.
How does this splitting take place, that is, how is each picture determined
to contain what it contains? Since Joe is the salient protagonist in the preced-
ing narrative, I assume that the covert splitting is the result of some pragmatic
mechanism that can isolate a figure corresponding to a salient discourse referent
and separate this from the rest of the picture (see the discussion on discourse
referents in section 2). Joe is the salient protagonist of the story, the most promi-
nent individual around whom the story revolves, thus, it is his epistemic state
that is relevant for the interpretation of the non-veridical content of picture p.
The sequence created by the splitting function is not yet a free perception
sequence: the second panel represents an external, third-person perspective, not
an internal, first-person one. In order to use an intensional operator like Abusch
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Fig. 5. Output of splitting function f : p1(left), p2 (right)
& Rooth’s, we have to adjust the perspective of the second picture, p2, because
we want to capture the fact that the world in p2 is the world as perceived by
the character. In order to accommodate this, we can hypothesise that a second
function operates which adjusts the current, external viewpoint to the character’s
viewpoint. The result is a set of hypothetical pictures with a first-person, internal
perspective (i.e. a set of free perception panels), that ‘match’ the content of p2.
The reason why the viewpoint-shifting function results in a set of pictures
and not in a unique picture is because we do not really know what the character
precisely sees: we just come to imagine what the world would look like from his
point of view, therefore many pictures could be compatible with what he saw.
Suppose picture (6a) below is the initial, external-perspective picture. Pictures
(6b) and (6c) depict two possible worlds viewed from the character’s eye location.
Picture (6d) does not depict a possible world: in (6a), there is no big blue rabbit
between the cube and the triangle. On the other hand, from picture (6a) we
cannot see what the character sees precisely, therefore there could be nothing
between the cube and the triangle (picture 6b) or there could be some small
rabbit that is not visible from above (picture 6c). Hence, the viewpoint-shifting
function gives us all and only the scenarios that match with picture (6a).
Fig. 6. (a) External (third-person) perspective picture. (b), (c), (d) Internal (first-
person) perspective pictures.
The main idea is that a world can be represented from di erent viewpoints. In
our case, this means that p2 and the output pictures are di erent representations
of the reality as perceived by the character. To make this precise, we abstract
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away from viewpoints and use the definition of the uncentered content of a
picture p (see Rooth & Abusch 2017):
 p   = {w |  v. (w, v) = p} (3)
In words, the uncentered content of a picture p is the set of worlds w such
that from some viewpoint v they are projected onto p.
Now we can give the definition of the viewpoint-shifting function:
g(vj , p2) = { (w, vj) | w    p2  } (4)
Function g applies to the viewpoint of the discourse referent j introduced
in p1, i.e. vj , and to picture p2, and shifts the viewpoint of p2 to vj , yielding
a set of first-person perspective pictures representing worlds that belong to the
propositional, uncentered content of p2. More simply, the output of g is a set of
pictures {q1, q2...qn}.
What we have now is actually a set of free perception sequences, whose
first panel is p1 and the second panel is a member of the output set of g, i.e.
{q1, q2...qn}. The remaining process is as proposed in Abusch & Rooth (2017),
namely embedding each member of the set {q1, q2...qn} under an intensional
operator P .
The proposal presented in this section is somewhat complex as it involves
di erent steps. Is there a more simple analysis to model interpretation of blended
pictures? In the following two sections, I consider two more ways.
3.2 Second proposal: Perspective blending as free indirect
discourse?
A di erent approach would be to regard blended pictures as instances of free
indirect discourse. In this section, I explore this idea.
Free indirect discourse is a literary style through which a character’s thoughts
and perceptual experience are represented with the mediation of the narrator’s
voice. This “intermediate mode” (McHale 2011) creates ambiguity as it is not
clear if the point of view expressed is the narrator’s or the character’s. The
usual pattern in free indirect discourse is that pronouns and tenses behave as in
indirect discourse and reflect the narrator’s perspective: third-person pronouns
refer to the character(s) and past tenses refer to the character’s present (at least
in English). The rest of the expressions, such as temporal and locative adverbials
(now, here), reflect the character’s perspective (for a thorough overview of the
expressions used in free indirect discourse, see Banfield 1982). For an illustration,
see the example below:
(1) Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another schoolweek! (Lawrence,
Women in Love, p. 185, as cited in Banfield 1982: 98)
In this example, tomorrow refers to the day following the day where the
protagonist is temporally located, while the past tense was is anchored to the
narrator’s context.
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Certain studies in the field of narratology discuss possible parallels of free in-
direct discourse in graphic novels and films (for example, Forceville 2002, Mikko-
nen 2008, Gha ary & Nojoumian 2013). According to these studies, analogues
of free indirect discourse in comics and/or in films are to be found in instances
where the reader/viewer cannot determine whether what is represented visually
(but also aurally in the case of films and animation) corresponds to the nar-
rator’s or the protagonist’s perspective. For instance, free perception panels in
comics and ‘point-of-view’ shots in film are taken in certain cases as possible
parallels to free indirect discourse whenever they create ambiguity. But can this
be supported semantically?
In semantic literature, di erent analyses are proposed about the status of
free indirect discourse (see Banfield 1982, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt
2014, Maier 2015, among others). Here I will remain agnostic as to which analy-
sis is the most tenable. What is of special relevance is the behaviour of indexical
expressions in free indirect discourse, which seems to be one of its defining char-
acteristics. In standard discourse, the context of utterance is responsible for
the interpretation of all indexical expressions such as first- and second-person
pronouns, and also temporal and locative adverbials like here and now. Direct
discourse can be considered a context-shifting mechanism because all expressions
in a direct discourse report refer to the context of utterance being reported. By
contrast, as mentioned above, in free indirect discourse, indexicals do not be-
have uniformly. This could lead to the assumption that free indirect discourse is
basically a context-shifting mechanism for certain expressions.
Now, let’s move to pictures. Here, there is no visual parallel of context-
dependent linguistic expressions like temporal adverbials. However, change in
the geometrical perspective of a picture is change in the locational point of
reference, so this could be considered parallel to context-shifting. Free perception
sequences involve change of perspective from one picture to another, so they can
be viewed as instantiations of context-shifting. On the other hand, single pictures
like (1a) do not involve any shifting as for a single picture there is by default only
one corresponding viewpoint from which the whole scene (the character and the
rest) is depicted (unless there are other embedded pictures).6 Hence, pictures
like (1a) do not seem to be semantic parallels to free indirect discourse if this
split of indexicals is its defining feature.
However, in line with the observations in narratological studies, as far as the
e ect on the reader is concerned, blended pictures seem to convey the same am-
biguity as passages in free indirect discourse do. More specifically, free indirect
discourse reports are usually ‘free’ in that they are not embedded under an atti-
tude or saying verb. Of course they can include a parenthetical verb indicating
6 One general remark should be made. Throughout a graphic narrative, there is con-
tinuous switching between multiple viewpoints. However, I reduce my discussion to
two viewpoints in order to refer to two broader notions: a) an external viewpoint that
corresponds to the possibly multiple locations in space-time that the narrator can
take, and b) an internal viewpoint that corresponds to a protagonist’s first-person
perspective.
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whether the sentence is a speech or thought event (example 2 below), but only
optionally. The absence of such a verb (example 3) may make the reader wonder
if what is described is ‘uttered’ by the narrator and is therefore true in the story,
or if the sentence only represents a character’s thought or perceptual experience.
See the examples below:
(2) It was seven o’clock, he thought.
(3) It was seven o’clock. (examples from Banfield 1982:205)
The same challenge is placed onto the reader of a graphic novel when seeing
(1a): is this picture a representation of the actual world in the story or is the
character hallucinating?7
To sum up, regarding the e ect on the reader’s interpretation, blended pic-
tures have a similar impact as passages in free indirect discourse in novels and
they too appear to be ‘syntactically free’. Nonetheless, from a semantic point of
view, such a view cannot be supported. In the following section, I will discuss a
more plausible analysis.
3.3 Third proposal: Blended pictures as indirect discourse
In this section, I will explore an alternative analysis that makes use of an inten-
sional belief-operator.
Instead of following the decompositional approach presented in section 3.1,
we can suggest a simpler analysis. Pictures like (1a) can be regarded as parallel
to indirect thought reports in language like “Joe thinks that he is surrounded by
superheroes”. In indirect discourse in written/spoken language, the narrator’s
perspective in the embedded clause is reflected through the use of the 3rd person
pronoun. Something similar happens in pictures like (1a): the protagonist is also
represented from a third-person perspective in the image. I assume that via
inferential reasoning the reader will come to realise that what is going on in
the picture is actually a hallucination. Inspired by Eckardt (2014), I assume a
‘cautious update’ for blended-perspective pictures (Maier & Bimpikou 2018).
The idea behind cautious update is that, even in normal, non-fictional dis-
course, we do not always update the common ground directly with the proposi-
tional content p of a sentence. If, for example, we consider the speaker confused,
we take p to be part of the speaker’s belief state only and not to form part of
the shared common ground. Thus, instead of updating the common ground with
the set of worlds where proposition p is true, we update with the proposition
that the speaker believes that p.
Extending this to fictional discourse, a cautious update may take place when-
ever the reader assumes that a certain proposition is not true in the world of the
fiction but true according to a protagonist, i.e. true in the protagonist’s belief
7 Ambiguity can be resolved through text, but here I just consider cases where no
captions are included.
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or imagination worlds. When seeing (1a), the reader infers that the protago-
nist hallucinates and so she has to perform a cautious update, i.e. embed the
propositional content of the picture under an intensional belief-operator bel.
The update will result in interpreting the picture as something like “Joe believes
that he is surrounded by superheroes”. This results in the picture being inter-
preted as depicting the character’s subjective world and not the actual world of
the fiction. More generally, for a picture p and a salient protagonist j, beljp is
true i  for all worlds w    Belj (where Belj is j’s belief state), w     p   (here
we use the uncentered, classical propositional content as defined in formula 3).
Should we appeal to a di erent operator, e.g. an imagination operator img?
It should be remarked that imagination is di erent from hallucination or, more
generally, faulty perception. When imagining, for example, when engaging in
role playing or when daydreaming, we do know that our imaginary worlds are
di erent from the actual, real world. On the other hand, in the case of faulty
perception, there is no such awareness on the part of the perceiver. Therefore,
imagining is distinct from misperceiving: the first involves the (aware) construc-
tion of a mental representation on the part of the agent, whereas misperception
involves no distinction on her part between the actual and the imaginary world.
Hence, when misperceiving, the agent actually believes that what she perceives
is true. This is why a belief operator seems more appropriate. What is common
in both imagining and believing though is that there are two di erent ‘layers’,
the external and the internal reality. As for how the perceiver’s awareness of the
distinction between actual and mental is conveyed in each case through pictures,
there seems to be a di erence in marking in comics, as illustrated contrastively
in figure (7). The blended picture (1a) is repeated in (7a); figure (7b) is a made-
up image where the character appears instead with a thought bubble. Thought
bubbles are conventionally used for imaginings and thoughts, so the most nat-
ural interpretation for figure (7b) would be that Joe is consciously thinking or
imagining something. By contrast, for hallucinations there is no overt marking
enclosing the character’s perception and we can either have blended pictures (fig.
7a) or free perception panels (fig. 3).8 So figures (7a) and (7b) seem to prompt
di erent interpretations. Any particular choice (overt embedding with a bubble
or non-embedding) has a significant e ect on the reading process and conse-
quently on the reader’s interpretation. This makes the prediction that a picture
with a thought bubble should be unambiguous, whereas pictures like (7a) can
be ambiguous: a reader might fail to understand that what is represented in the
picture is true only in the character’s mind.
Although I mainly discuss single pictures, it is very common in comics to have
sequences of blended pictures spanning a large part of the narrative, as in Bill
Watterson’s comic series Calvin and Hobbes. What would be the most satisfac-
tory proposal from the ones suggested so far, also from the point of view of cog-
nitive processing? According to the first proposal, the reader has to re-imagine
the scene from a first-person perspective. The indirect discourse approach in-
8 For a detailed discussion on speech and thought bubbles in comics and a somewhat
di erent approach to their relation to “awareness”, see Cohn (2013).
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Fig. 7. (a) Blended picture. (b) Picture with a thought bubble.
volves the insertion of a belief operator without applying extra operations such
as a viewpoint-shifting mechanism. For sequences of blended pictures, we may
assume that these are grouped together as a constituent and that the intensional
operator scopes over the whole constituent. This is also relevant for animation
and film. Consider the movie Fight Club or the episode of Bojack Horseman
(fig. 1b) where Bojack hallucinates. It is hard to imagine how splitting and re-
orienting suggested in 3.1 for pictures could be applied in continuous shots. For
animation, we could suggest that the intensional operator could apply at the
level of a whole scene (taking a scene to correspond to a series of successive
shots that represent a certain spatio-temporal slice of the fictional world).
Overall, blended pictures can be paralleled to indirect discourse reports in
language. That makes the indirect discourse analysis more appealing because it
can apply to both pictorial and linguistic data.
4 Discussion
In this paper, I discussed perception representation in graphic narratives, mainly
comics, and I focused on depictions of characters that are surrounded by their
hallucinations. These data are similar to free perception sequences in that they
also depict de se experience and therefore can also represent non-veridical percep-
tion. Unlike free perception sequences though, our data are single pictures. Our
goal was to build on Abusch & Rooth’s (2017) account in order to include these
data as well. I proposed two ways to analyse blended pictures (sections 3.1 and
3.3) and suggested that a third option, namely comparing blended-perspective
pictures to free indirect discourse (section 3.2), is not a tenable approach.
An interesting case is the representation of di erent kinds of perception in
visual narratives. For instance, dreaming is a kind of perceptual experience that,
on the one hand, is not exactly like thinking or conscious imagining and, on the
other hand, it is not exactly like hallucination or misperception. The following
questions arise: first, how are di erent kinds of perceptual experience conveyed
in pictures and how are representations of perceptual events di erent or simi-
lar across di erent media? secondly, how are distinct perceptual phenomena in
pictures to be modelled semantically? For instance, to the extent that hallucinat-
ing and misperceiving are di erent from dreaming, should we appeal to di erent
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kinds of modal operators in the mental representations of blended-perspective
pictures?
A di erent question is whether the above observations can be tested exper-
imentally. I already suggested that blended pictures and pictures with bubbles
represent di erent kinds of perceptual experience especially with respect to how
they encode the agent’s awareness of the imagined content. Do di erent ways
of representation cause significant di erences in readers’ interpretations as was
suggested in section 3.3? These issues are left for future work. I hope to have
pointed out some interesting directions for further research.
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Abstract. This paper considers how to derive free relatives — e.g. John
eats [DP what Mary eats] — in Minimalist Grammars. Free relatives
are string-identical to indirect questions — e.g. John wonders [CP what
Mary eats]. An analysis of free relatives as nominalised indirect questions
is easy to implement, but empirical evidence points instead to wh-words
reprojecting in free relatives. Implementing a reprojection analysis in
Minimalist Grammars requires innovations to revise the stipulation that
the probe always projects the head, and to allow features to be reused
non-consecutively.
1 Introduction
This paper considers how to derive free relatives (FRs) (1) in Minimalist Gram-
mars (MG) [15, 17]. Section 2 illustrates MGs with an analysis of indirect ques-
tions (IQs) (2), which are string-identical to FRs. An analysis of FRs as nom-
inalised IQs is easy to implement, but the evidence presented in Sect. 3 points
instead to wh-words reprojecting in FRs [7]. In order to implement a reprojection
analysis of FRs, I propose two innovations to MG in Sect. 4: one, a Reproject
operation that revises the stipulation that the probe always projects the head;
and two, feature recycling, a way for features to be reused non-consecutively. I
explore these innovations in Sects. 5 and 6 before concluding in Sect. 7.
(1) John eats [DP what he eats].
(2) John wonders [CP what Mary eats].
2 Minimalist Grammars, Indirect Questions,
and Free Relatives
An MG analysis specifies a lexicon, pairing words with ordered lists of syntactic
features. Matches between the first elements in these lists license applications of
the structure building operations Merge and Move. We write t[f ] when the head
of a tree — found by following the headedness arrows > and < down to a leaf
node — has a sequence of syntactic features whose first element is f, and t for
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that tree with feature f erased. Merge (3) is licensed by matching category X
and selector =X features on the head of a pair of trees t1 and t2. If the selector
t1 is lexical, it is linearized to the left < and t2 is called the complement;
otherwise t1 is linearized to the right > and t2 is called the specifier. Move (4)
is licensed by matching probe +x and goal -x features on a tree t1 containing
a subtree t2. The probe t1 takes as a specifier the maximal projection of t2,
t2M , which is made phonetically null in its original position.1 The matching
features that license Merge and Move are checked and deleted. Note especially
that the selector/probe t1 projects the head, whose remaining features drive
further structure building.
(3) Merge (t1[=X], t2[X]) = <
t1 t2
if t1 is lexical, >
t2 t1
otherwise.
(4) Move (t1[+x]) = >
t2M t1
· · · {t2[-x]M    } · · ·
An uncontroversial analysis of indirect questions (IQs) (2) can be imple-
mented in MG with the lexicon in (5), illustrated with derivation (6) and derived
(7) trees.
(5) John :: D Mary :: D wonders :: =Q =D V eats :: =D =D V
  :: =V C   :: =V +wh Q what :: D -wh
(6) Merge
  :: =V C Merge
Merge
wonders :: =Q =D V Move
Merge
  :: =V +wh Q Merge
Merge
eats :: =D =D V what :: D -wh
Mary :: D
John :: D











In two Merge steps, eats checks its =D selector features against the category
D features of what, thenMary. Omitting consideration of the tense layer, the null
question complementiser   :: =V +wh Q merges next. Move checks +wh against
-wh to complete the embedded question. Construction of the main clause ends
with the null complementiser   :: =V C of the start category C.
The lexicon in (5) cannot derive free relatives (FRs) (1). Substituting eats
for wonder does not converge, since eats selects for a complement of category
D, not Q. A simple solution supplements the lexicon with   :: =Q D — a null
D that selects a Q complement. Merge of   :: =Q D with the output of Move
in (6) converts the IQ from category Q to D, which eats can then take as its
complement. Several versions of this null head analysis of FRs have been pro-
posed, e.g. [11, 12]. However, as shown in the next section, there is a good deal
of evidence against it.
3 Dual Role of Wh-words in Free Relatives
On the null head analysis, the derivation of a FR proceeds via an IQ of category
Q. Projecting Q and merging   :: =Q D seals o  the wh-word inside the IQ,
preventing it from informing the rest of the derivation. However, the evidence
suggests that the wh-word itself is the head of the FR, since the behaviour of a
FR is keyed to the wh-word that forms it. This section shows that this is so for
category distribution and case matching.
First, FRs distribute with the category of their wh-word (8), cf. [1]. A FR
with what (1) distributes as a DP; but FRs formed with where distribute as PPs
rather than DPs (8a), and those formed with how as AdvPs in not being able
to intervene between a verb and its object (8b). On the null head analysis, this
would require null, Q-complement-taking lexical items of many categories, e.g.
  :: =Q P,   :: =Q Adv. And even then, nothing would enforce category matching
between the null lexical item and the wh-word inside the FR, as required to
rule out (9); in other words, we would expect mixtures like what :: D -wh and
  :: =Q P to be grammatical.
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(8) a. i. Mary put the book [PP on the shelf] / [PP where she keeps it].
ii. *Mary put the book [DP the shelf] / [DP what she built].
b. i. John speaks [AdvP quickly] / [AdvP how you speak].
ii. *John takes [AdvP quickly] / [AdvP how you write letters] notes.
(9) *Mary put the book [DP what John built].
Second, in languages with morphological case, e.g. German [13], the wh-
word in a FR must satisfy the case requirements of both the relative and matrix
clauses. (10) is grammatical, since the nominative wh-word is the subject of the
FR, which is the subject of the sentence. But (11) is ungrammatical due to the
competing case requirements placed on the wh-word inside the FR, where it is
an accusative object, and the FR as a whole, which is the nominative subject of
the sentence. This conflict cannot be resolved — neither the accusative nor the
nominative form of the wh-word will do. Since the null head analysis involves
two distinct lexical items of category D — what and   :: =Q D — it o ers no















‘Who is not strong must be clever.’
















‘Who God has created weak must be clever.’
Matches between FRs and their wh-words in distribution and case argue
that the moving wh-word itself projects the head of FRs to determine their
behaviour in the rest of the derivation. A number of researchers have reached this
conclusion [1, 3, 6, 7]. However, the reprojection analysis directly contradicts the
standard stipulation that a probe always projects over the goal it attracts to its
specifier [5]. This stipulation is built into the definition of Move in (4), meaning
MG cannot accommodate a reprojection analysis of FRs without amendments.
The next section proposes a way to overcome this stipulation and implement a
reprojection analysis of FRs in MG.
4 Implementing Reprojection in Minimalist Grammars
This section seeks to implement a reprojection analysis of FRs in MG. It does
so by proposing two innovations: (i) Reproject, a new structure-building opera-
tion that revises the stipulation that the probe always projects; and (ii) feature
recycling, a way for the category feature of the wh-word to be reused in the face
of the resource sensitivity of MG. Consequences of these innovations and further




In revising the stipulation that a probe always projects, I propose to add Repro-
ject to MG’s inventory of structure building operations. We want Reproject to
apply as in (12), reversing headedness to make what the head, thereby allowing
what to determine the future of the derivation; and deleting the category feature
Q, which would otherwise be left unchecked and cause the derivation to crash.2








A general definition of Reproject is given in (13). A unary operation apply-
ing to a tree with specifier t1, head t2, and complement t3, Reproject switches
headedness to t1 and deletes the category feature of t2, leaving t3 unchanged.






However, the way Y is checked without matching another feature in (13)
would make Reproject very di erent from Merge and Move, which symmetrically
check pairs of matching features.3 Reproject is defined symmetrically in (14),
where it applies to a tree where a reprojection feature *Y on the specifier t1
matches the category of the head t2. Both features are checked, and headedness
switches to t1. Using (14) means adding reprojection features *Y to the inventory
of syntactic features, and FR-specific reprojecting versions of wh-words to the
lexicon; e.g. what :: D -wh *Q, where :: P -wh *Q.4






2 The question of what features are on what in (12) is postponed to the next subsection.
3 Even with persistent features [16], as discussed in the next subsection, while checking
is not necessarily symmetric, structure building is still licensed by pairs of matching
features.
4 Wh-clustering [10] — see Sect. 5.3 below — provides a precedent for Reproject
in being triggered by a feature on a specifier rather than a head. Clustering also




However, as things stand the outcome of (14) has no features. t1 is the head,
but all its features have been checked en route to it becoming the specifier of t2.
In deriving the FR in (1), what :: D -wh *Q has its D checked by Merge with
eats, -wh by Move, and *Q by Reproject, rendering its feature list empty, i.e.
what :  . The next subsection proposes a way for category features to be reused
so that the wh-word can serve as the head of FRs after Reproject.
4.2 Feature Recycling
In order to account for the matching e ects observed in Sect. 3, we would like
what to play a dual role in deriving (1) by contributing its category feature twice:
first as complement to eats ; then again after Move and Reproject to categorise
the FR. However, MG structure building is resource sensitive: the matching
features that license Merge and Move are checked and deleted. D of what :: D
-wh *Q is expended in Merge with eats, and is subsequently unavailable.
Endowing what with a second D feature ordered after -wh and *Q, i.e.
what :: D -wh *Q D, (cf. where :: P -wh *Q P) invites the same empirical chal-
lenges as the null head analysis: with two separate category features, nothing
enforces category and case matching between FRs and their wh-words. Instead,
we would like one and the same D feature to contribute twice to the derivation.
Persistent features are an existing innovation that allow category features
to be used multiple times [16]. Merge continues to be licensed symmetrically
by matching features, but persistent features (underlined F) do not have to
delete. Persistent features were motivated for implementing the movement theory
of control [8], allowing the same D to occupy multiple argument positions by
satisfying multiple =D features. However, persistence in what :: D -wh *Q does
not help in deriving FRs, since the two desired uses of D are non-consecutive.
Move and Reproject must apply after Merge of what with eats but before what
categorises the FR. Hence D would have to delete to allow Move to be triggered
by -wh before having the chance to provide the category of the FR.
I therefore propose feature recycling. Beyond persisting at the head of a list,
features can live on in the derivation by cycling to the end of the list after
licensing Merge. Feature recycling allows the D of what :: D -wh *Q to play a
dual but non-consecutive role, as shown in the derived tree of the FR from (1) in
(15). After licensing Merge with eats, D cycles to the end of the feature list; and
after Move checks -wh and Reproject checks *Q, the recycled D is back at the
head of what ’s feature list to serve as the head of the FR. The diagram in (16)
summarises the di erences between standard resource sensitive feature checking,









what :: D -wh *Q




Thus we have implemented a reprojection analysis of FRs, cf. [1, 3, 6, 7]. How-
ever, the analysis has come at the cost of two innovations. The first, Reproject,
reverses headedness to the wh-word and deletes the category feature of the em-
bedded clause, which would otherwise be left unchecked and cause a crash. The
output of Reproject would lack any features were it not for the second innova-
tion, feature recycling, which provides a way for the wh-word’s category feature
to be reused non-consecutively as the head of the FR. I explore these innovations
further in the next two sections.
5 More on Reproject
This section considers the Reproject operation in greater detail, with discussion
of the location of the triggering feature, Reproject’s relationship to Move, and
multiple-wh FRs.
5.1 Wh-word Trigger
This subsection attempts to justify making the wh-word the trigger for Repro-
ject. Whereas we could have put the triggering feature *Y on the head that is
reprojected over, the definition of Reproject in (14) has the triggering feature on
the wh-word, e.g. what :: D -wh *Q. The argument is based on the complement
restriction on FRs. Wh-words can only form FRs if they lack a complement, as
shown by the ungrammaticlity of (17).
(17) *John eats [DP what food Mary eats].
This restriction is much easier to state if the wh-word is the trigger for Re-
project. We can exclude from the lexicon wh-words with both a selector feature
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and a Reproject feature, e.g. *what :: =N D -wh *Q. By the time   :: +wh Q
interacts with the wh-word in the Move step, on the other hand, it is unable to
discriminate between a wh-word with or without a complement; in either case
the wh-word will now have -wh as its first feature, =N having long since been
checked. Since the relevant information to distinguish between good FRs and
(17) is not available to   :: +wh Q, the complement restriction on FRs argues
that the wh-word should trigger Reproject.
However, this conclusion is provisional. Much stronger evidence would be
cases of wh-words reprojecting over lexical items other than   :: +wh Q. Only
then could we be sure that the wh-word is the trigger for Reproject, rather than
the head reprojected over.
5.2 Reprojecting Move
Reproject as in (14) involves the heads what :: D -wh *Q and   :: =V +wh Q. It
is licensed symmetrically by matching between the reprojection feature *Q and
category feature Q. But the two heads match in more than Q — they also match
for wh. In Sect. 4.1, wh was checked by an application of Move before Reproject.
But nothing said there enforces the co-occurrence in a lexical item’s feature
list of a Move licensee like -wh and a Reproject trigger like *Q. If Reproject is
always fed by Move, we would be missing a generalization. Instead, we could
recast Reproject as a version of Move, as in (18).
(18) Reprojecting Move (t1[+x Y]) = <
t2M t1
· · · t2[-x *Y]M     · · ·
The definition in (18) enforces a dependency between Move licensees and
Reproject triggers. Continuing to assume that the wh-word is the trigger for
Reproject, we could further strengthen the dependency between moving and
reprojecting by collapsing Move licensing and Reproject triggering into a single
feature, *-x. The reprojecting lexical item what :: D *-wh would then trigger
Reprojecting Move, as defined in (19).
(19) Reprojecting Move (t1[+x Y]) = <
t2M t1
· · · {t2[*-x]M    } · · ·
However, the definition in (19), reintroduces the asymmetry problem from our
first definition of Reproject in (13). The category feature Y on t1 is asymmet-
rically checked, deleting without having matched with another feature. Beyond
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this technical point, I cannot see how to decide between (18) and (19) as the
definition of Reprojecting Move.
More generally, Reprojecting Move raises problems regardless of which of
(18) or (19) we choose. For one, it increases the size of the ‘moving window’ on
feature lists from one to two. Whereas Merge (3) and Move (4) apply based only
on the first feature of the head, Reprojecting Move requires sight of the first
two. A second problem might be that we have to restate all the restrictions on
Move for Reprojecting Move, like the shortest move constraint and islands. Thus
while reducing redundancy in enforcing a dependency between Move licensees
and Reproject triggers, Reprojecting Move might increase redundancy elsewhere
in the system. However, redundancy only arises to the extent that movement as
it feeds reprojection is subject to the same constraints as ordinary movement. If
empirical investigation finds it to be subject to di erent constraints, we would
have a strong argument for Reprojecting Move as its own operation. As with
the previous subsection, we end by wondering whether wh-words reproject over
lexical items beyond   :: +wh Q.
5.3 Clustering and Reproject
Languages with overt multiple-wh movement to Spec,CP — like Bulgarian and


















‘I have given you the things that needed to be installed in the appropriate
place at the appropriate time.’
Multiple-wh FRs distribute with the category of the topmost wh-word — D
in (20). In terms of an MG analysis of wh-clustering [10], this means there is
a dependency between Reproject triggers and Move licensees, but not Cluster
licensees. Working with the definition of Reproject in (14), the lexical entries for
the wh-words in (20) would be ce :: D  wh -wh *Q, unde :: P  wh  wh and
caˆnd :: P  wh. The reprojection trigger *Q co-occurs with -wh, not the Cluster
licensor  wh or licensee  wh.
6 More on Reusing Features
Section 3 emphasised matches between FRs and their wh-words match in order
to argue that the moving wh-word projects the head of FRs. Section 4.2 proposed
feature recycling as a way for the wh-word’s category feature to be reused to
implement a reprojection analysis of FRs. This section explores ways in which a
FR and the wh-word that forms it can behave di erently — if only very slightly.
Slight di erences regarding case syncretism, complement/adjunct where FRs,
and A-bar features suggest that the notion we need may not be recycling but
refreshing, returning to the lexicon to pick another list of features compatible




Despite the disucssion of case matching in Sect. 3, I have yet to mention case
features. In MG, all lexical items of categoryD also bear a k(ase) feature -k. The
ungrammaticality of (21) shows that -k must recycle along with D in deriving
FRs, since the FR as a whole must be in a case position.
(21) *It seems [DP what John eats] to be nice.
English wh-words do not di er morphologically for case,5 which might sug-
gest a generic -k feature for English rather than more articulated -nom, -acc, etc.
Support for generic -k comes from the lack of case matching e ects in English
FRs. (22) is grammatical, despite the wh-word being assigned accusative inter-
nal to the FR, while the FR is nominative in the sentence overall. This contrasts
with the German mismatch from Sect. 3, repeated here as (23).
(22) [DPNOM WhatACC John ate] killed him.































‘Who is not strong must be clever.’
For English, then, we can say that generic -k of what :: D -k -wh *Q is licensed
inside the FR by a case-assigner, recycled along with D, and licensed again by
another case-assigner in the main clause. In German, on the other hand, the
morphological di erences among wh-words for case might suggest lexical items
of category D di er among -nom, -acc, etc. In (24), wer :: D -nom -wh *Q is
licensed for nominative inside the FR, recycled with D in forming the FR, and
licensed again for nominative in the main clause.
Switching between -acc and -nom is ungrammatical in (23), but this is not
always the case in German for a FR configuration that mixes nominative and
accusative. Such mismatches are possible when there is case syncretism, as in













‘What you have cooked is moldy.’
Starting with was :: D -acc -wh *Q inside the FR, we cannot switch to
was :: D -nom -wh *Q in the main clause via feature recycling, incorrectly
predicting (25) to be bad. We could salvage feature recycling by changing our
assumptions about case features, claiming that there is only one lexical item
was :: D -nomacc -wh *Q whose underspecified -nomacc case feature can be
5 I set aside whom as an archaism.
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checked by either a nominative or accusative case-assigner. Alternatively, we
could account for (25) by refreshing rather than recycling the features of was.
After moving to specifier position and reprojecting, was :: D -acc -wh *Q has
exhasted its list of features. Rather than pre-empting this problem with feature
recycling, was :   could refresh its features by reaching back into the lexicon
for a list of features compatible with its morphological form. This refreshed list
could be slightly di erent — including -nom rather than -acc in deriving (25).
While either underspecified -nomacc or feature refreshing would account
equally well for German case syncretism, refreshing appears to be the only plau-
sible option for the topic of the next subsection.
6.2 Complement vs. Adjunct Where Free Relatives
The previous subsection showed that syncretism allows wh-words and the FRs
they form to di er in case. This section argues that sycretism also allows di er-
ences in category.
Following a prominent analysis of adjunction in MGs [9], PPs have very
di erent categories depending on whether they appear in complement or adjunct
position: where :: P -wh is a complement to verbs like put :: =D =D =P, whereas
where ::  V -wh adjoins to category V, which continues to be the head. In
(26), where is an adjunct to eats inside the FR, while the FR as a whole is
a complement to put. Thus where has di erent category features internal and
external to the FR, which would not follow from feature recycling.
(26) Mary put the book [PPcomp wherePPadj John eats ].
It is di cult to countenance an underspecification analysis among two dif-
ferent feature lists for where along the lines of underspecified -nomacc in the
previous subsection. That leaves us with feature refreshing: in deriving (26),
where ::  V -wh is exhausted to where :   in deriving the FR, before refreshing
as where :: P -wh for the main clause.
6.3 A-bar features
Whether features are recycled or refreshed, A-bar features are not reused. Despite
being headed by a wh-word, a FR cannot itself undergo wh-movement, as in (27).
(27) *[DP What John eats] does Mary eat t?
Unlike category and case features, which play a dual role in deriving FRs,
-wh is definitively consumed in moving what inside the FR, so would have to
be barred from recycling. In terms of refreshing, meanwhile, we could say that
features are refreshed based on the non-wh part of the word, assuming decom-
position of e.g. German wer into wh w - + -er nominative D.
Yet FRs can embark on other A-bar movements, e.g. topicalisation in (28).
(28) [DP What John eats], I eat t.
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Still, the movement in (28) cannot result from reusing a feature. Assuming
topicalisation is licensed by -top, it must be added to the FR after it has been
fully formed: while the FR as a whole is topicalised in (28), the wh-word does
not undergo topicalisation inside the FR, so -top cannot have been present on
what at the start of the derivation. The opposite behaviour of -wh and -top in
being active only internal vs. external to the FR tracks the di erence between
intrinsic vs. optional features [4, p. 231].
7 Conclusion
This paper set out to derive FRs in MG. Reviewing category and case matching
e ects motivated implementing a reprojection analysis. Doing so came at the cost
of two innovations. Reproject, a new structure-building operation, revised the
stipulation that the probe always projects. The technical questions of whether
the trigger is the wh-word, and whether Reproject is a special case of Move, rest
on the empirical question of whether wh-words reproject over lexical items other
than   :: +wh Q. Feature recycling provided a way for the category feature of
the wh-word to be reused nonconsecutively as the head of the FR in the face of
the resource sensitivity of MG. The slight relaxation of matching e ects where
there is syncretism suggested features might be refreshed rather than recycled,
though A-bar features cannot be reused.
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